Doern v. Crawford’s Empirical Analysis
1966
Citation profile
6 federal appellate · 30 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 42 later decisions — most recently June 2006 · most notably 55 Wis. 2d 27 - Pamperin v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance (1972), 81 Wis. 2d 183 - Lecus v. American Mutual Insurance Co. of Boston (1977)
6 federal appellate · 30 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Arthur v. Morgan · Raymond v. Century Indemnity Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““. . . the controlling test of whether persons are members of a household at a particular time is not solely whether they are then residing together under one roof. Living together under one roof is a factor to be considered and must have occurred at some time. When not occurring at the time in question, the absence from the family roof must be of a temporary nature with intent on the part of the absent person to return thereto. There is a close analogy between the concepts of household and domicile because intent of the person involved plays such a significant part. The one material difference between the two is that a domicile once acquired is not lost when a person leaves it, even though intending never to return, until he establishes a domicile elsewhere. We determine that this is not true with respect to a household, and, therefore, physical absence coupled with intent not to return is sufficient to sever the absent person’s membership in the household. Every person has a domicile but not every person is a member of a household. “Whether the absence from the household is of long or short duration is immaterial except as it may give rise to an inference of intent to remain away permanently or only temporarily. In the instant situation the fact that Paulson later discontinued the divorce action and returned to the household of his wife and stepson is not conclusive on the issue of whether his absence therefrom at time of accident was intended by him to be permanent or temp”
8 later decisions quote this exact passage“We have stated [that] the issue of... intent is not one that properly can be decided on a motion for summary judgment. Credibility of a person with respect to his subjective intent does not lend itself to be determined by affidavit.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“automobile. The insurance company denied coverage and moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as to it. Its appeal from the court's order denying the motion presents the question whether Paulson, the policyholder, on the date of the accident was residing in the same household with his wife and stepson. In affirming the action of the trial court in denying the insurance company's motion for summary judgment the court said, after referring to the above cases:”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.