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304 F.3d 813

Docket No. 02-1848.

Boyd v. United States

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted: July 9, 2002.

Filed: Sept. 25, 2002.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied: Nov. 12, 2002.

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 2002-11-12

2 counsel of record

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation · Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp. · Mathenia v. Delo

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 2002-11-12

How this case has been cited

Cited by 24 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2021

12 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

180200220102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1*814Willie E. Boyd, pro se.

¶2Mary Jane Lyle, argued, Asst. U.S. Attorney, St. Louis, MO, for appellee.

¶3Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5Willie Boyd’s petition for panel rehearing having been granted, we return the matter to the District Court with directions to file and then dismiss Mr. Boyd’s motion under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it is, on its face, a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition, see Mathenia v. Delo, 99 F.3d 1476, 1480 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, Mathenia v. Bowersox, 521 U.S. 1123, 117 S.Ct. 2518, 138 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1997), that we have not previously authorized and do not now authorize, our authorization being a prerequisite under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (2000) to the filing of a second or successive habeas petition.

¶6In order to establish a uniform procedure throughout the Circuit, we encourage district courts, in dealing with purported Rule 60(b) motions following the dismissal of habeas petitions, to employ a procedure whereby the district court files the purported Rule 60(b) motion and then conducts a brief initial inquiry to determine whether the allegations in the Rule 60(b) motion in fact amount to a second or successive collateral attack under either 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or § 2254. If the district court determines the Rule 60(b) motion is actually a second or successive habeas petition, the district court should dismiss it for failure to obtain authorization from the Court of Appeals or, in its discretion, may transfer the purported Rule 60(b) motion to the Court of Appeals. Depending on which course of action the district court chooses, the petitioner may either appeal the dismissal of the purported Rule 60(b) motion or, if the district court has elected to transfer the purported 60(b) motion to the Court of Appeals, await the action of the Court of Appeals.

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