State v. Moyer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “district court made no explicit finding with respect to whether a conflict of interest existed.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Moyer · State v. Moyer

2. “' "This statute creates a two-step process. First, the trial court must determine if there was some fundamental failure of the proceeding. If so, the trial court moves to the second step and assesses whether it is possible to continue without an injustice. In other words, the trial court must decide if the prejudicial conduct's damaging effect can be removed or mitigated by an admonition, jury instruction, or other action. If not, the trial court must determine whether the degree of prejudice results in an injustice and, if so, declare a mistrial. State v. Ward , 292 Kan. 541 , 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied [ 565 U.S. 1221 ], 132 S.Ct. 1594 , 182 L.Ed.2d 205 (2012) ; see State v. Race , 293 Kan. 69 , 80, 259 P.3d 707 (2011). " ' "In Ward , our court articulated this standard by dividing the appellate court's abuse of discretion inquiry into two parts, asking: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when deciding if there was a fundamental failure in the proceeding? and (2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion when deciding whether the conduct resulted in prejudice that could not be cured or mitigated through jury admonition or instruction, resulting in an injustice? 292 Kan. at 551 [ 256 P.3d 801 ].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Sims

3. “Clearly, under any realistic appraisal of human nature, the presence of the parent/child relationship in the context presented here poses a threat of actual bias. Actual bias is not only probable but unavoidable when a presiding judge's child is a material, endorsed law enforcement witness for the prosecution in the case against the defendant. The existence of the presiding judge-father/son-witness relationship in this case shreds any illusion of impartiality. In my dissenting opinion in State v. Ward , 292 Kan. 541 , 583, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), I stated: *”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Moyer