State v. Clark’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

48 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 48 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “An improper out-of-court identification procedure requires suppression of an in-court identification unless the trial judge determines that the in-court identification is of independent origin. . . . The test to determine the validity of pretrial identification procedures under the due process clause is whether the totality of the circumstances reveals pretrial procedures so suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identity as to offend fundamental standards of decency, fairness, and justice. . . . Even if the pretrial procedure is invalid, the in-court identification will be allowed if the trial judge finds it is of independent origin. . . . After hearing the voir dire evidence, the trial judge must make findings of fact to determine whether the in-court identification meets the tests of admissibility. . . . The standards to be used to determine reliability of the identification are those set out in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 , 34 L.Ed. 2d 401 , 93 S.Ct. 375 (1972) — (1) opportunity to view, (2) degree of attention, (3) accuracy of description, (4) level of certainty, (5) time between crime and confrontation. ... If the findings of the trial judge are supported by competent evidence, they are conclusive on the appellate courts. (Citations omitted.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 70 N.C. App. 40 - State v. Grier · 52 N.C. App. 676 - State v. Rogers

2. “1. That there was ample opportunity for [the prosecuting witness] to observe the defendant at the time of the commission of the crimes with which he is charged; 2. That from evidence offered there is nothing to indicate that any suggestions were made by the investigating officers or anyone else to [the prosecuting witness] which would color her identification on January 24, 1980 of the defendant made at the in-person line-up; 3. That the Court has viewed State’s Exhibit Number One, a photograph of the six (6) individuals who were in the in-person line-up, which was conducted on January 24, 1980, and the line-up was in all respects fair and reasonable, and presented six (6) black males similar to the defendant in age, height and weight, all wearing the same or identical items of clothing and did not in any manner distinguish the defendant from the other individuals standing in the line-up; 4. That the in-court identification of the defendant is of independent origin based solely on what [the prosecuting witness] saw at the time of the crime and does not result from any out of Court confrontation or from any other pretrial identification procedures which were conducive to lead to irreparable mistaken identification to the extent that the defendant would be denied due process of law; 5. That the in-court identification of the defendant by [the prosecuting witness] is based upon her own independent observations of the defendant, and is not based upon any improper out of Court ide”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Washington

3. “In ruling upon a motion for joinder, the trial judge should consider whether the accused can be fairly tried upon more than one charge at the same trial. If such consolidation hinders or deprives the accused of his ability to present his defense, the cases should not be consolidated. State v. Davis, 289 N.C. 500 , 223 S.E. 2d 296 (1976), [death penalty vacated, 429 U.S. 809 , 50 L.Ed. 2d 69 , 97 S.Ct. 47 (1976).] In determining whether defendant has been prejudiced, the question posed is whether the offenses are so separate in time and place and so distinct in circumstances as to render a consolidation unjust and prejudicial to an accused. State v. Greene, 294 N.C. 418 , 241 S.E. 2d 662 (1978). However, it is well established that the motion to join is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and his ruling will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Davis, supra; Dunaway v. United States, 205 F. 2d 23 (D.C. Cir., 1953). In the instant case, all of the matters out of which the joined cases grew occurred on the same afternoon of the same day and each was perpetrated according to a common modus operandi Thus, the facts of this case meet the statutory requirements for joinder, and the record shows that the respective charges are not so distinct in time and circumstances as to prejudicially hinder or deprive defendant of his ability to defend any one of the charges.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 57 N.C. App. 444 - State v. Wilson