State v. Jackson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Threaten” is defined as “to utter threats against”; “threat” is defined as “an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury or damage on another.” (Citation omitted). This usage suggests the focus in determining whether a threat has been made is upon the actions of the person expressing or uttering his or her intention to inflict evil, injury or damage.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Bartilson · State v. Welborn

2. “Once a defendant is found competent, the presumption of competency continues until contrary evidence is produced. See State v. Thomas, 205 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Iowa 1973). Defendant asserts, however, that the question of competency is always open, citing [State v.] Kempf, 282 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa 1979). It is true that a defendant may present evidence of incompetency at any point in the proceedings. But after an adjudication of competency, new or additional evidence must be' produced by defendant to overcome the presumption of competency the law imposes. In the absence of such additional proof, the trial judge was not obliged to reconsider the same evidence upon which the competency hearing judge had already determined defendant was competent to stand trial. Kempf only addressed [the] trial court’s continuing duty to consider evidence of incompetency that was not presented previously due to [the] trial court’s failure to hold a competency hearing. Id. at 706-07 . Here, a pretrial competency hearing was held, and the competency issue decided adversely to defendant. Thus, no “unresolved question” of defendant’s competency existed until defendant produced evidence to generate such a question. See id. at 707 . In the absence of additional evidence, [the] trial court properly relied on the competency hearing court’s determination.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Rieflin

3. “[T]he terrorism statute does not state clearly whose reasonable expectation is addressed. But, because “the only act mentioned ... is the act which is intended to place another in fear,” the reasonable expectation must be that of the actor. Like the other sections of the assault chapter, use of the objective standard of reasonableness [in prosecutions under subsection 2] indicates the issue is not whether the victim actually believed the threat would be carried out, but whether the actor so intended, and whether the actor’s belief was reasonable. . .. We also note that while subsection (1) of the terrorism statute explicitly requires the accused’s act must place the victims of the act “in reasonable apprehension of serious injury,” subsection (2) contains no similar language. This disparity suggests the victim’s state of mind was not intended to be a factor in subsection (2), under which this defendant was charged.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. White