J-A09010-23
2023 PA Super 146
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LANCE MITCHELL RILEY :
:
Appellant : No. 566 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 2, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0001711-2018
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: AUGUST 3, 2023
Lance Riley appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas on October 2, 2019.
On appeal, Riley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction for receiving stolen property, contending the Commonwealth failed
to prove all elements of the crime. After careful review, we affirm.
We previously reiterated the trial court’s summarization of the factual
history on review of Riley’s initial direct appeal:
[Edward Cornett] testified that on August 18, 2018, he resided in
Chambersburg; and he was staying with a friend, Tyler Ewing. At
that time, [Cornett] owned an AR-15 rifle. He testified that he had
possession of the rifle on August 17, 2018, when he went to bed.
He kept the rifle in a bag.
The following morning, Ewing woke []Cornett, yelling that the bag
and rifle were missing. Mr. Cornett had not given anyone
permission to take the rifle. Mr. Cornett did not see anyone take
the rifle.
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[Erik Beamer] testified that on August 18, 2018, he knew [] Ewing
through a mutual friend. [] Beamer went to Ewing's residence with
his girlfriend. They went to Ewing's residence to “hang out and
pretty much I guess we did some drugs.” [] Beamer's drug of
choice at this time was heroin.
[] Beamer testified that he stole a gun from Ewing's residence. []
Beamer testified that he “traded it for heroin” from [Riley]. He
texted [Riley] that night to “trade the item that I [stole] for
drugs.”
The trade occurred on Queen Street in Chambersburg. In
exchange for the rifle, [Riley] gave [] Beamer heroin and $100
cash. [Riley], [] Beamer, [] Beamer's girlfriend, and Dustin Kahn
were present during the transaction. During [] Beamer's
testimony, the Commonwealth played several video clips from the
downtown Chambersburg surveillance cameras. These video clips
tracked the movement of [] Beamer in the downtown area both
before and after he stole the firearm.
The Commonwealth next presented the testimony of Kahn. []
Kahn was a co-defendant of [Riley], and had previously pled guilty
to receiving stolen property for the firearm in question. [] Kahn
initially testified that, after receiving the gun from [] Beamer, he
“held it for a day and gave it back to him whenever he needed it
back.
The Commonwealth next called Detective James Iverson to
testify. Detective Iverson is a criminal investigator with the
Chambersburg Police Department. [Detective] Iverson was
involved with the arrest of [Riley], and noted that a vehicle
matching the description of the one used in this case was present
at the scene of [Riley]'s arrest.
The final witness for the Commonwealth was Detective Matthew
Lynch from the Chambersburg Police Department; [Detective]
Lynch was the investigating officer in this case. Based upon
information [Detective] Lynch learned through the course of his
investigation, he accessed the municipal surveillance cameras
covering downtown Chambersburg. The surveillance video
corroborated what [] Beamer and [] Kahn subsequently disclosed
during their interviews with police.
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Commonwealth v. Riley, 1974 MDA 2019 (Pa. Super. filed November 10,
2020) (unpublished memorandum) (citations omitted).
On June 24, 2019, following trial, a jury convicted Riley of one count
each of receiving stolen property and delivery of a controlled substance. On
October 2, 2019, the trial court sentenced Riley to an aggregate term of fifty
four to two hundred and forty months’ incarceration. Riley filed a nunc pro
tunc post-sentence motion with permission from the court. The trial court
subsequently denied the motion.
Riley filed a direct appeal challenging the sufficiency and weight of the
evidence supporting his convictions, as well as his sentence. On November
10, 2020, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Relevantly, this Court
found that Riley had failed to preserve a claim regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence because his actual argument was a challenge to the weight of the
evidence, not its sufficiency.
Subsequently, Riley sought post-conviction relief in which he argued
appellate counsel was ineffective for numerous reasons including failing to
preserve a sufficiency of the evidence claim on direct appeal. An evidentiary
hearing was held, after which the parties and the court agreed to reinstate
Riley’s right to appeal the sufficiency of the evidence nunc pro tunc. This timely
appeal followed.
On appeal, Riley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his conviction for receiving stolen property. Specifically, Riley contends the
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Commonwealth presented no evidence at trial to establish that he knew, or
believed, that the gun at issue was stolen. The Commonwealth disagrees,
arguing that it introduced circumstantial evidence that, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict winner, permitted the jury to infer that
Riley possessed the requisite knowledge for a conviction of receiving stolen
property.
Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
is to determine whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict
winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences therefrom are
sufficient for the trier of fact to find that each element of the crimes charged
is established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Dale, 836
A.2d 150, 152 (Pa. Super. 2003). The Commonwealth may meet this burden
of proving every element of the crime by utilizing only circumstantial evidence.
See Commonwealth v. Bruce,
916 A.2d 657, 661 (Pa. Super. 2007).
“[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need
not preclude every possibility of innocence.” Id. (citation omitted). Any doubt
raised as to the accused’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact-finder, so long as
the evidence presented is not utterly incapable of supporting the necessary
inferences. See
id. This Court does not independently assess credibility or
otherwise assign weight to evidence on appeal. See Commonwealth v.
Kinney,
863 A.2d 581, 584 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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A person is guilty of receiving stolen property if “he intentionally
receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing that it
has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the
property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the
owner.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a). The crime has three elements: (1)
intentionally taking possession of another person’s movable property; (2)
knowing or believing that it has been stolen; and (3) an intent to deprive the
rightful owner of her property permanently. See Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 128 A.3d 261, 265 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc).
Riley only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
second element, i.e., whether he had knowledge or belief that the firearm was
stolen. Regarding this element, this Court has provided the following analysis:
Importantly, the Legislature expressly defined the required mental
state as “knowing” or “believing.” Because the Legislature
excluded mental states such as recklessness, negligence, or
naiveté about the stolen status of the property, those mental
states are insufficient. This reasoning is consistent with the
common recognition that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed. Thus, courts may not hold that a less culpable mental
state satisfies a criminal statute where the statute demands proof
of the more culpable mental state.
Accordingly, the Commonwealth had the burden to establish
either that [the defendant] knew [the property] in question was
stolen, or believed that it had probably been stolen. A person
“knows” that goods are stolen if he is “aware” of that fact.
Id. (citations omitted).
As there is rarely direct proof that a defendant knew for a fact that
property was stolen, guilty knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial
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evidence. Id. Mere possession of stolen property is not sufficient, by itself, to
justify an inference that the defendant knew the property was stolen. See
id.
at 267.
Proof that the goods were recently stolen, however, may provide
the jury with sufficient circumstantial evidence to support an
inference of guilty knowledge, since the “circumstances of
possession as presented by the Commonwealth” (the recency of
the theft) suggest “an explanation for the possession” (that the
accused was the thief []).
Id. Once the Commonwealth proves the recency of the thefts, the jury is free
to infer that the defendant was the thief unless the defendant can offer a
satisfactory alternative explanation for his possession of the stolen goods.
Id.
at 269-70.
Other circumstantial evidence that can support an inference of
knowledge or belief that property is stolen includes the place or manner of the
defendant’s possession of the property, modifications to the property
indicative of unlawful possession, conduct or statements made by the
defendant, false accounts for possession of the property, the fact that the theft
occurred near where the defendant has possession of the property, or an
excessively discounted price for the property. See id. at 268.
When viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict
winner, the record contains the following testimony: On the night of August
17, 2018, Edward Cornett was staying at his friend Tyler Ewing’s apartment.
That night, Erick Beamer and his girlfriend went to Ewing’s apartment to hang
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out and partake in heroin. On August 18, 2018, Cornett woke up to discover
a rifle bag of his was stolen, including an AR-15 rifle.
After stealing the gun, Beamer texted Riley to exchange the stolen gun
for heroin. Beamer and his girlfriend met up with Riley in a car driven by Riley.
Riley was in the driver’s seat and Dustin Kahn was in the passenger seat.
Beamer showed Riley the gun and then handed the gun to Kahn after Riley
gave Beamer the heroin. Kahn took the gun to a house that he and Riley were
staying at and left it there. Kahn then returned to the car and Riley drove
Beamer and his girlfriend to a local hotel and dropped them off.
The Commonwealth argues that the evidence was sufficient to establish
Riley’s guilty knowledge because:
the jury heard evidence that [Riley] was in close proximity to
where the theft of the firearm occurred, that after the transaction
was complete, [] Kahn removed the firearm from the vehicle
[Riley] was driving and placed the firearm in a residence, and the
nature of the transaction itself was an exchange for illegal drugs.
Commonwealth’s Brief, at 9.
We agree with Riley that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he
knew the gun had been stolen. The gun was not discovered at the time of
Riley’s arrest. Riley made no statement, false or otherwise, as to the gun’s
provenance. While the Commonwealth proved recency of the theft, this factor
is only relevant for supporting an inference that the defendant was the thief.
Here, we know Riley is not the thief. It was Beamer who admitted to, and
pleaded guilty to, stealing the gun.
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However, while none of these reasons alone would be enough to support
an inference of guilty knowledge, we find that a totality of the circumstances
could support an inference that Riley believed the gun was probably stolen
since it was used in an illegal exchange for drugs. When a firearm is bartered
for narcotics, the seller of narcotics has good reason to believe the firearm is
stolen. As such, while this is not evidence that Riley knew the AR-15 rifle was
stolen, these circumstances are sufficient to enable a fact-finder to infer that
a defendant believed that the firearms were probably stolen. See
Commonwealth v. Gomez, 224 A.3d 1095, 1100 (Pa. Super 2019), appeal
denied,
236 A.3d 1053 (Pa. 2020).
Accordingly, we conclude the Commonwealth presented sufficient
evidence to allow the fact-finder to infer that Riley had guilty knowledge,
believing that the gun he received in exchange for heroin was probably stolen.
See Robinson, 128 A.3d at 268. Riley is due no relief on appeal.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/03/2023
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