concurrence">CARSON, J.,

concurring.

The unlawful stop ultimately resulted in the seizure of contraband. Were that all, the unlawful stop would require the exclusion of the evidence garnered from the stop, in this case depriving the police of probable cause necessary for a lawful arrest. Pooler v. MVD, 306 Or 47, 52-53, 755 P2d 701 (1988); see abo State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 561 P2d 1006 (1977).

Defendant, however, consented to the search. The validity of his consent determines the outcome of this case. If *627the consent were involuntary and, thus, invalid, the subsequent search and resulting seizure, arrest, and conviction likewise were invalid.

A police officer may inform a person that, unless a consent to search is given, the officer will seek a search warrant; the justification is that, although it is coercion, it is constitutionally permissible coercion. State v. Hirsch, 267 Or 613, 622, 518 P2d 649 (1974) (citing State v. Douglas, 260 Or 60, 488 P2d 1366 (1971)). As Chief Justice O’Connell explained in Douglas: “If the officers threaten only to do what the law permits them to do, the coercion that the threat may produce is not constitutionally objectionable.” State v. Douglas, supra, 260 Or at 81 (O’Connell, C. J., dissenting on other grounds).

In this case, Officer Becker told defendant that, unless defendant consented, Becker would detain the pickup until he communicated with the district attorney about a warrant. Because the stop was unlawful, however, Becker could not lawfully detain defendant’s pickup, either on the basis of the stop itself or on the basis of evidence garnered from the stop. Thus, Becker could not lawfully assert that he would detain the pickup; his statement that he would do so was a material misrepresentation of what the law permitted, consequently invalidating defendant’s consent to search. Cf. State v. Hirsch, supra; State v. Douglas, supra.

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How this case has been treated — in progress