Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 302 F.3d 660 - Williams v. Rep Corp.

Williams v. Rep Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

302 F.3d 660 · 2002

Citation profile

46
cited by 46 later decisions
1
states following
July 2018
most recently cited

34 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Hojnacki v. Klein-Acosta · Anthem Ins. Companies v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. · Swearngin v. Sears Roebuck & Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A party waives any argument that it does not raise before the district court....”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Mr. Williams submits that REP Corp. is subject to liability under the Act notwithstanding the fact that it did not actually sell the machine that injured him. He offers several arguments in support of his contention. First, Mr. Williams contends that REP Corp. falls within the Act’s definition of “manufacturer” and therefore may be liable under the Act. The Act defines “manufacturer” to include “a seller who: ... (D) is owned in whole or significant part by the manufacturer; or (E) owns in whole or significant part the manufacturer.” Ind.Code Ann. § 33-1-1.5-2(3) (West 1996). The Act defines a “seller” in general terms as “a person engaged in the business of selling or leasing a product-” Id. § 33-1-1.5-2(5). At the time the district court entered summary judgment for REP Corp., the evidence before the court indicated that “REP France” was the manufacturer of the machine and that REP Corp. was a wholly owned subsidiary of “REP France.” Even if REP Corp. could be considered a “seller” under the statute’s generic definition, and therefore a “manufacturer” because it is owned by “REP France,” there is still no evidence that REP Corp. sold, leased or otherwise put into the stream of commerce the allegedly defective machine as required by Ind. Code § SS-l-1.5-3(a). It was later disclosed that REP International manufactured the machine and did not own REP Corp. This development does not change the basic analysis. REP, the parent corporation, owns REP International and REP Corp. Yet”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.