Johnson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Constitutional speedy trial claims are evaluated under the two-part framework set out in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and refined in Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). The first part requires the trial court to determine whether the time between the defendant's arrest or indictment and his trial was long enough to be considered presumptively prejudicial to the defendant. If the presumptive prejudice threshold was crossed, the court proceeds to the second part of the framework, applying a context-focused, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial. The four factors that the court must examine are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for it; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. However, these four factors have no talismanic qualities and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant in light of the animating principles of the speedy trial guarantee. The Barker - Doggett framework necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis, a task better suited to trial courts than appellate courts. We have explained that the trial court's discretion in applying this framework is substantial and broad. We will accept the court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and we will defer to the court's ulti”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 343 Ga. App. 391 - ELLIS v. the STATE.

2. “necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Terrell v. State

3. “trial scheduling and requests for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not interfere unless there was a clear abuse of discretion.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Terrell v. State