Cody v. Hillard’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 federal appellate · 10 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 54 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A]n earlier established prevailing party status extends to postjudgment work only if it is ‘a necessary adjunc[t] to the initial litigation.’ Work that is more ‘like a new, separate lawsuit’ requires a fresh determination of entitlement to fees. The test is whether the later issues litigated were ‘inextricably intertwined with those on which the plaintiff prevailed in the underlying suit.’”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 328 F. Supp. 2d 36 - Blackman v. District of Columbia · 421 F. Supp. 2d 1061 - Grier v. Goetz

2. “Defendants object to compensating Ms. Hill and Ms. Winter under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and contend it is unclear when Ms. Hill and Ms. Winter would be compensated. However, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(h) provides, “In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.” Absent an agreement between parties regarding compensation for Ms. Hill and Ms. Winter, any attorneys’ fee award will be made as authorized by law. Under Rule 23(h) and in the context of the January 24, 2008 hearing (doc. # 1208) before Judge Earl H. Carroll regarding the appointment of Plaintiffs’ class coun sel and papers the parties have filed, the April 1, 2008 Order means that Ms. Hill’s and Ms. Winter’s compensation will be determined under the governing statutory authority, i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 3626 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997 (e), 1983, 1988, unless the parties reach a different agreement. Under § 1988, the court may award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party. Under § 1997e, the court may not award fees except to the extent the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of Plaintiffs’ rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under § 1988 and the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation. Section 1997e also limits the hourly rate to 150 percent of the hourly rate established for payment of”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 633 F. Supp. 2d 834 - Graves v. Arpaio

3. “[T]he work done by counsel in [the monitoring phase] ... was as necessary to the attainment of adequate relief for their client as was all of their earlier work in the courtroom which secured ... [the] initial success in obtaining the consent decree. This case did not involve a single tortious act by the [defendant] that resulted in a discrete injury to [the plaintiff], nor was the harm alleged the kind that could be remedied by a mere award of damages or the entry of declaratory relief. Instead, [the plaintiff] filed suit to force the [defendant] to comply with its obligations under the Clean Air Act to develop and implement an emissions inspection and maintenance program covering 10 counties surrounding two major metropolitan areas. Protection of the full scope of relief afforded by the consent decree was thus crucial to safeguard the interests asserted by [the plaintiff].... In a case of this kind, measures necessary to enforce the remedy ordered by the District Court cannot be divorced from the matters upon which [the plaintiff] prevailed in securing the consent decree.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 421 F. Supp. 2d 1061 - Grier v. Goetz