Koninklyke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maalschappy, N. V. v. Strachan Shipping Co.’s Empirical Analysis
301 F.2d 741 · 1962
Citation profile
19 federal appellate · 1 district · 8 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 43 later decisions — most recently May 2021 · most notably Halliburton Company and Continental Casualty Company v. Norton Drilling Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (1962), Ham Marine, Inc. v. Dresser Industries, Inc. (1995)
19 federal appellate · 1 district · 8 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp. · Wilburn Boat Company v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company · Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co. · Crumady v. the Joachim Hendrik Fisser · Garrett v. Co
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has held that where a shipowner is damaged by a personal injury recovery against it, which damage was occasioned by the negligence of the stevedore in the performance of his contractual undertakings, then a contract action for breach of warranty will lie against the stevedore. See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic S. S. Corp., 1956, 350 U.S. 124 , 76 S.Ct. 232 , 100 L.Ed. 133 ; Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 1958, 355 U.S. 563 , 78 S.Ct. 438 , 2 L.Ed.2d 491 ; Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 1959, 358 U.S. 423 , 79 S.Ct. 445 , 3 L.Ed.2d 413 . The action is not a derivative one from the basis of the suit by the injured party against the shipowner, but is based purely on damage resulting from a breach of contract.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“That in this case Hagans was a beneficiary under the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act, and in Ryan the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act was invoked, does not alter the application of the decision in Ryan. The important consideration is that BUerman’s claim against Atlantic is founded upon a contractual relationship in which Atlantic gave Ellerman a warranty to discharge the cargo in a reasonably safe manner. It is not grounded on any claim for contribution based upon tort or upon any duty which Atlantic owed Hagans. Atlantic further argues, in effect, that stripped of its maritime nature, Hag-ans’s claim against Ellerman is aborted by § 203 of the Pennsylvania Compensation Act of 1915. It implies that by the force of this section Ellerman is entitled to the status of a statutory employer and is thus excluded from any liability other than that permitted under the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act. Atlantic reasons that since Ilagans had recovered a workmen's compensation award against it he may not look to Ellerman for damages and, of course, if Ilagans has no right of recovery against Ellerman there is no ground for a claim by the latetr for indemnity against Atlantic. * * * [The] basic premise [of that contention] is incorrect for Hagans’s claim is maritime in nature. Since Hagans was injured ashore, the workmen’s compensation to which lie is entitled is governed by the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation statute, but this is not to say that i”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““In Ryan and progeny the accidents or injuries were aboard ship and the federal compensation act applied. Here the injury was sustained on a dock. * * * I do not believe the Supreme Court held in Ryan and related cases that Congress, in passing the federal compensation act to fill a gap in compensation coverage, intended at the same time to limit valid state compensation coverage in any manner. As I understand Ryan, there is an implied contract to stevedore properly, the breach of which is actionable if, and only if, the applicable compensation act does not prevent it. True, the Court’s thinking as to lolly the federal act does not bar recovery could be applied as well to the Texas act with the same result, but Texas courts have not chosen to follow this thinking. Apparently convinced legislative policy so compels, Texas courts hold compliance by employer with the Texas Compensation Act terminates all liability of employer arising out of covered injuries to employees. West Texas Utilities v. Renner, 32 S.W. 264 (Ct.Civ.App.1930), 53 S.W.2d 451 (Com. App.1932) ; Westfall v. Lorenzo Gin Company, 287 S.W.2d 551 (Ct.Civ.App. 1956, no writ history); McCormick v. United States, 134 F.Supp. 243 (S.D. Tex.1955). “In short I believe that when the federal law filled a gap in workmen’s compensation coverage and allowed indemnity recovery it did not oust state law where validity [sic] in force; neither did it limit the force of this valid state law in any manner. States differ as to allo”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.