¶1*556 Korner & Sampson, Coral Gables, for appellant.
¶2Leonard Frishman, Coral Gables, and Barry J. Clyman, for appellee.
¶3Before PEARSON, HENDRY and NATHAN, JJ.
¶4HENDRY, Judge.
¶5This consolidated appeal involves an effort by the appellant to impose a constructive or resulting trust upon the assets of the defendant-appellee and his former wife and also to foreclose a mortgage upon the couple's marital residence.
¶6The appellant is the grandmother of the appellee's ex-wife. The marriage of the appellee and his wife was dissolved by a circuit court decree dated September 11, 1973, which decree is included in the record on appeal.
¶7By the express terms of the final decree, the court determined that neither party established any special equity in the marital home, which is involved in this case, and the property was declared subject to a partition suit.
¶8The record shows that during the pendency of the dissolution proceeding, the appellant filed her complaint seeking to impose a resulting or constructive trust on money which the appellant allegedly loaned to the appellee and his wife during their marriage.
¶9The record also shows that on the same day in which the appellant filed her complaint, the appellee's ex-wife, Patricia Joan Willaford, executed and delivered to her grandmother, the appellant, a mortgage deed covering the marital residence.
¶10On the face of the deed, the appellee's name is crossed out in three places, and he neither joined nor consented in the deed.
¶11It further appears that the mortgage secured a promissory note totaling $41,269.00, which is exactly the sum which the appellant alleged in her complaint that she had loaned the couple during their marriage.
¶12We do not deem it necessary to unduly lengthen this opinion by tracing the various procedural steps undertaken by the parties. It is sufficient to note that by a judgment on the pleadings and by entry of a summary judgment the trial court entered judgments in favor of the appellee.
¶13On appeal, the appellant has raised two points in support of her contention that the court below committed reversible error.
¶14First, appellant argues that the court erred by entering a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the appellee where the appellant properly alleged a cause of action for a constructive trust.
¶15In her complaint, the appellant averred that she "loaned" money to the appellee and his former wife so that the couple could purchase the marital home and pay off other debts they had incurred.
¶16Further, appellant alleged that she had sought security for the loans, but the appellee and his ex-wife refused to provide it. Appellant contended that it was only by virtue of the family relationship and the trust and confidence which she placed in the appellee and his ex-wife that she made the loans.
¶17The appellee advanced several affirmative defenses to the appellant's claim, the chief of which was that any monies advanced by the appellant were in the form of a gift to her granddaughter.
¶18In our opinion, the trial court was correct in determining that the complaint failed to state a cause of action entitling the appellant to impress a constructive trust.
¶19In the first place, we think the appellant has not shown a res upon which a constructive trust might be based. See, *557 Colony Hotel, Inc. v. Pokress, Fla. 1956, 88 So.2d 618.
¶20Secondly, our reading of the complaint convinces us that the appellant has failed to state any facts which tend to show that the appellee or his former wife abused any confidence reposed in them by the appellant or employed any other fraudulent or questionable means for obtaining money from her. See, Fickling Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 1936, 123 Fla. 556, 167 So. 42; Ament v. Ament, Fla.App. 1973, 278 So.2d 330.
¶21As her second point on appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by declaring the mortgage which was given to her by her granddaughter to be null and void.
¶22The central issue under this point is whether or not Patricia Joan Willaford had the legal capacity on August 21, 1973 to encumber property which was held during the marriage as a tenancy by the entirety. We hold that she did not.
¶23It is the law that property held by the entireties may not be encumbered or alienated without the joint action of both parties; one party may not act so as to defeat the other's rights in the property. Anderson v. Trueman, Fla. 1930, 100 Fla. 727, 130 So. 12; Tingle v. Hornsby, Fla. App. 1959, 111 So.2d 274.
¶24Appellant argues, however, that when the mortgage deed was executed the marriage had been orally dissolved by the trial court on the same day, and therefore the property was no longer held by the entireties, but as tenants in common.
¶25Appellant relies on the cases of Berkenfield v. Jacobs, Fla. 1955, 83 So.2d 265; and McKendree v. McKendree, Fla.App. 1962, 139 So.2d 173 as support for her position.
¶26We find that the rule of law applied in each case was that a divorce decree is not effective until it is reduced to writing and signed by the chancellor, and that oral pronouncements of the court are not construed as final in nature.
¶27The exception alluded to in the Berkenfield case, and heavily relied upon by the appellant, is a narrow one, and we decline to extend it to the facts involved in this case.
¶28We hold that the decree dissolving the marriage was not final until September 11, 1973, and that at the time the mortgage deed was executed and delivered the property still was held as a tenancy by the entirety. Therefore, the court was correct in determining that the mortgage was a nullity.
¶29Accordingly, the judgments appealed hereby are affirmed.
¶30Affirmed.