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30 Ind. 378

Cross v. Wood

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided November 15, 1868

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1868-11-15

<p>Surety. — Guarantor.—Extension of Time. — An agreement, inado while the interest law of 1865 was in force, by a creditor with the principal debtor, without the consent of the surety or the guarantor, to give a limited time after the debt became due, in consideration of the payment in advance 'of four per cent, in excess of six per cent, interest, released the surety and the guarantor.</p>

Relies on Harbert v. Dumont · Redman v. Deputy

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1868-11-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently February 1981

6 state decisions

401868187018801890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Gregory, J.

¶1Suit by the appellant on a promissory note and guaranty thereof against John (Wood, Jr., Oliver Wood, John Wood, Sr., and Nathan Wood.

¶2John Wood, Sr., was a surety, and Nathan Wood the guarantor. The defense successfully set up by them in the court below was, that the payee, knowing the relation of the parties to the note as principals and sureties, made an agreement with the principals to give three months time, in consideration of the payment in advance of four per cent, usurious interest, or four per cent, in excess of six per cent., without the knowledge or consent of the sureties.

¶3The note was executed March 18th, 1865, due fifteen months after date. The suit was commenced on the 3d of October, 1867. The trial was had on the 21st of September, 1868. The contract to give time was made in the month of January, 1867.

¶4At the time this contract was made the act of December 19th, 1865 (Spec. Sess. 1865, p. 176), was in force. By that act, the contract to pay'more than six per cent, interest was void as to the excess, but money voluntarily paid could not be recovered back, directly or indirectly.

¶5It is claimed that Harbert v. Dumont, 3 Ind. 346, is not good law; and that Redman v. Deputy, 26 Ind. 338, is not in poiut from the fact that in the latter case there was a payment of legal as well as usurious interest in advance.

¶6The taking of usury is not malum in se, but only malum prohibitum. By the law in force when the contract for *379delay was made it was not unlawful to take usury in advance.

T. J. Merrijidd and W. II. Galldns, for appellant.S. I. Anthony, F. Church, S. F. Perkins, L. Jordan, and S. F. Perkins, Jr., for appellees.

¶7The statute making the taking of usury a misdemeanor was repealed by the act of March 7th, 1861 (2 G. & H. 657, sec. 10). By the act of March 9th, 1867, it is provided, that all interest exceeding the rate of ten per centum per annum shall he deemed usurious and illegal as to the excess only. This was the law in force at the time of the trial, and by it, it was not usurious to take ten per cent, interest in advance. The validity of the agreement for the delay must, however, be tested by the law in force when the contract was made.

¶8The evidence given on the trial in the court below is-in the record, and by it, it is clear to our minds that substantial justice was done; and that there is no available error in the record.

¶9The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

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