Miller v. Collins’s Empirical Analysis
305 F.3d 491 · 2002
Citation profile
31 federal appellate · 1 district ·
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Slack v. McDaniel · Houston v. Lack · Christopher Artuz Superintendent Green Haven Correctional Facility v. Tony Bruce Bennett · Lucas v. O'Dea · Dunlap v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In our view, there are two ways to read Bronaugh . The first, which is the State of Ohio’s position in this case, is that a Rule 26(B) application is technically part of the direct review process, but in effect, it functions as a collateral attack because it only tolls the statute of limitations during pendency, it does not affect the conclusion of direct review and thus does not postpone the initial running of the one-year limitations period. The other possible interpretation is that because a Rule 26(B) application is part of the direct review process, a conviction does not become final pursuant to section 2244(d)(1)(A) until the Ohio courts dispose of a petitioner’s Rule 26(B) application. Thus, a timely application does not merely toll the statute of limitations, the limitations period does not begin to run until its conclusion.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Orange v. Calbone · Lopez v. Wilson“(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. DiCenzi v. Rose · Dicenzi v. Rose“(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of— (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.