Jones v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

53 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “`Where the deceased criminal defendant has not had the one appeal to which he is statutorily entitled, it may not be fair to let his conviction stand. But, on the other hand, where the right of appeal has been accorded and the Court of Special Appeals has decided that there was no reversible error, no unfairness results in leaving the conviction intact even though an application for further review has not been resolved when the defendant dies. The mere possibility that this Court might have reversed the conviction is not sufficient ground to order dismissal of the entire indictment.'”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Cherry v. State · West v. United States

2. “The mootness of an appeal of right taken from a criminal conviction brings into play different considerations than does the mootness of a petition for a writ of certio-rari committed to the Supreme Court’s discretion. As Mr. Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent to Durham, supra at 484 , 91 S.Ct. at 860-61 , a court of appeals confronts a “contrasting and very different situation” in disposing of a moot appeal of right than does the Supreme Court in disposing of a moot petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court may dismiss the petition without prejudicing the rights of a deceased petitioner, for he has already had the benefit of the appellate review of his conviction to which he was entitled of right. In contrast, when an appeal has been taken from a criminal conviction to the court of appeals and death has deprived the accused of his right to our decision, the interests of justice ordinarily require that he not stand convicted without resolution of the merits of his appeal, which is an “integral part of [our] system for finally adjudicating [his] guilt or innocence.” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 , 76 S.Ct. 585, 590 , 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. West v. United States

3. “Merely because the evidence in the principal’s trial may have been different, or the principal may have agreed to a favorable plea bargain arrangement, or the jury in the principal’s trial may have arrived at a compromise verdict, is not a good reason for allowing the accessory to escape the consequences of having committed a particular offense.... Consequently, with respect to cases where the trials of accused accessories before the fact commence after the date of our opinion in the present case, an accessory before the fact may be convicted of a greater crime or greater degree of crime than that of which his principal was convicted. (Citations omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 111 Md. App. 401 - Harvey v. State