Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 305 F.2d 572 - Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates

Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates’s Empirical Analysis

305 F.2d 572 · 1962

Citation profile

41
cited by 41 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
4
states following
August 2015
most recently cited

21 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 41 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2015 · most notably United States v. Byrum (1972), Rogers v. Grimaldi (1989)

21 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

210196219701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on International Ass'n of Machinists v. Duckworth · Mosser v. Darrow · United States v. Crosby · Campbell v. United States · Henry Heide, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “It is established beyond question under New York law that it is illegal to sell corporate office or management control by itself (that is, accompanied by no stock or insufficient stock to carry voting control). . . . The same rule apparently applies in all jurisdictions where the question has arisen. . . . The rationale of the rule is undisputable: persons enjoying management control hold it on behalf of the corporation’s stockholders, and therefore may not regard it as their own personal property to dispose of as they wish. Any other rule would violate the most fundamental principle of corporate democracy, that management must represent and be chosen by, or at least with the consent of, those who own the corporation.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “). Indeed, as Judge Friendly himself earlier observed, a contractual provision which would require as a condition of the sale that the seller of stock deliver to the buyer the resignations of the majority of the company's directors and cause the buyer's nominees to be elected in their place is violative of public policy”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[t]o hold the seller for delinquencies of the new directors only if he knew the purchaser was an intending looter is not a sufficient sanction.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.