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30 N.Y. 259

Jewell v. . Wright

New York Court of Appeals

Decided March 5, 1864

New York Court of Appeals · decided 1864-03-05

This action was brought to recover the amount of a promissory note made by the defendant Wright to the order of the defendant Dunlap, who endorsed it for the benefit and accommodation of the defendant Taylor; and it was without consideration. It was made and endorsed by Dunlap, and delivered to Taylor at Lockport, 11. Y., May 30, 1857, for $400, payable at Niagara County Bank, at Lockport, one year from date.

Relies on Pomeroy v. Ainsworth

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1864-03-05

How this case has been cited

Cited by 23 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 1973

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 14 state decisions

60186418701880189019001910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Ingraham, J.

¶1 It was not denied on the trial of this cause that the note on which the suit was brought was negotiated at a rate of interest illegal, both in Connecticut and New York.

¶2 The main question in the case is, whether the laws of *264 New York or Connecticut are to control as to the defense of usury. The note was negotiated in Hartford, but was payable at Lockport, in New York.

¶3 Nor can it be denied that a contract is to be governed by the laws of the place where it is made, if it is not to be performed according to the terms of the contract elsewhere. (Story on Conflict of Laws, § 282: 6 Paige, 280; 2 Kent’s Com. 457; Davis v. Garr, 2 Selden, 124.)

¶4 But if such note or contract is by its terms to be performed in another state, then the laws of that state must govern. (2 Kent’s Com. 460.) This rule was laid down by this court in Jacks v. Nichols (1 Seld. 178). The court in delivering the opinion, says: “ Concede that the contract ivas made in Connecticut, if it was to be performed in New York, it must, prima facie, be regarded as having been made with reference to the laws of New York.” The fact that.the note was dated in New York, is alone presumptive evidence that the maker not only resided at the place of its date, but contemplated payment there. For the purpose of charging the endorsers, the makers must have been sought at their residence or place of business in this state. The same is stated in Curtis v. Leavitt (15 N. Y. R. p. 9-227), where it is said: “It is a general rule that the law of the place, where contracts purely personal are made, must govern as to their construction and validity, unless they are to be performed in another state or country, in which case their construction and validity depends upon the law of the place of performance.” In Bowen v. Newell (13 N. Y. p. 290), it was held that the law of the place where the note or draft is payable, governs as to the days of grace allowed upon it. In Everett v. Vendryes (19 N. Y. R. p. 436), it was' held the law of the place where the bill was payable, controled as to the liability of the drawer to the indorsee. And in Cutler v. Wright (22 N. Y. R. 472), it was held that a note made in New York, but dated in Florida, and payable there, was governed by the laws of that place; and it is said the authorities do not leave *265 this question in cloubt. The same was also held in Pomeroy v. Ainsworth (22 Barb. 127).

¶5 These cases from our own courts, render it unnecessary to examine any other class of decisions upon this point.

¶6 The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.

¶7 Davies, J. read an opinion in favor of affirmance. Seldeh, J. was absent.

¶8 All the other judges being for reversal, judgment reversed.

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