State v. Kirkley’s Empirical Analysis
1983
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 133 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 160 later decisions (4 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 2006 · most notably McKoy v. North Carolina (1990), State v. Jackson (1983)
3 federal appellate · 133 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Witherspoon v. Illinois · Furman v. Georgia · Lockett v. Ohio · Eddings v. Oklahoma · Lehman Bros. v. Lilly
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 160 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Prior to discussing the merits of each contended error during the prosecutor’s argument to the jury, we must set forth the standard of review to be employed. The defense counsel at trial failed to object to or take exception to any part of the prosecutor’s final argument to the jury. If a party fails to object to a jury argument, the trial court may, in its discretion, correct improper arguments. State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355 , 259 S.E. 2d 752 (1979). When a party fails to object to a closing argument we must decide whether the argument was so improper as to warrant the trial judge’s intervention ex mero motu. We are therefore reviewing the judge’s action and must decide if he abused his discretion. In State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355 , 259 S.E. 2d 752 (1979), Chief Justice Branch stated: In capital cases, however, an appellate court may review the prosecution’s argument, even though defendant raised no objection at trial, but the impropriety of the argument must be gross indeed in order for this Court to hold that a trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero motu an argument which defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when he heard it. 298 N.C. at 369, 259 S.E. 2d at 761. (Emphasis added.) * * * * In North Carolina it is well settled “that counsel is allowed wide latitude in the argument to the jury.” State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 368 , 259 S.E. 2d 752, 761 (1979); see also: State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313 , 226 S.E. 2d”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Fletcher · State v. Hill“unanimously find that a mitigating circumstance exist[ed] before it [could] be considered for the purpose of sentencing.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. State v. McKoy · Williams v. Dixon“I'm asking you to impose the death penalty as a deterrent, to set a standard of conduct.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Hipps · State v. Fletcher
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.