Dillsworth v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 60 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 62 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “If each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not, the offenses are not the same and do not merge. However, if only one offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not, the offenses are deemed the same, and separate sentences for each offense are prohibited.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 80 Md. App. 647 - Hankins v. State · Rose v. State

2. “[l]enity ... serves only as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not used to beget one.” 9 . § 643B. Mandatory sentences for crimes of violence. (a)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Spitzinger v. State · Brown v. State

3. “A common thread connects all the cases we have just discussed. It is the assumption (often not articulated) that under the circumstances of a given case, it is reasonable to believe that the legislature that enacted a, particular statute or statutes would express some intent as to multiple punishment. That assumption is appropriate when a single act is charged as multiple offenses under a single statute (Lad ner,; Bell and Prince), where the subject of two statutes is of necessity closely intertwined (Loscomb and Fields), where one offense is necessarily the overt act of a statutory offense (Walker), and where one statute, by its very nature, affects other offenses because it is designed to effect multiple punishment (Whack). Under those circumstances, it is not unreasonable to assume that the legislative body contemplated the possibility of multiple punishment and to conclude that unless the intention in favor of multiple punishment is clear, as in Whack, the Rule of Lenity or its equivalent should be applied against the imposition of multiple punishment. But that thread is not present in the case at bar. What is now Art. 27, § 12 (assault with intent to murder) was enacted by Ch. 138, Laws of 1809, as part of an early codification of Maryland criminal law. That codification did not include the offense of attempted robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon (now Art. 27, § 488) which did not become part of our statutory law until enacted by Ch. 457, Acts of 1927. Not only wer”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Pair v. State