State v. Tichnell’s Empirical Analysis
1986
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 91 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 94 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2023 · most notably Walker v. Illinois (1986), Hunt v. State (1990)
1 federal appellate · 91 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Brady v. State of Maryland · Chapman v. State of California · Gideon v. Wainwright · United States v. Bagley
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 94 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“A two-part test was articulated in Strickland, i.e., that to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel the defendant must show both that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. [Citations omitted.] The prejudice component of Strickland “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” [466 U.S.] at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064 . Accordingly, as we said in Harris, supra, 303 Md. at 700 , 496 A.2d 1074 , citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 , it is not enough for the defendant merely “to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding, or that the errors impaired the presentation of the defense.” (Emphasis in original.) The burden is on the defendant to establish “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. at 2068 . Furthermore, a reasonable probability is “ ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Id.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage““ ‘Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to elimi nate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ’ ””
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Oken v. State · State v. Thomas““Tichnell also claimed that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the sentencing jury that it had the option of imposing a life sentence without regard to the relative weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and must find beyond a reasonable doubt that a death sentence was appropriate before that sentence could be imposed____ We note, however, that the proposed instruction would sanction total disregard for the statutorily mandated weighing process in the sentencing jury’s determination whether to impose a life or death sentence. Therefore, the failure to give such an instruction was not error. As the State maintains, if life sentences could be imposed without regard to articulated aggravating and mitigating factors, there would be no principled or rational way to differentiate the few cases in which the death penalty is justified from the many in which it is not. Nothing in the statute requires that the jury be instructed that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate sanction before that sentence may be imposed. See Foster, Evans and Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306 , 503 A.2d 1326 (1986); Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487 , 499 A.2d 1261 (1985); Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439 , 499 A.2d 1236 (1985).””
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Scott v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.