Johnson v. Lilly’s Empirical Analysis
1992
Citation profile
45 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 47 later decisions — most recently February 2025 · most notably Clemmons v. Office of Child Support Enforcement (2001), Jenkins v. International Paper Co. (1994)
45 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson · Campbell v. Holt · Rhodes v. Cannon · Sullivan v. Edens · Paragould v. Lawson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(b) In any action involving the support of any minor child or children, the moving party shall be entitled to recover the full amount of accrued child support arrearages from the date of the initial support order until the filing of the action. (c) Any action filed pursuant to subsection (b) may be brought at any time up to and including five (5) years beyond the date the child for whose benefit the initial support order was entered reaches the age of eighteen (18) years. (d) No statute of limitation shall apply to an action brought for the collection of a child support obligation or arrearage against any party who leaves or remains outside the State of Arkansas with the purpose to avoid the payment of child support. (e) This section shall apply to all actions pending as of March 29, 1991, and filed thereafter and shall retroactively apply to all child support orders now existing.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“[W]e have long taken the view, along with a majority of the other states, that the legislature cannot expand a statute of limitation so as to revive a cause of action already barred. Rhodes v. Cannon, 112 Ark. 6 , 164 S.W.752 (1914); Couch v. McKee, 6 Ark. 484 (1845). In Wasson v. State ex. rel. Jackson, 187 Ark. 537 , 60 S.W.2d 1020 (1933), this court wrote: In most jurisdictions it is held that, after a cause of action has become barred by the statute of limitations, the defendant has a vested right to rely on that statute as a defense, and neither a constitutional convention nor the Legislature has power to divest that right and revive the cause of action. Where title to property has vested under a statute of limitation, it is not possible by an enactment to extend or revive the remedy since this would impair a vested right in the property. Id. at 538 , 60 S.W.2d at 1020 -21 (quoting 6 R.C.L., p. 309).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[N]o one has any vested right in a statute of limitations until the bar of the statute has become effective. It is also true that the General Assembly may validly enlarge the period of limitations and make the new stiatute, rather than the old, apply to any cause of action which has not been barred at the time the new statute becomes effective.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Branch v. Carter
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.