Cobbins v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) The seriousness of the offense, and whether violence was employed by the juvenile in the commission of the offense; (2) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated offenses which would lead to the determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by past efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile and the response to such efforts; and (3) The prior history, character traits, mental maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the juvenile’s prospects for rehabilitation.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Butler v. State · James Booker Jr. v. State

2. “The hearing on the motion to transfer was not held until almost fourteen months after the charges were filed. For nine months Cobbins was held in the Mississippi County Detention Center, unable to post bonds. Section 9-27-318(b)(2) states that “the circuit court shall hold a hearing within ninety days of the filing of charges to determine whether to retain jurisdiction of the juvenile in Circuit Court.” Cobbins would have us hold that the Circuit Court loses jurisdiction of the charges upon failing to hold the transfer hearing within the ninety-day period. Although the language of the statute is mandatory, it is silent on the effect of noncompliance. In making the decision on this issue, the Trial Court analogized to parole revocation hearings. A statute requires that a hearing be conducted on parole revocation within a reasonable time, not to exceed sixty days after the defendant’s arrest. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-301 (b)(2) (1987). In Haskins v. State, 264 Ark. 454 , 572 S.W.2d 411 (1978), we held that this requirement was not intended by the General Assembly to be jurisdictional. The sixty-day limitation represented the period beyond which the hearing could not be delayed if the defendant objected. Failure to demand a hearing within the sixty-day period waived the right to insist on a timely hearing. Here, the trial Court relied on the Haskins case and determined that the ninety-day hearing requirement was not intended to be jurisdictional. We consider the analogy to be apt. A”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Robinson v. State