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30 Mass. 284

Wilbur v. Crane

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided October 15, 1832

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1832-10-15

<p>Assumpsit on a promissory note, dated May 28, 1826, signed by the defendant as promisor, payable to Samuel Wilbur or bearer, for the sum of 200 dollars, on demand with interest, attested by Samuel Wilbur junior.</p> <p>At the trial before Shaw C. J. at April term 1831, it appeared in evidence, that Samuel Wilbur junior, who was a deputy sheriff, had a warrant issued by Cyrus Lotbrop, on the complaint of a married woman, Tylee Lincoln, the wife of Amos Lincoln, on the bastardy act, charging the defendant with being the father of her bastard child. When the officer went with the warrant to arrest the defendant, he was authorized by the complainant to settle with the defendant, and for that purpose he took a receipt signed by the complainant. The officer testified, that when he saw the defendant, he informed him of the purpose of his call; that thereupon the defendant expressed his willingness to settle the demand and to give his note for 200 dollars ; and he thereupon signed the note in question. He expressed an earnest desire that the business should be kept secret. The witness also testified, that the note was prepared and taken by him ; that it was made payable to his father, the plaintiff, or bearer, because the witness was told that it would not do to malte it payable to the complainant, she being a married woman; that his father had no knowledge of the transaction, no interest or concern in the matter, and no notice of the proceeding, but that his father had previously authorized him to take obligations and notes in his name, and bring actions in his name, when it suited his convenience; that when he took the note, he offered to give the defendant Tylee Lincoln’s receipt for the money and discharge from further claim, but that the defendant declined taking it, lest the possession of it should expose him to an action by Amos Lincoln, but that he requested the officer to keep it for him, which he did, and he had it still; but it was not produced.</p> <p>He further testified, that he made no return of the warrant until since the commencement of April term 1831 of this Court, when he returned it to Lothrop with a certificate of his proceedings thereon.</p> <p>It further appeared, that Tylee Lincoln had been deserted by her husband, about three years before the trial, that he had left her very destitute, had made no provision for her since, and was reputed to be living in adultery with another woman.</p> <p>It further appeared, that after the commencement of this action a release was executed by Amos Lincoln to the defendant, “ of and from all actions and cause or causes of action whatsoever &c., and particularly from any claim, demand, or complaint whatsoever arising for or by reason of any alleged intercourse with my wife, and from any charge for the maintenance of any child of which my wife is said now to be pregnant.”</p> <p>It further appeared, that after this suit had been some time pending, the defendant sent a notice to the plaintiff, that he was desirous of having a trial; whereupon the plaintiff said that the defendant did not owe him any thing, and that he knew nothing of any note or suit against the defendant.</p> <p>Upon these facts the question was, whether the plaintiff had a right to recover.</p> <p>The cause was argued in writing.</p>

Decided 1832-10-15

Wilde J.

¶1delivered the opinion of the Court. In deciding this cause, we have not thought it necessary to consider and determine all the questions which have been raised and argued by the learned counsel, but have confined our consideration to those alone which appear to be most important, and which are decisive of the merits of the case.

¶2The action is assumpsit on a promissory note of hand, and the defence is, that the note is void for want of consideration ; or if not, that it has been legally released and discharged.

¶3It was proved on the trial, that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the giving of the note at the time, and had no interest or concern in the matter. He is a mere nominal party, and sues for the use and benefit of one Tylee Lincoln, the wife of Amos Lincoln, to whom she had been married for a long time previous to this transaction. If any consideration was given for the note, it was given by her.

¶4The first consideration relied on by the plaintiff’s counsel is, that the note was given to compromise a process com*289meneed by Tylee Lincoln against the defendant, on the bastardy act, (St. 1785, c. 66,) and that the process was accordingly no further prosecuted.

¶5The second, that the defendant was discharged from all further liability by Tylee’s receipt, which receipt, though not received by the defendant, was given to the officer for his use, and was retained in the hands of the officer by his request.

¶6The objection made to the first mentioned consideration is, that the process was. void, and could not be maintained without joining the husband. This objection appears to the Court to be well-founded. The rule, that no action can be maintained by or against a feme covert, appears to be of universal application; we are not aware of any exception. The husband and wife are considered in law but as one person. There is allowed but one will between them, which .s placed in the husband. This may be a technical and artificial rule, but the Court have no power to dispense with it for that reason. And there seems to be no good exception to it, if we had the power. If the wife were allowed to sue alone, the defendant, if he should recover judgment for costs, might have no sufficient means to secure payment, which would be unjust. For as the husband would be entitled to the money if the wife should recover judgment, he ought to be responsible if she should fail.

¶7But it has been argued, that this case is an exception to the general rule, or does not fall within it, first, because the process is in some respects in the form of a criminal prosecution. But we consider the form of process immaterial ; the suit is in substance and effect a civil suit ; as much so, as it would have been if the remedy provided were a special action on the case. The object of the suit is to recover damages up to the time of the judgment, and security for subsequent damages and expenses.

¶8Secondly, it is said that the statute expressly provides that the mother of a bastard child may prosecute, and that feme-coverts are comprehended in this provision. It may be so, but we give no opinion on this point. . Whatever nay be the construction of the statute in this respect, it is *290not to be presumed that there was any intention to interfere with or change the rights of the husband as established by law. The form was adapted to the cases which were chiefly, if not solely, intended to be provided for ; and besides, the language of the statute does not prohibit the joining the husband, and the rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication. By the statute of wills (1783, c. 24,) it is provided, that all persons of full age and of sane mind may dispose of their real estates, as well by last will and testament in writing, as otherwise by any act executed in his or her lifetime. It was, however, decided in the case of Osgood v. Breed, 12 Mass. R. 530, that a married woman, although within the words of the statute, was not authorized, during coverture, to make a devise of her lands, because, say the Court, “ it was not the design to alter the relation between husband and wife, or the legal effect of that relation.” And there is much less reason, or appearance of reason, in the present case, for supposing that the legislature intended to alter the legal effects of that relation, by the statute in question.

¶9But it is again argued, that if the husband should have joined in the process, the non-joinder was only matter of abatement, and that the process was not void. We consider it, however, immaterial whether the process was void, or only voidable by plea of abatement. If the defendant had a legal right to defeat the process, the surceasing the suit was not a valid consideration to support the note.

¶10The second consideration relied on, viz. that the wife discharged the defendant from his liability, is altogether unfounded. Her receipt was a void act, and could not operate as a discharge, or in any other manner. Upon the whole, therefore, we are of opinion that the first ground of defence is well maintained, and this is decisive of the cause.

¶11We have, however, no doubt that the second ground of defence is equally well maintained.

¶12If this note had been given to the wife directly, it would have enured to the use of the husband, and he alone could have released or discharged it; and the intervention of a trustee does not change the husband’s rights. It is true he *291might recover on the note in the name of the nominal promisee, but he has a right also to release the note; and we think the release in the case does operate as a discharge. The note is not released in terms, but every matter and thing the note was given to secure was released, and this alone would show a failure of consideration.

¶13“ The note,” it is said, “ was given in this manner, for the laudable, as well as obvious purpose, of securing the avails of it to the mother of the child, whose interests the Court will protect by all legal measures in their power.” Or in other language, as we understand it, the wife, after committing the foulest crime against her husband, may secure to her own use the wages of her iniquity, in defiance of his authority and rights, by the intervention of a trustee, and this is such a laudable act as to deserve the especial protection of the Court. We certainly feel no disposition to countenance such an attempt. The law does not sanction it, nor will it, we trust, ever be tolerated in a court of justice.

¶14It is the opinion of the Court therefore, upon the whole matter, that this action, upon the facts reported, cannot be maintained, and the plaintiff, according to the agreement of parties, is to become nonsuit.

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