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← 301 SW2D 185 - Tiller v. Fields

Tiller v. Fields’s Empirical Analysis

1957

Citation profile

26
cited by 26 later decisions
1
states following
March 2016
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 20 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 26 later decisions — most recently March 2016 · most notably Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp. (2005), Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely (1966)

4 federal appellate · 20 state decisions

801957196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Wheeler v. United States · Stekoll Petroleum Co. v. Hamilton · Hoover v. Wukasch · Phillips Petroleum Company v. Heber A. Peterson and Astrid N. D. Peterson, Phillips Petroleum Company v. John H. Haslem and Rebecca H. Haslem · Willson v. Superior Oil Company

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Anticipatory provisions in leases for the commitment by the lessee of such leases to unitization, of necessity must be in general terms. Neither the lessor nor the lessee has any way of knowing at the timé the lease is taken the facts with respect to which it will be necessary for the lessee to apply his power. It is not practicable for the lessee to await.the ascertainment of such facts. He knows from experience that because of the possibility of many changes in ownership of the lessor’s interest as time goes on, it may be difficult to effect an agreement if the right to unitize is not included in the lease itself. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 10 Cir., 218 F.2d 926 . The Texas courts, as well as other courts, have recognized these basic facts, and have consistently sustained the basic validity of lease pooling provisions and units formed under their authority. * * * ””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Lessee, at its option, is hereby given the right and power in its discretion to pool or combine, as to any one or more formations, the land covered by this Lease or any portion of said land, insofar only as gas or gas condensate rights are concerned ..., with other land, lease or leases in the immediate vicinity thereof, except to the extent and in the manner hereinafter stipulated. With respect to any such unit so formed, Lessee shall execute in writing an instrument or instruments identifying and describing the pooled acreage, and file same for recording in the office of the County Clerk in Hardin County, Texas, and the pooled unit shall become effective on the date such instrument or instruments are so filed for record .... Operations for drilling on or production of gas from any part of the pooled unit which includes all or a portion of the Leased Premises, regardless of whether such operations for drilling were commenced or such production was secured before or after the date of this lease or the date of the instrument designating the pooled unit, shall be considered as operations for drilling on or production of gas from the Leased Premises, whether or not the well or wells be located on the Leased Premises, and the entire acreage constituting such unit or units shall be treated for all purposes, except the payment of royalties on production from the pooled unit, as if the same were included in this Lease. The above right and power to pool may be exercised at any time a”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “"Appellants in their brief cite the case of Stekoll Petroleum Co. v. Hamilton, 152 Tex. 182 , 255 S.W.2d 187 . We think a careful analysis of this case will show that it is supportive of ap-pellees’ position rather than that of appellants’ because it is clearly recognized in the Stekoll case that the statute of frauds is met where the contract, instrument or agreement, gives either party the unqualified right or power to make a selection or determination of the details without the necessity of further agreement or approval of the other party. Also in this connection see Taylor v. Lester, Tex.Civ.App., 12 S.W.2d 1097 , wr. ref.; Gray v. Producers’ Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 227 S.W. 240 ; Rountree v. Bridwell, Tex.Civ.App., 269 S.W.2d 824 , wr. ref., n. r. e.; Lingeman v. Shirk, 15 Ind.App. 432 , 43 N. E. 33 ; Peckham v. Lane, 81 Kan. 489 , 106 P. 464 , 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 967. The lease pooling provision in question in this case clearly gives the lessee the broad and unqualified power to select or determine the lands (in the immediate vicinity) to be placed in the unit — this broad power is subject to the other terms of the pooling provision that same be in units authorized by the Railroad Commission of Texas or other regulatory body, etc.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.