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← 303 F.3d 333 - Kutzner v. Cockrell

Kutzner v. Cockrell’s Empirical Analysis

303 F.3d 333 · 2002

Citation profile

52
cited by 52 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
September 2023
most recently cited

28 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 52 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2023 · most notably Dunn v. Cockrell (2002), Pippin v. Dretke (2005)

28 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

310200220102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · Slack v. McDaniel · United States v. Agurs · Giglio v. United States · Barefoot v. Estelle

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[D]ue process is not implicated by the prosecution's introduction or allowance of false or perjured testimony unless the prosecution actually knows or believes the testimony to be false or perjured.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “`The McFarland Court was concerned only with that period of time between the habeas petitioner's motion for the appointment of counsel and the filing of the initial petition.' Thus, McFarland does not justify appointment of counsel or stay of execution for the preparation of a second federal habeas petition.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.