Mohammed v. Reno’s Empirical Analysis
309 F.3d 95 · 2002
Citation profile
34 federal appellate · 9 district · 2 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1292 · 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (§ 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (§ 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on Landgraf v. USI Film Products · Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Enrico St Cyr · Hilton v. Braunskill · Janet Reno, Attorney General v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee et al. · Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. Holiday Tours, Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 106 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[t]he necessary ‘level’ or ‘degree’ of possibility of success will vary according to the court's assessment of the other [stay] factors. The requisite showing of 'substantial possibility’ of success is ‘inversely proportional to the amount of irreparable injury plaintiff[] will suffer absent the stay.’ Simply stated, more of one excuses less of the other.”) (citing Mohammed and cases from other circuits). . See id. at 354 (speaking in térms of the Hirschfeld likelihood of success standard,”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of [the removal] order is prohibited as a matter of law”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[w]hen Congress pointedly uses both words in one subsection and then uses only the term “enjoin” in an adjacent subsection, there is an implication that “restrain” is used in (f)(1) to refer to an interim prohibition, and that the omission of “restrain” in (f)(2) therefore makes this subsection inapplicable to such a prohibition. Reading the coverage of both subsections to be identical renders “restrain” in (f)(1) surplusage. Moreover, when Congress wished to legislate concerning a stay pending appeal, it explicitly used the word “stay.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(3)(B) (service or petition for review does not “stay” removal pending court’s decision unless the court so orders). If Congress wanted to apply a heightened standard to a stay pending appeal, it would likely have used the word “stay” in subsection 1252(f)(2) instead of the word “enjoin”; indeed, it would likely have included such a standard in subsection 1252(b).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.