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← 302 Md. 111 - Leonard v. State

Leonard v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1985

Citation profile

66
cited by 66 later decisions
4
states following
April 2016
most recently cited

66 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 66 later decisions — most recently April 2016 · most notably Parren v. State (1987), Maus v. State (1987)

66 state decisions

2401985199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Johnson v. Zerbst · Faretta v. California · Gideon v. Wainwright · Powell v. State of Alabama Patterson · Adams v. United States Ex Rel. McCann

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 66 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(b) Express waiver of counsel. If a defendant who is not represented by counsel indicates a desire to waive counsel, the court may not accept the waiver until it determines, after an examination of the defendant on the record conducted by the court, the State’s Attorney, or both, that the defendant is knowingly and voluntarily waiving the right to counsel. If the file or docket does not reflect compliance with section (a) of this Rule, the court shall comply with that section as part of the waiver inquiry. The court shall ensure that compliance with this section is noted in the file or on the docket. At any subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the docket or file notation of compliance shall be prima facie proof of the defendant’s express waiver of counsel. After there has been an express waiver, no postponement of a scheduled trial or hearing date will be granted to obtain counsel unless the court finds it is in the interest of justice to do so.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “First, it is necessary, as Faretta says, that the defendant “be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Under this category, we suggest that the defendant be advised: (a) That self-representation is almost always unwise ____ (b) That he is entitled to and will receive no special indulgence by the court____ (c) That the prosecution will be represented by an experienced professional counsel---- (d) That he is going to receive no more library privileges than those available to any other [pro se defendant] ____ Second, we feel it would certainly be advisable to make some inquiry into his intellectual capacity---- (a) His education and familiarity with legal procedures ____ (b) If there is any question in the court’s mind as to a defendant’s mental capacity it would appear obvious that a rather careful inquiry into that subject should be made____ (c) [H]e must be made aware of the alternative, i.e., the right to counsel____ (d) Perhaps some exploration into the nature of the proceedings, the possible outcome, possible defenses and possible punishments might be in order. While this may seem to be sliding back into pre-Faretta practices, it will serve to point up to defendant just what he is getting himself into and establish beyond question that “ ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” ( Faretta, supra, [422 U.S.] at p. 835, 95 S.Ct. at p. 2541 .) (e) It should be made clear that if there is misbehavior or trial disruption,”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “It seems obvious to us that Leonard expressed in clear terms a “desire or inclination” to represent himself, and that his statements should have led the trial court reasonably to conclude that Leonard desired self-representation.... In particular, Leonard’s' affirmative response to the court’s inquiry as to whether he wanted to conduct his own defense was, standing alone, sufficient to trigger an inquiry under Rule 723 c to ascertain whether he truly wanted to represent himself.... The State seeks to avoid this conclusion by arguing that Leonard’s behavior effectively prevented the trial court from conducting the requisite waiver of counsel inquiry. Under this theory, the State seems to contend that Leonard’s behavior foreclosed and excused totally a Rule 723 c waiver inquiry. Although the proposition that a defendant’s conduct may in some limited circumstances preclude a Rule 723 c inquiry is correct in the abstract, we are unable to agree with the State that this proposition has any application to these facts. A brief explanation of our rationale will reveal the flaw in the State’s argument. The Maryland Rules governing waiver of counsel recognize that a defendant may waive his right to counsel by conduct. Md. Rule 723 d 2 [now Md. Rule 4-215(c) ]; see Brown v. State, 50 Md.App. 651 [ 441 A.2d 354 ] (1982) (defendants by their actions effectively waived their right to counsel). For example, a defendant may waive his right to counsel, either affirmatively or by neglecting or”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.