Volume 306 — Pennsylvania State Reports

Notice by assignee of mortgagee to tenants is not regular entry by suit (ejectment), or foreclosure proceedings, and is a nullity, as such privity does not exist as would enable a mortgagee to compel tenants of the mortgagor to pay him rent: Myers v. White, 1 Rawle 353; Bulger v. Wilderman, 101 Pa. Superior Ct. 168; Abraham, etc., B. & L. Assn. v. Miller, 13 Pa. D. & C. 73.

<p>Where regular employer controls conduct of employee he is responsible for his actions while the employee is performing services for another: Funston v. Ingenito, 282 Pa. 124; Thatcher v. Pierce, 281 Pa. 16, 20; Lang v. Hanlon, 302 Pa. 173; Robson v. Martin, 291 Pa. 426.</p> <p>The fact that the chauffeur, when delivering cars from his employer’s garage, did so in hope of receiving a tip from those to whom he delivered the car, would not make him any the less the servant of his regular employer, the keeper of the garage.</p> <p>There is nothing in the present record to take the case out of the rule that a bailee’s possesion continues till the bailed article is redelivered to the bailor, and the bailee is responsible for the negligence of his servant: Jimmo v. Frick, 255 Pa. 353; Perry v. Fox, 156 N. Y. Supp. 368; Matlack v. Chalfant, 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 49; Griesmer v. Netter, 273 Pa. 546.</p>

The bank takes the position that it did all that it was required to do to protect its own rights by taking Mrs. Jurist’s statement as to the extent of the mortgage. We have already shown that this position is incorrect, and that the bank should have searched the record for the mortgage, and, having found it, should have made inquiry to determine the extent of the debt secured by the mortgage.

<p>The owners of all the capital stock of the Liberty Brewing Company were the owners of its property, and, in the absence of proof of its market value when the federal taxes were paid the actual value of the corporate stock was the value of the corporate property: Jarvis, Trustee, v. Bell, 296 Pa. 568.</p> <p>We contend that no final assessment of taxes due to the federal government which the appellants paid for the Liberty Brewing Company was ever made against it so far as the evidence shows.</p>

The writ of scire facias in the instant case was sued out on June 3, 1931, and the Act of 1931 went into effect on September 1, 1931. The question, therefore, arises: What effect, if any, has this amending act upon pending litigation? It is undoubtedly procedural in its nature, and hence “it is applied, as of course, to litigation existing at the time of its passage”: Vinnacombe v. Phila., 297 Pa. 564; Bailey v. Lavine, 302 Pa. 273.

<p>Plaintiff was a mere invitee, as to whose safety defendant owed merely the duty of reasonable care: Nichol v. Telephone Co., 266 Pa. 464.</p> <p>Defendant was under no duty to warn plaintiff that a large electric motor, operating a driving belt, was dangerous : O’Keefe v. Thorn, 24 W. N. C. 379; Gallagher v. Snellenburg, 210 Pa. 642; Fletcher v. Traction Co., 190 Pa. 117.</p> <p>The fact that a machine is at rest at any particular moment does not render it any less dangerous under the rule of law here applicable, for the very reason that it may start up at any time: Landis v. Curtis & Jones Co., Inc., 224 Pa. 400; Fletcher v. Traction Co., 190 Pa. 117; Baldwin v. Urner, 206 Pa. 459; Fick v. Jackson, 3 Pa. Superior Ct. 378.</p> <p>The physical facts show that plaintiff is solely responsible for the accident: Maue v. Ry., 284 Pa. 599.</p> <p>Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.</p>

There was no evidence of snch continued fraud or concealment as would toll the l-unning of the statute: Smith v. Blachley, 198 Pa. 173.

<p>The Superior Court in its opinion points out that the school district was without authority to contract with Kolansky for the collection of the school taxes. The appellee wishes to add that under section 402 of the School Code, or School Law, the appellant school district must collect the necessary taxes in the manner provided by the School Law. There is no place in this law for the appointment of an attorney or agent to collect school taxes. This duty is upon the city treasurer and no ingenuity or invention in calling the collector, agent or attorney, can contravene or circumvent the provisions of the School Law.</p>