¶1This is a petition for mandamus to require Hon. C. W. Laughlin, Judge of the District Court of Duval County, to proceed to trial and judgment in a contempt proceeding in a cause originally filed in that court, styled Felipe Valerio v. Daniel To-bin, Jr., et al., in which case a final judgment had been entered and an appeal taken to this Court. It is now pending in this Court as Cause No. 13297, Daniel To-bin, Jr., et al. v. Felipe Valerio, Jr.
¶2The petition asked, in the alternative, that if we should conclude that this Court has jurisdiction of the contempt proceeding *353because of the appeal, then and in that event that we proceed to hear and decide such contempt proceeding.
¶3The law is well settled that after an appeal has been perfected to this Court that it is our duty, and not that of the trial court, to punish for any contempt for a failure to obey the judgment of the trial court pending the appeal. International Ladies Garment Workers’ Local Union No. 123 v. Dorothy Frocks Co., Tex.Civ.App., 97 S.W.2d 379; Ex parte Travis, 123 Tex. 480, 73 S.W.2d 487; 3 Tex.Jur. p. 369, Sec. 262.
¶4On September 3, 1957, the District Court of Duval County rendered a final judgment, among other things, ordering Daniel To-bin, Jr. (County Judge), T. H. Molina, Juan Leal, Jose D. Ramos, and Dennis P. McBride (County Commissioners), “to forthwith permit and allow Plaintiff, Felipe Va-lerio, Jr., to sit and act as County Commissioner of Precinct No. 4 of Duval County from the entry of final judgment herein until the end of said term on December 31, 1958.”
¶5On September 28, 1957, Daniel Tobin, as County Judge of Duval County, officially approved Felipe Valerio, Jr.’s official bond for the office of County Commissioner of Precinct No. 4, and filed the same with the County Clerk, together with his oath of office and his loyalty oath. On September 30, 1957, Felipe Valerio, Jr., was permitted to sit at a meeting of the Commissioners’ Court and participated therein as a member.
¶6Thereafter on October 4, 1957, Valerio was told by Tobin, Molina, Leal, Ramos and McBride, that he would not thereafter be permitted to sit as a member of the Commissioners’ Court. They gave as their reason for such action that a super-sedeas bond had been filed. The only one of the above named persons who attempted to file a supersedeas bond was Jose D. Ramos. The judgment being one other than for money, could only be superseded after the trial court had made an order setting the amount of such supersedeas bond. Rule 364(e), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Even if the bond filed by Ramos had been a legal one, it would not inure to the benefit of the other defendants who made no attempt to file a supersedeas bond.
¶7Respondents herein contend that the judgment is against Duval County, and that the County is not required to give a supersedeas bond. We do not agree. While the suit is against the County Judge and County Commissioners in their official capacities, it is not a suit against the County and, therefore, if respondents desire to supersede the judgment they must give a supersedeas bond, as is provided for by Rule 364(e), T.R.C.P. Ploch v. Dickison, Tex.Civ.App., 223 S.W.2d 568.
¶8Respondents further contend that the judgment entered in the trial court was not a final judgment because an appeal was taken. We again do not agree. There must be a final judgment before there can be an appeal, and it must be obeyed unless superseded during the pendency of the appeal.
¶9Under the circumstances, the respondents herein are guilty of disobeying the judgment of the trial court in refusing relator the right to sit as a member of the Commissioners’ Court of Duval County.
¶10Unless we have assurance in writing, within five days, that respondents will carry out the judgment of the trial court, we will proceed to enter judgment holding respondents in contempt of this Court.