Chesnut v. Montgomery’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 federal appellate · 8 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Any administrator ... who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any information which such administrator is required by this subchapter to furnish to a participant or beneficiary (unless such failure or refusal results from matters reasonably beyond the control of the administrator) by mailing the material requested to the last known address of the requesting participant or beneficiary within 30 days after such request may in the court’s discretion be personally liable to such participant or beneficiary in the amount of up to [$110] a day from the date of such failure or refusal and the court may in its discretion order such other relief as it deems proper. For purposes of this paragraph, ... each violation described in subparagraph (B) with request to a single participant or beneficiary, shall be treated as a separate violation.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 664 F. Supp. 2d 972 - Brubaker v. Deere & Co. · Geissal v. Moore Medical Corp.

2. “Although an “employer’s good faith and the absence of harm are relevant in deciding whether to award a statutory penalty,” Chesnut v. Montgomery, 307 F.3d 698, 704 (8th Cir.2002), “neither [a defendant’s] good faith nor the absence of actual injury to [the plaintiff] precludes the award of a statutory penalty.” Id. at 703 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 633 F. Supp. 2d 695 - Settell v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

3. “[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Susan E. Cox and Edward A. Cox v. Iowa Department of Human Services