Hobbs v. Pepersack’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The crime with which Hobbs was charged was robbery with a deadly weapon with a potential aggregate sentence of 160 years on the eight counts. Anno.Code of Maryland, art. 27, § 488 (1957). As distinguished from simple robbery, id. § 486, which carries a maximum sentence of ten years, the use of a dead ly weapon in perpetrating a robbery doubles the possible punishment. The statute, however, not only fails to define the term ‘robbery,’ but it also gives no indication what weapons are considered deadly. The answer to both questions can be found only in the Maryland case law. Even assuming the doubtful proposition that Hobbs might know how to research such a problem, the case law itself furnishes no clear answer. For example, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that a loaded gun may be a deadly weapon while an unloaded one may not. Davis v. State, 225 Md. 45 , 168 A.2d 884 (1961). Also, a knife may be either a deadly weapon or only a dangerous one, depending on the size of the blade and manner of its use. See Barefoot v. State, 222 Md. 67 , 158 A.2d 649 (1960). Likewise, a weapon not deadly per se, such as a club, may not even be dangerous within the meaning of the statute unless utilized in a threatening manner. Davis v. State, supra. At all events, to secure a conviction for the more serious degree of robbery, the state must prove that the defendant had both the intent to commit the robbery and the intent to use the deadly weapon in furtherance thereof. Midgett v. State,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 206 F. Supp. 301 - Hobbs v. Pepersack

2. ““The case will be remanded to the District Court. If the state so desires, a hearing may then be held to determine whether the defendant was in fact represented by counsel at his trial, or whether he intelligently waived his right to counsel. If the state does not contest the truth of the petition, or offer any other reason for denying relief, the District Court should afford the state a reasonable opportunity to retry the prisoner. In default of this the court should order his release. Compare Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 549 , 81 S.Ct. 735 , 5 L.Ed. 2d 760 (1961).” Hobbs v. Pepersack, Warden, 4 Cir., 301 F.2d 875, at 880 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 206 F. Supp. 301 - Hobbs v. Pepersack

3. “It was the Court's holding [in Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 , 82 S.Ct. 498, 7 L.Ed.2d 442 (1962)] that, in the absence of knowing waiver, the state was obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to appoint counsel to defend the accused since the `nature of the charge' was `too intricate for a layman to master.' * * * The present case falls squarely within the rationale of Chewning.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Patton v. North Carolina