J-S10045-23
2023 PA Super 203
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MACH TRANSPORT, LLC :
:
Appellant : No. 1003 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 11, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No: CP-09-SA-0000504-2021
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.
OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 13, 2023
Appellant, Mach Transport, LLC, was issued a traffic summons for
driving an unregistered vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1301. A magisterial district
justice found Appellant guilty and fined Appellant $4,652.00, and Appellant
timely appealed to the court of common pleas. On the day of trial, Appellant
appeared in court through counsel. Counsel and the Commonwealth agreed
that Appellant would pay a reduced fine. The trial court accepted the
agreement, entered a disposition of guilty and imposed the reduced fine.
Appellant now appeals to this Court and asks us to vacate its guilty plea
because it was unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. Appellant asserts
that (1) its attorney entered the guilty plea by mistake by relying on a
registration for another vehicle, and (2) the registration for the correct vehicle
demonstrates that it was properly registered on the date of the traffic stop.
For the reasons that follow, we remand for further proceedings concerning
whether Appellant is entitled to vacatur of its guilty plea.
J-S10045-23
Appellant, a limited liability corporation, is a Kentucky trucking
company. On January 22, 2021, a police officer conducted a traffic stop on a
tractor trailer owned by Appellant. The operator of the vehicle could not
provide a valid registration for the vehicle, so the officer issued a citation for
driving an unregistered vehicle. On October 21, 2021, a magisterial district
justice found Appellant guilty under Section 1301 and imposed a fine of
$4,652.00. Appellant appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
for a trial de novo.
On the date of trial, March 11, 2022, counsel for Appellant appeared as
the lone representative on Appellant’s behalf. The Commonwealth informed
the court, “This is an agreement . . . where the Commonwealth agrees to
reduce the fine to the amount of $2,326.00.” N.T., 3/11/22, at 2. Counsel
for Appellant advised that Appellant “[was] not present, [but] I have the
authority to go ahead and enter this [agreement] on [Appellant’s] behalf.”
Id. The Commonwealth stated that it had no objection to counsel negotiating
the agreement on Appellant's behalf. Id. The court asked whether counsel
“discussed with [Appellant] the fact that [counsel] was going to negotiate in
[an] attempt to get this [agreement]?” Id. at 3. Counsel answered, “Yes.”
Id. The court asked, “And your client was agreeable to that?” Id. Counsel
answered, “Yes.” Id. The court stated, “Based on that I will grant the
resolution that has been worked out between the Commonwealth and
[Appellant].” Id. On the disposition sheet, the court checked the box marked
“guilty” as well as the boxes marked “agreement,” “pay costs,” “pay fines”
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and “amended.” Miscellaneous Criminal Court and Information Sheet,
3/11/22. The court also wrote, “Reduce fine to $2,326.00 under 60-day
suspension.” Id.
On April 11, 2022, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court.
Subsequently, Appellant filed a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal in which it raised one issue: “Did the trial court err in accepting
Appellant’s guilty plea as it was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary since
Appellant provided a current vehicle registration but it was not presented
during plea negotiations?” The trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion
recommending that this Court affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. The
court stated, “[A]t the March 11, 2022 hearing, Appellant never entered into
a guilty plea nor was Appellant’s case dismissed; rather this Court merely
granted the Resolution stipulated to between Appellant and the
Commonwealth.” Opinion, 6/23/22, at 3.
Appellant presents a single issue in this appeal: “Did the Trial Court err
in accepting Appellant’s guilty pleas [sic] as it was not knowing, intelligent and
voluntary since Appellant provided a current vehicle registration but it was not
presented during plea negotiations?” Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant asks this Court to vacate its guilty plea on the ground that
Appellant’s counsel entered the plea by mistake. In an affidavit appended to
Appellant’s brief, counsel averred that he had the correct registration in his
possession on the date of the common pleas hearing but mistakenly entered
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the guilty plea by using a registration for another vehicle.1 The correct
registration demonstrates that the vehicle stopped by the police was properly
registered in Kentucky on the date of the stop. Appellant’s brief concludes,
“Appellant in no way made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary agreement to
plead guilty to driving an unregistered vehicle [because] the vehicle was
legally registered.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.
The Commonwealth’s brief does not address whether Appellant entered
a guilty plea. Instead, the Commonwealth states that “in the interests of
justice, as [Appellant] appears to have facially set forth a claim of [its]
innocence based on after-discovered evidence, the Commonwealth has no
objection to a remand of this matter to the trial court” for Appellant to raise a
claim of after-discovered evidence. Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
We begin by addressing Appellant’s argument that the court of common
pleas erred in declining to vacate its guilty plea. Three questions require
consideration: (1) whether the court had the authority to accept a guilty plea
in an appeal from a summary criminal conviction from a magisterial district
justice court, (2) whether the record demonstrates that Appellant entered a
guilty plea, and (3) whether the court should consider Appellant’s request to
withdraw its guilty plea.
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1 The Commonwealth correctly points out this issue could not have been raised
in the trial court, since Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D) expressly provides that there shall
be no post-sentence motion following a trial de novo in the court of common
pleas. Appellant’s first opportunity to raise its issue therefore was on appeal
to this Court.
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We answer the first question in the affirmative. In summary cases, the
Rules expressly permit guilty pleas in a magisterial district justice court, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. 454(A-B), but the Rules are conspicuously silent as to whether
guilty pleas are permissible in common pleas court in appeals from a
magisterial district justice court. The only procedures that the Rules expressly
authorize in appeals are (1) dismissal of the appeal if the defendant fails to
appear on the date of trial, Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(D); (2) withdrawal of the appeal
by the defendant, Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(E); or (3) trial de novo followed
immediately by the verdict and sentencing (if necessary), Pa.R.Crim.P.
462(A), (F). The Comment to Rule 462 states that procedures in summary
appeals are “comparable” to the summary trial case procedures in Rule 454
(procedures before magisterial district justices). The term “comparable”
means that the procedures on appeal are similar, but not identical, to
procedures in a magisterial district justice court. See Merriam-Webster.com
(defining “comparable” as “similar, like”). Thus, the Comment leaves open
whether guilty pleas are available in appeals from a magisterial district justice
court.
Although the Rules are silent, the Judiciary Code establishes that
common pleas courts have the authority to accept guilty pleas in appeals of
summary criminal cases from a magisterial district justice court. The Code
provides in relevant part that “[e]very judge of a court of common pleas shall
have all the powers of a . . . magisterial district judge of the minor judiciary.”
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 912. Since Pa.R.Crim.P. 454 authorizes magisterial district
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justices to accept guilty pleas in summary criminal cases, Section 912 extends
the same authority to common pleas judges in appeals from a magisterial
district justice court.2
The next question is whether Appellant actually entered a guilty plea in
common pleas court. The court asserts that “Appellant never entered into a
guilty plea . . . rather this Court merely granted the Resolution stipulated to
between Appellant and the Commonwealth.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Opinion,
6/23/22, at 3. In our view, however, the “resolution” was equivalent to a
negotiated guilty plea. A guilty plea is “an admission of all the elements of a
formal criminal charge.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 351 A.2d 280, 282
(Pa. 1976). In a negotiated guilty plea, the defendant admits all elements of
the charge in exchange for some concession by the Commonwealth, e.g., a
reduced sentence. Comment, Pa.R.Crim.P. 590. Although the parties did not
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2 This application of Section 912 is beneficial to our criminal justice system.
It has been approximated that in the past, ninety percent of all criminal cases
end with guilty pleas. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History,
79 Colum.
L. Rev. 1 (1979). Without guilty pleas, the already large backlog of cases in
our criminal justice system might swell beyond the breaking point. Section
912 helps reduce this backlog by authorizing guilty pleas in summary criminal
appeals. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, plea bargaining
is "inherent in the criminal law and its administration" and that "[d]isposition
of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the [criminal]
process but a highly desirable part for many reasons."
Id. citing Brady v.
United States,
397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970).
Although Section 912 fills a gap left open by the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
we respectfully suggest that it would assist practitioners for our Supreme
Court to amend the Rules to state explicitly that guilty pleas are available in
appeals from summary convictions in magisterial district justice court.
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expressly state that Appellant was “pleading guilty,” they informed the court
that Appellant agreed to pay a reduced fine of $2,326.00. Counsel for
Appellant further advised that Appellant consented to counsel negotiating this
agreement with the Commonwealth.3 These facts reflect a negotiated plea in
which Appellant admitted guilt for driving an unregistered vehicle in return for
a reduced fine.
The third and final question is whether the court should consider
Appellant’s request to withdraw its guilty plea. Upon review, we remand this
case with the directive that the trial court conduct a hearing on this issue.
The present case involves a post-sentence attempt to withdraw a guilty
plea, so the attempt must satisfy a stricter standard than a pre-sentence
motion to withdraw a guilty plea. In a pre-sentence motion, the defendant
must offer a claim of innocence that is “at least plausible to demonstrate, in
and of itself, a fair and just reason for . . . withdrawal of a plea.”
Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1292 (Pa. 2015). In
contrast, to prevail on a post-sentence request to withdraw a plea, “[a]
defendant must demonstrate that manifest injustice would result if the court
were to deny his post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Manifest
injustice may be established if the plea was not tendered knowingly,
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3 It is permissible for an attorney to enter a guilty plea on behalf of a corporate
client, since “a corporation may appear in court only through an attorney at
law admitted in practice before the court.” Walacavage v. Excell 2000,
Inc.,
480 A.2d 281, 284 (Pa. Super. 1984). The same principle applies to
limited liability corporations such as Appellant. Banks v. Cooper,
171 A.3d
798, 799 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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intelligently, and voluntarily.” Commonwealth v. Hart, 180 A.3d 660, 664
(Pa. Super. 2017). “The determination of the existence or nonexistence of
manifest injustice lies . . . with the trial court in the first instance.”
Commonwealth v. Starr,
301 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 1973). To determine
whether a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the court must
examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea.
Id.
In this case, Appellant argues that its guilty plea was unknowing and
unintelligent because it is actually innocent of driving an unregistered vehicle.
Appellant argues that its counsel mistakenly entered Appellant’s guilty plea
based on a registration issued to another vehicle. The correct registration,
Appellant continues, demonstrates that its vehicle was properly registered at
the time of the traffic stop. In effect, Appellant contends that it would be
manifestly unjust not to allow it to withdraw its guilty plea because there was
no factual basis for the plea.
Manifest injustice may occur, inter alia, when a defendant enters a guilty
plea based on a mistake of fact that his attorney failed to recognize in advance
of the guilty plea hearing. See Commonwealth v. Hodges, 789 A.2d 764,
765, 767 (Pa. Super. 2002) (denial of request to withdraw guilty plea
constituted manifest injustice, where (1) defendant entered guilty plea in first
degree murder case to avoid death penalty and was sentenced to life
imprisonment, (2) defense counsel believed mistakenly that defendant was
seventeen years old at time of offense, but (3) defendant was actually fifteen
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years old at time of offense and therefore could not be subject to death
penalty; under these circumstances, defendant’s plea agreement was not
knowing, intelligent or voluntarily). Alternatively, manifest injustice may
occur when a defendant provides evidence that satisfies the after-discovered
evidence doctrine. Under this doctrine, relief is available when the evidence
(1) could not have been obtained prior to conclusion of trial by the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will
not be used solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely
result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted. Commonwealth v.
Rivera, 939 A.2d 355, 359 (Pa. Super. 2007). The after-discovered evidence
doctrine also applies to evidence discovered after a guilty plea that meets
these four standards. Commonwealth v. Peoples,
319 A.2d 679, 681 (Pa.
1974).
In view of the evidence allegedly demonstrating Appellant’s innocence,
we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings concerning
whether to vacate Appellant’s guilty plea where it would be manifestly injustice
not to do so. Starr, 301 A.2d at 595 (determination of manifest injustice lies
with trial court in the first instance).
Case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Date: 10/13/2023
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