¶1*46Aaron M. Kanner, Richard Kanner, Miami, Fla., for appellants.
¶2Louis F. Oberdorfer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Atty., Dept. of Justice, John B. Jones, Jr., Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., John J. Gobel, A. F. Prescott, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Edward F. Boardman, U. S. Atty., Lloyd G. Bates, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for appellee.
¶3Before RIVES, JONES, and GEWIN, Circuit Judges.
¶5Before considering the merits of this appeal we dispose of the motion of the appellants to certify the case to the Supreme Court of Florida under Florida Statutes § 25.031, F.S.A. and Florida Appellate Rule No. 4.61, 31 F.S.A. This motion was carried with the case. It is denied.
¶6The facts are stipulated. By the stipulation it is shown that, on December 12, 1946, Joe H. Weitzner purchased a parcel of land in Dade County, Florida, upon which a dwelling had been erected. He and his wife promptly occupied the property and resided upon it until his death on October 9, 1956. At the time of the purchase and at all times thereafter Weitzner and his wife were the parents of two grown children, neither of whom ever resided upon the property.
¶7In January of 1954, federal income tax assessments were made against Joe H. Weitzner in the amount of $125,717.63 for tax deficiencies for 1942 and 1943. A tax lien notice was filed in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, on April 9, 1954. On August 17, 1956, Joe H. Weitzner, without joinder of his wife, executed a deed, without valuable consideration, purporting to convey the property to his wife. The United States brought suit to foreclose its tax lien. Joined as defendants were the widow of Joe H. Weitzner, his two children and the administrator of his estate. It was the contention of the defendants that, although exemptions do not generally preclude the United States from levying upon property for the satisfaction of tax liens, the Florida Constitution and statutes gave to the wife and children of Weitzner, at the time the property was acquired and occupied as homestead, a vested property interest and estate which is separate and apart from the title of the husband. This property interest, the widow and children contend, cannot be attached for obligations which they did not incur and for which they are not liable. The interest of the husband in the property they assert, was not such an interest as could be levied upon *47and sold separate from the interests of widow and children. The district court held that Weitzner had full property rights in the homestead and the constitutional and statutory restrictions upon his power to convey and devise the homestead property did not prevent the tax lien from attaching nor prevent its foreclosure. The court’s decree directed the foreclosure of the tax lien and the sale of the property. The widow, the children and the administrator have appealed.
¶8Homestead in Florida is created and governed by the State Constitution1 and Statutes.2 There are, as clearly appears, two aspects of homestead in Florida,3 the exemption from judicial sale and the transfer of title by conveyance, devise or descent. As Mertens has said, “It is well settled that state exemption laws do not protect property against federal tax liens … Nevertheless, there is a conflict in the cases as to whether a tax lien is valid upon a homestead interest. The resolution of this issue may depend upon whether there is involved a single interest of the taxpayer who is subject to tax liability, or whether both spouses have an interest while only one is under a tax liability.” 9 Mertens Law *48of Federal Income Taxation, Ch. 54, p. 102, § 54.52. If it is determined that a wife does not have, during the lifetime of her husband, a property right in a homestead where the title is in his name alone, we need proceed no further and the Government should prevail.
¶9It has long been settled that the homestead provisions of the Florida Constitution do not create property rights in the husband, wife or children. They are exemption provisions and these provisions inure to the widow and heirs if, by the laws of descent the homesteader’s title is cast upon them. Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687; Johns v. Bowden, 68 Fla. 32, 66 So. 155; 1 Redfearn, Wills and Administration of Estates in Florida 416, § 232; 16 Fla.Jur. 273, Homesteads § 3. The Constitution restricts and the statute prohibits the testamentary disposition of homestead. The provisions for the descent of homestead are no more than they purport to be- — provisions for the transfer of the homestead property from the homesteader-owner to those designated by the statute as entitled to inherit from him, and fixing the nature of the estates which the law casts upon them at his death. Such provisions neither diminish the character of the estate of the homesteader nor create any ownership interest in the wife. The requirement for the consent of the wife to the alienation of the homestead does not create or recognize a property interest in her.
¶10The wife, in order to acquire the property, or interest in it, must survive her husband, the husband and wife relationship must exist at the time of his death, and the property must have been occupied at the time of his death by a family of which the husband was the head. The homestead was designed for the purpose of protecting the head of the family by securing to him a shelter for himself and the members of his family. Hill v. First National Bank, 79 Fla. 391, 84 So. 190, 20 A.L.R. 270. The rights of a wife to the benefit of this protection during her husband’s lifetime are marital rights rather than property rights. As in the case of inchoate dower,4 that which the wife has during her husband’s lifetime with respect to homestead ownership is remote, uncertain and a mere expectancy or possibility and not a vested property right, interest or title. It follows that the tax liens of the United States were and are valid and enforceable against the property claimed as homestead. The judgment of the district court is
¶11Affirmed.