Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 306 Ark. 4 - McElroy v. Grisham

McElroy v. Grisham’s Empirical Analysis

1991

Citation profile

91
cited by 91 later decisions
1
states following
March 2019
most recently cited

89 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 91 later decisions — most recently March 2019 · most notably Ward v. Doss (2005), Ramirez v. White County Circuit Court (2001)

89 state decisions

510199120002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Hayes v. First National Bank of Memphis · Winkle v. Grand National Bank · Davidson v. Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. · Rick's Pro Dive 'N Ski Shop, Inc. v. Jennings-Lemon · Taggart & Taggart Seed Company, Inc. v. City of Augusta

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 91 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In denying that the transactions amounted to a usurious loan, the appellees first contend that the documents were not usurious on their face. While it is true that, taken alone, the original warranty deed and option contract appear to be documents concerning only the sale of land, and no mention of a loan or obligation on the part of Mr. McElroy to repay the appellees is recited, these transactions call to mind an oft quoted maxim: “The law shells the covering and extracts the kernel. Names amount to nothing when they fail to designate the facts.” Sparks v. Robinson, 66 Ark. 460 , 51 S.W. 460 (1899). In Sparks, we upheld the trial court’s conclusion that an absolute bill of sale of a sewing machine, coupled with an absolute right of redemption, amounted to nothing more than a mortgage with a usurious rate of interest. Here, the chancellor found that the purported sale and option to repurchase were nothing more than a cloaking device to hide the true transaction — a loan in the amount of $80,000 to be repaid in two years, with interest totalling $40,000. Such a transaction has been historically recognized as one of several simple devices to evade Arkansas usury laws. See G. Collins andV. Ham, The Usury Law of Arkansas: A Study in Evasion, 8 Ark. L. Rev. 399 (1954).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “(a) General Loans: (i) The maximum lawful rate of interest on any contract entered into after the effective date hereof shall not exceed five percent (5%) per annum above the Federal Reserve Discount Rate at the time of the contract. (ii) All such contracts having a rate of interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate shall be void as to the unpaid interest. A person who has paid interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate may recover, within the time provided by law, twice the amount of interest paid. It is unlawful for any person to knowingly charge a rate of interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate in effect at the time of the contract, and any person who does so shall be subject to such punishment as may be provided by law.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “whether the 'lender' intended to violate the usury laws, but whether the lender knowingly entered into a usurious contract intending to profit by the methods employed.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.