State v. Reese’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The most fundamental rale of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. State v. Arnett, 290 Kan. 41, 47 , 223 P.3d 780 (2010). But if a statute is plain and unambiguous, this court will not speculate about legislative intent or turn to canons of construction or legislative history. State v. Coman, 294 Kan. 84, 92 , 273 P.3d 701 (2012). On the other hand, where a criminal statute is silent or ambiguous on a matter, the rule of lenity applies to mandate that the statute be construed in favor of the accused. Cf. State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 249 , 200 P.3d 22 (2009) (statute silence or ambiguity on unit of prosecution construed in favor of defendant).” State v. Reese, 300 Kan. 650, 653 , 333 P.3d 149 (2014).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Jordan · State v. Cheeks

2. “Kansas' DUI law is a self-contained criminal statute, which means that all essential components of the crime, including the elements, severity levels, and applicable sentences, are included within the statute.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Mejia · State v. Myers

3. “(i) For the purpose of determining whether a conviction is a first, second, third, fourth or subsequent conviction in sentencing under this section: (1) Convictions for a violation of this section, or a violation of an ordinance of any city or resolution of any county that prohibits the acts that this section prohibits, or entering into a diversion agreement in lieu of further criminal proceedings on a complaint alleging any such violations, shall be taken into account, but only convictions or diversions occurring on or after July 1, 2001. .... (3) 'conviction' includes: . . . (B) conviction of a violation of an ordinance of a city in this state, a resolution of a county in this state or any law of another jurisdiction that would constitute an offense that is comparable to the offense described in subsection (i)(1) or (i)(2) . . . . "(j) For the purposes of determining whether an offense is comparable, the following shall be considered: (1) The name of the out-of-jurisdiction offense; (2) the elements of the out-of-jurisdiction offense; and (3) whether the out-of-jurisdiction offense prohibits similar conduct to the conduct prohibited by the closest approximate Kansas offense.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Myers · State v. Patton