¶1(dissenting):
¶2I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that police involvement in the conduct of the UPS employees was insufficient to remove their acts from the category of a “private search.” In my view, the majority’s contention is forcefully refuted by the facts set forth in its opinion. I would reverse.
¶3The majority enunciates two factors critical in determining whether or not search or seizure by a private citizen constitutes government action: (1) Whether the government instigated, participated, or acquiesced in the citizen’s conduct, and (2) whether the citizen engaged in the search with the intent *438to further law enforcement efforts. United States v. Bazan, 807 F. (2d) 1200 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lambert, 771 F. (2d) 83 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Snowadzki, 723 F. (2d) 1427 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Miller, 688 F. (2d) 652 (9th Cir. 1982).
¶4As to the first factor, the search in question was instigated by Police Officer Brookie Priester. The record reflects no indication that any UPS employee suspected a connection between the appellant and contraband shipments. The overt instigation of Officer Priester set up surveillance which led to interception of the next package addressed to appellant. It is clear that without police involvement, the evidence used to convict the appellant would not have come to light. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 L. Ed. (2d) 639 (1989).
¶5I would find that the second factor was established when UPS employees acted in concert with police with the obvious intent to further law enforcement efforts. In direct response to explicit police instructions, UPS employees intercepted and searched the package, discovered the contraband, and reported to police officers who continued uninterruptedly their supervision of the transaction.
¶6The identical test articulated by the majority leads to the inescapable conclusion that at all times subsequent to the initial request by Officer Priester, UPS employees acted as agents of the government. When scrutinized under the requirements of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution, my reading of this record fully convinces me that appellant’s constitutional rights were violated.
¶7Unwilling to concede that the end justifies the means, I share the view of Justices Black and White that “[ujnfortu-nately, grave evils such as the narcotics traffic can too easily cause threats to our basic liberties by making attractive the adoption of constitutionally forbidden shortcuts that might-suppress and blot out more quickly the unpopular and dangerous conduct.” Harmelin v. Michigan, — U.S. —, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2717, 115 L. Ed. (2d) 836 (1991) (White, J. dissenting) (citing Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 427, 90 S. Ct. 642, 658, 24 L. Ed. (2d) 610 (1970) (Black, J. dissenting)).
¶8I concur in the majority view that the line between govern*439mental and private search is indeed fine. But there is a definitive line — and its broad purposes eclipse any validity of the reactionary trend to eviscerate constitutional protections in the hope of curing specific societal ills. It is my firm belief that in this instance, that line has been transgressed. I would reverse.