¶1concurring.
¶2I concur in the result reached by the majority and in the principles of law which I understand the majority to rely upon in reaching its holding. As I understand the majority opinion, the vice in the State’s case here is that the State chose in drafting its indictment to tie itself to the one specific date of 12 December 1980 and to allege that the defendant “did feloniously agree, plan, combine, conspire and confederate” on that date. I further understand the majority opinion to interpret the use of the verbs “agree,” “plan,” “combine,” “conspire” and “confederate” to have caused the defendant reasonably to believe that the State contended that he entered into the alleged conspiracy on that date. The defendant then justifiably relied upon the misperception induced by the indictment and prepared his defense in the belief that the State would seek to prove his involvement in a conspiracy on that date and no other.
¶3At trial the State’s evidence tended to show that the defendant entered into the conspiracy to commit felonious larceny well prior to the specific date alleged in the bill of indictment and remained a party to the conspiracy until a time well after the date alleged in the bill. As I read the majority opinion, the majority views this simply as a case in which the form of the bill of indictment allowed the defendant the reasonable belief that the State was contending that he conspired only on the date alleged in the bill. After the defendant offered evidence in the nature of alibi evidence for the date charged, the State did not attempt to prove that he entered into the conspiracy on that date. In other words, the majority treats this as a case in which the failure of the State’s proof to match its allegations substantially impaired the defendant’s ability to prepare a defense. I agree.
¶4I am concerned, however, that portions of the majority opinion could be misconstrued as changing long established principles of law regarding the somewhat unique offense of criminal conspiracy. I do not believe that the majority opinion is intended to *652have or has that effect. In particular, I am concerned that the majority opinion not be misread as indicating that in the present case the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant entered into a criminal conspiracy to commit larceny prior to 12 December 1980 and continued as a conspirator until the conspiracy was consummated by the actual larceny. The fault is in the bill of indictment, not the evidence presented. The evidence clearly was sufficient in this regard to support a conviction for conspiracy upon a proper bill of indictment giving adequate notice to the defendant which would enable him to adequately prepare a defense.
¶5Conspiracies are continuing offenses which generally occur over a period of time of more than a day. Even though the offense of conspiracy is complete upon the formation of the illegal agreement, the offense continues until the conspiracy is either consummated or abandoned. State v. Conrad, 275 N.C. 342, 168 S.E. 2d 39 (1969). A distinction must be made here between the larceny and the criminal conspiracy to commit larceny. In the first, the corpus delicti is the act itself; in the latter, it is the meeting of the minds in an agreement to do the act. See, State v. Whiteside, 204 N.C. 710, 169 S.E. 711 (1933). As conspiracies are continuing offenses, the better practice in drawing bills of indictment would be to state the dates of the criminal conspiracy as the entire period during which the State contends the defendant was a party to the continuing conspiracy. This may be done by simply stating that the defendant agreed, planned, combined and conspired “from on or about” a particular date “until on or about” a particular date.
¶6Had the bill of indictment in this case been drawn as indicated above, a result different from the one reached by the majority would have been required. The defendant would have known that the State contended that the conspiracy began sometime in October or November of 1980 and continued until at least the end of December of that year. Providing such information in the bill of indictment would assure that the defendant was aware of the necessity of filing a bill of particulars if he desired further and more specific information.
¶7We have previously indicated that, in conspiracy cases, we will encourage our trial courts to allow motions for bills of particulars directing prosecutors to reveal information required to *653enable defendants to meet the charges against them, to the extent such information is known to the prosecutors. State v. Conrad, 275 N.C. 342, 168 S.E. 2d 39 (1969). The State will frequently not have direct evidence available to it to show the precise date upon which the conspirators entered into the conspiracy. The State can be required, however, to provide the defendant with such information as it has on the issue. See, id.The conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence and may be proved by circumstantial evidence. “It may be, and generally is, established by a number of indefinite acts, each of which, standing alone, might have little weight, but, taken collectively, they point unerringly to the existence of a conspiracy.” State v. Whiteside, 204 N.C. 710, 712, 169 S.E. 711, 712 (1933); quoted with approval in State v. LeDuc, 306 N.C. 62, 76, 291 S.E. 2d 607, 616 (1982). Therefore, in such cases, the State often will not be able to give the defendant a precise date upon which it contends the conspiracy was formed but will be able to place the defendant in as good a position as the State finds itself. The ultimate issues of whether and on what date a conspiracy has been entered into by the defendant will remain a question for the jury, with the State and the defendant going to trial with equal knowledge.
¶8Even if the defendant did not seek a bill of particulars, a bill of indictment as suggested herein would have informed the defendant that the State contended that the conspiracy charged was a continuing offense occurring over a considerable period of time. He would then have understood that the evidence he actually offered during the trial here, concerning his whereabouts on the weekend of 12 December 1980 and on the 19th and 20th of December, 1980, did not tend to establish an “alibi” in the true sense of that term. In order to establish an alibi, a defendant must offer evidence showing that he was elsewhere at the time of the crime in question and, therefore, could not have committed the crime charged.
¶9The majority holds, and I agree, that under the bill of indictment and the evidence relied upon in this case, the defendant’s offer of evidence that he was elsewhere on the only date charged in the bill was in the nature of alibi evidence and made the time of the offense material and of the essence. State v. Whittemore, 255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E. 2d 396 (1961). Under a bill of indictment that alleged the entire time during which the State contended the con*654spiracy existed, however, time clearly would not have been made of the essence or material by the defendant’s “alibi” evidence. Unlike the crimes charged in Whittemore, the continuing offense of criminal conspiracy may and often does occur on more than one date. Thus, evidence that the defendant could not have entered into the conspiracy on four or five days during the several months the State sought to prove he was engaged in a continuing criminal conspiracy would not have amounted to true “alibi” evidence, as it would not have tended to show that the defendant was elsewhere during the entire time the crime was committed and, therefore, could not possibly have committed the crime. A bill of indictment worded as I have suggested, would have caused the defendant to know that the evidence he intended to and did offer during his trial clearly did not tend to negate the possibility that he was already a party to a criminal conspiracy on the dates for which he prepared his defense. He would have known that, instead, his evidence, at most, had some tendency to show that he did not enter into a conspiracy on those dates. Had the bill of indictment given proper notice to the defendant, the defendant simply would have been able to prepare his defense in light of the facts the State sought to prove.
¶10The circumstantial evidence offered by the State was substantial evidence tending to show that the defendant and his alleged co-conspirator had a meeting of the minds sometime between October and the date on which the hams were actually stolen. The State’s evidence tended to show that they had conversations concerning the hams and their value as early as October. They had other conversations in the ensuing months. The State’s evidence also tended to show that the defendant’s alleged co-conspirator stole the hams and delivered them to the defendant who sold them for substantially less than their market value and gave some of the proceeds to the alleged co-conspirator. The crime of conspiracy has been committed when there is a union of wills for the unlawful purpose. “Furthermore, the agreement may be ‘a mutual, implied understanding’ rather than an express understanding.” State v. LeDuc, 306 N.C. 62, 75, 291 S.E. 2d 607, 615 (1982). Such an implied understanding need not be proved by direct evidence of acts which precede the completion of the conspiracy. State v. Locklear, 8 N.C. App. 535, 174 S.E. 2d 641 (1970). As pointed out by Chief Justice Stacy for this Court:
*655If four men should meet upon a desert, all coming from different points of the compass, and each carrying upon his shoulder a plank, which exactly fitted and dovetailed with the others so as to form a perfect square, it would be difficult to believe they had not previously been together. At least it would be some evidence tending to support the inference.
¶11State v. Lea, 203 N.C. 13, 31, 164 S.E. 737, 747, petition for reconsideration denied, 203 N.C. 35, 164 S.E. 749, cert. denied sub nom. State v. Davis, 287 U.S. 649, 77 L.Ed. 561, 53 S.Ct. 95 (1932). The evidence introduced by the State constituted substantial circumstantial evidence that the defendant entered into a criminal conspiracy to commit larceny at some point between October and the day the hams were stolen in December. It would be appropriate upon this evidence, therefore, to submit the issue of the defendant’s guilt of criminal conspiracy to the jury based upon a proper bill of indictment. Such a bill would be proper if it gave the defendant sufficient notice of the charges against him to enable him to prepare his defense. A proper bill would not permit the defendant to reasonably but erroneously prepare his defense in the belief that the State would offer proof of criminal conduct occurring only on the day for which he offered alibi evidence.
¶12Based upon my understanding of the holding of the Court, as explained herein, I concur.