Le Tulle v. Scofield’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

301 federal appellate · 13 district · 18 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 533 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Where the consideration is wholly in the transferee’s bonds, or part cash and part such bonds, we think it cannot be said that the transferor retains any proprietary interest in the enterprise.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co. · Emery v. Commissioner

2. ““[T]he section [defining “reorganization”] is not to be read literally, as denominating the transfer of all the assets of one company for what amounts to a cash consideration given by the other a reorganization. We have held that where the consideration consists of cash and short term notes the transfer does not amount to a reorganization within the true meaning of the statute, but is a sale upon which gain or loss must be reckoned. [Citing the Pinellas case.] * * * “In applying our decision in the Pinellas case, supra, the courts have generally held that receipt of long term bonds as distinguished from short term notes constitutes the retention of an interest in the purchasing corporation. * * * “We are of opinion that the term of the obligations is not material. Where the consideration is wholly in the transferee’s bonds, or part cash and part such bonds, we think it cannot be said that the transfer- or retains any proprietary interest in the enterprise. On the contrary, he becomes a creditor of the transferee * * 6”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Berner v. United States

3. “since appellees' contentions as to reformation of the policy and as to allowance of attorney fees and penalty seek to change or to add to the relief accorded by the judgment which was in their favor, they can raise here such issues only by a cross-appeal. [Cases cited.] On the other hand, the contention that the policy covered the accident seeks only to sustain the judgment for a reason presented at the trial and determined adversely to appellees. * * * it is no more than a change of reason for such recovery * * *. In such situations the rule is that `a respondent or an appellee may urge any matter appearing in the record in support of a judgment.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Drinan v. A. J. Lindemann & Hoverson Co.