Volume 31 — Connecticut Reports

Bill for a foreclosure. The respondents filed an answer and cross-bill, and the case was referred to a committee, by whom the facts were found. The mortgaged premises were the two outer sections of a tract of land of about twenty-five acres, situated in the town of Hartford, upon the central section of which stood a rifle factory, known as Sharps’ Rifle Factory.

Bill in equity, for an injunction against the levy of executions by the respondents, upon forty-nine shares of the capital stock of the Hartford and New Haven Railroad Company, attached by them as the property of William Jarvis, and which were claimed by the petitioner under a previous assignment of the same from the said Jarvis.

Grand-juror’s complaint, charging the defendant with an assault and battery on Dorinda Blackwell; appealed by the defendant from the judgment of a justice of the peace, and tried in the superior court, on the plea of not guilty, before Me Curdy, J: On the trial the counsel for the state claimed that the assault and battery had been committed by Mrs. Alford on Mrs. Blackwell in the manner alleged.

AssuiMPSiT, brought by the plaintiff as indorsee, against the defendant as maker of the following note. Broad Brook, Nov. 19,1859. “ Thirty days after date I promise to pay to Eli Gowdy or order, eleven hundred thirty-six dollars, value received. A. E. Gowdy.” The note was indorsed by the payee as follows:— “ For value received I hereby warrant the within note good and collectible till January 1, 1861.

Assumpsit, for repairs made by the plaintiffs upon a vessel belonging to the defendants.

Norton of Farmington. The appellants, who were a banking corporation located at Albany in the state of New York, presented to the commissioners on the estate a large claim for which they held a mortgage on real estate in Albany. The assignment was made in 1860. The insolvent act of 1853, under which it was made and under which the estate was in settlement, contained the following provision:— “ Sec. 19.

Bill for a foreclosure. The case was referred to a committee, by whom the following facts were found.

Assumpsit, upon sundry special counts, alleging a promise oí the defendants, partners under the name of Lawton & Wright, to pay a debt due to the plaintiffs from the firm of Faulkner & Wright; with a general count for money had and received by the defendants to the use of the plaintiffs. The case was tried in the superior court, under the general issue, closed to the court, before Waldo, J. Upon the trial the plaintiffs proved the following facts.

Amicable submission to the superior court, upon the following agreed statement of facts: The City Bank of New Haven was incorporated in the year 1831, the charter, which was a close one, containing the following provision:— “ The bank by its president, whenever and as soon as it. shall become organized under its charter, shall subscribe to the capital stock of the Hampshire and Hampden Canal Corporation the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, being one thousand shares, to…

Bill for a foreclosure ; reserved by the superior court, on facts found, for the advice of this court. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Application for a mandamus, reserved by the superior court, on a demurrer to the return, for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Trespass, for an injury done to the person of the plaintiff by a dog of the defendant, brought upon the statute (Rev. Stat., tit. 1, sec. 282,) which provides, that “ whenever any dog shall do any damage, either to the body or property of any person, the owner or keeper, &c., shall pay such damage, to be recovered in an action of trespass.” Upon the trial in the superior court, before Park, I, on the general issue closed to the court, the following facts were specially found…

Amicable submission to the superior court, by the plaintiff as executor of the will of Gideon Morehouse, and the defendant as administrator of the estate of Eunice Morehouse, a former wife of Gideon Morehouse, upon the following agreed statement of facts:— Eunice Morehouse was the daughter of William Robinson, and was married to Gideon Morehouse in 1828.

Assumpsit. Yerdict for the defendant in the superior court, and motion for a new trial by the plaintiffs. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Motion for a new trial by the defendants ; also motion in error. The case will be sufficiently understood from the opinion.</p>

<p>Action on the case for damage to the land of the plaintiff, from slacks and dirt washed upon it from the ore works of the defendants ; tried to the jury in the superior court, upon the general issue, with notice of the defense below stated, before Seymour, J.</p> <p>The defendants claimed the' right to discharge the slacks and dirt from their works upon the land of the plaintiff, under an award formerly made between the plaintiff and themselves on the subject, and under a deed conveying to them the right given by the plaintiff in compliance with the award, and on the trial offered in evidence the submission, award and deed. The submission was as follows :—</p> <p>“ This agreement between the Proprietors of the Ore Bed in Salisbury and Albert Bushnell, witnesseth: — that said parties have agreed to submit the matter in controversy between them in relation to the damage claimed by said Bushnell to have been sustained by him by the washing of ore by said Proprietors at their ore bed in Salisbury, and the discharge of slacks into a stream of water that runs through the meadow and land of said Bushnell, to the arbitrament and final award of Richard Smith, Robert N. Puller, and William H. Walton, who are to notify and meet the parties as soon as may be convenient, at the public house in Lakeville, and shall examine the land of said Bushnell, on which it is claimed damages have been sustained, which lies on both sides of the highway leading from Josiah M. Reed’s to said Bushnell’s dwelling house ; and they shall assess such damages in favor of said Bushnell as they shall find he has sustained since the last payment made to him by said Proprietors; and shall also assess, as near as may be, such damage as shall accrue to said Bushnell in the future by a continuance of washing ore by said Proprietors, and the necessary discharge of slacks into said stream in the ordinary manner of washing ore, and by the floating or carrying of dirt, slacks and particles of ore upon said land; and upon the payment by said Proprietors to said Bushnell of the damages assessed, it is agreed that said proprietors and their successors shall forever stand discharged of all further claim for damages, past and future, occasioned, or that may be occasioned, by the washing of ore by said Proprietors.</p> <p>“ And the said Bushnell hereby agrees that said arbitrators shall have power to order the execution by him of such lease, leases, releases or instruments, as in their judgment may be necessary to protect the said Proprietors and their successors from and against any future claim for damages for future injuries to said lands that may be made by said Bushnell, his heirs or assigns, in consequence of a continuance by said Proprietors and their successors of the business of washing ore in said stream, and the carrying of dirt, slacks and fine ore on to said lands of said Bushnell before described ; and, upon the payment or tender of said damages, said Bushnell hereby agrees and binds himself to execute, with all due solemnities, any such leases, releases or instruments as said arbitrators may prescribe. Witness the said parties, this third day of June, 1858.”</p> <p>The material part of the award was as follows :</p> <p>“ That the aforesaid Proprietors pay or tender to said Bushnell the sum of $650, within thirty days from date, and that said Proprietors shall stand acquitted and discharged from any and all damage that has occurred in time past, or which shall occur in time to come, to said Bushnell, by a continuance of washing ore by said Proprietors, and the necessary discharge of slacks, dirt, and particles of ore into the stream of water mentioned in said submission, in the ordinary manner of washing ore and by the floating or carrying of said slacks, dirt and particles of ore into and upon the lands of said Bushnell, mentioned in said submission. And we do also award that the said Bushnell shall execute and deliver, without unnecessary delay, to said proprietors, the following instrument, which is hereunto annexed. Dated this 8th day of July, 1858.”</p> <p>The material parts of the deed, which was executed on the same day that the award was made, were as follows :—</p> <p>u To all people, <fcc. Enow ye that I, Albert Bushnell of the town of Salisbury, * * * * do give, grant, bargain, and sell unto the Proprietors of the Ore Bed in Salisbury aforesaid, their successors and assigns forever, the right to wash iron ore at their ore bed in said Salisbury, in that certain stream of water which flows from said ore bed through the lands of Newton I. Reed, and near to the Ohatfield ore bed, into and through that certain lot of land lying on the west side of the highway leading from Josiah M. Reed’s dwelling house to my residence in said Salisbury, containing about six and one-half acres; also into and through that certain other lot of land lying directly opposite the before mentioned lot of land, and on the easterly side of said highway, called my home meadow, containing about fifteen acres; with the right and privilege to discharge, float or carry slacks, dirt and particles of ore into and upon said parcels of land, which may accrue, float or be carried in said stream of water and discharged on said lands, from and by the ordinary mode and manner of washing iron ore in said stream, by said Proprietors of the Ore Bed in Salisbury aforesaid; and also the right to use the engine, or a similar one in operation, for the purpose of discharging water with the dirt and slacks therein. To have and to hold the before mentioned rights and privileges unto the said Proprietors of the Ore Bed in Salisbury, their successors and assigns forever. And also I, the said Bushnell, do for myself, my heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, covenant to acquit and discharge said proprietors, their successors and assigns, of and from all damages and injuries which have been or which hereafter may' be done, in and upon said parcels of land, by the washing of iron ore in said stream, in the way and manner aforesaid, and of the carrying, floating and discharging of dirt, slacks and particles of ore into and upon said lands in consequence of said washing of ore as aforesaid. * * And it is further understood, that the said Bushnell shall not be compelled to open ditches oh said lands to carry said particles of ore and slacks through said lands, but the said Bushnell shall be permitted to allow said slacks and particles of ore to go and flow upon said lands where they are inclined to go and where the water may take them. Nor is it understood by this instrument that the said Bushnell shall be liable to pay damage for said slacks and particles of ore, if they go and are carried upon the highway, or upon lands of adjoining proprietors.”</p> <p>The defendants contended that they had washed ore in the stream only in the ordinary manner, and so had done only what by the foregoing award and deed they had a right to do. The plaintiff admitted that the defendants had washed ore only in the ordinary mode and in accordance with the requirements of the award and deed, but claimed to recover for damage done to a piece of land known as the “ pasture lot,” not described in the instruments, and as to which he claimed that no rights were given to the defendants, which adjoined the “ meadow lot ” described in the instruments, and upon which slacks and dirt spread and. were washed from the meadow lot, on which they had accumulated in a very great quantity, filling up the bed of the stream and raising the meadow lot above the adjoining land, so that the dirt washed upon it passed over upon the adjoining land. This lot was owned by the plaintiff when the deed was given. He also claimed that the defendants were liable for damage done to the “ home meadow ” by dirt washed upon it by the stream, from deposits of dirt made by the defendants on the banks of the stream near their works. The defendants denied that any damage had been done in the mode last stated, and requested the court to charge the jury that they were not liable for any damage done to the pasture lot in the manner claimed. The judge did not so instruct the jury, but charged them pro forma, that the award and deed did not justify the defendants in washing slacks and dirt upon the pasture lot, subject however to this qualification, that they were liable only for the natural and necessary injuries resulting to the pasture lot, and that the plaintiff could not recover if by the use of ordinary and reasonable care he might have confined the dirt and slacks to the meadow lot, and thus have prevented injury to the pasture.</p> <p>The jury were requested by the court, if they should find for the plaintiff, to assess by itself the injury they might find, if any, done to the pasture lot by washing ore; but the jury found a general verdict for the plaintiff. Before the acceptance of the verdict the court inquired if they assessed anything for damage to the pasture lot, to which the jury replied that the whole amount of their verdict was for damage done to the pasture lot, and that they could not agree in finding any damage except to that lot.</p> <p>The defendants moved for a new trial for error in the charge of the court.</p>

<p>Action for an assault and battery; tried to the jury in the superior court on the general issue, before Seymour, J. Verdict for the plaintiff; motion for a new trial by the defendant. The case will be sufficiently understood from the opinion.</p>

<p>Bill for an injunction. Facts specially found and a decree rendered for the petitioners in the superior court, by Dutton, J. Motion in error by the respondent. A statement of the case, which could not well be understood without a map, is omitted, as the general principles decided will be sufficiently understood from the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, against the defendant as indorser of the following instrument:—</p> <p>*3 Canaan, May 16,1860. g To Van Antwerp & Co., No. 9 Wall street, New York City. ® Ninety days after date, I promise to pay to the order of V William Douglass thirty-five hundred dollars, value re- ^ ceived, at the Metropolitan Bank, New York City. § Forbes Monson.</p> <p>The acceptance of Van Antwerp & Co. was written upon the paper, and the name of the defendant was indorsed upon it.</p> <p>On the trial to the jury in the superior court, on the general issue, before Seymour, /., the plaintiffs, a banking corporation located at Great Barrington in the state of Massachusetts, offered evidence to show that they had received the paper of the maker, Forbes Monson, in the regular course of business, and that they took it in good faith and with no knowledge of any infirmities attaching to it, and that it had been duly protested for non-payment and notice thereof given to the defendant.</p> <p>The defendant offered himself as a witness to prove, that sometime in February, 1860, Monson applied to him to indorse for him several printed blank drafts, to enable him to make thereon drafts from time to time of from §100 to §500 each; that he did so indorse them, the same being first signed by Monson ; that at the time he indorsed the paper in question, it was a printed blank as follows, the name of Monson being subscribed thereto in writing:—</p> <p>t New York 185 CD ¿g Sewell, Ferris & Co., Pay to Dollars. os Forbes Monson.</p> <p>And that Monson, after the paper was so indorsed, without the defendant’s knowledge or authority, had altered the same by erasing the words “ New York,” “ Sewell, Ferris & Co.,” and the figure “ 5,” and inserting other words and figures, so as to make the §3,500 instrument described in the declaration. To the admission of all this testimony under the pleadings the plaintiffs objected, but the court overruled the- objection and admitted the evidence.</p> <p>The plaintiffs thereupon offered evidence to prove that it was customary for banks to discount paper written on printed blanks, where the printed matter or some part of it was erased, and that such erasure did not of itself cast suspicion on the paper, and that Monson upon a similar blank to the one upon which the $3,500 instrument was made, and which was indorsed by the defendant at the same time, had erased the words “ Sewell, Ferris & Co.,” and filled it up as a promissory note for $650, and procured the same discounted at the Norfolk Bank, and that the defendant had afterwards paid it. And the plaintiffs claimed, and requested the court to charge the jury, that upon the admitted facts they were entitled to recover; that, in connection with said evidence of custom, there was nothing on the face of the paper to put them on inquiry ; that the paper when indorsed by the defendant was a blank, and that if the defendant intrusted Monson with his name in blank as indorser, he was liable for any amount, on any contract adapted to the indorsement, that Monson might have filled up the blank with, if the plaintiffs took it bona fide, without notice, and for value, no matter what might have been the agreement between the defendant and Monson.</p> <p>The court did not instruct the jury as claimed by the plaintiffs, but charged them that the indorsement by the defendant of such a paper as the one upon which the instrument in question was made, did not of itself, without other proof, imply an authority to Monson to strike out the name of Sewell, Ferris & Co., and change it into a promissory note ; that there was on the face of the paper evidence that the defendant intended to indorse a draft on Sewell, Ferris & Go.; that the paper when indorsed by the defendant was not wholly a blank, but was an inchoate bill of exchange ; and that, unless the defendant had in fact given Monson authority to make the alteratiori, the defendant was not liable thereon, there being in the opinion of the court no authority implied as matter of law to strike out the erased words ; but that the facts proved by the plaintiffs were proper for their consideration, as tending to show that authority was actually given by the defendant to Monson to make the instrument in question; and that if on the whole testimony they were satisfied that Monson had such authority, they should find for the plaintiffs.</p> <p>The jury having rendered a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial.</p>

<p>It is a well settled rule of construction in respect to wills, that a court may inquire into every material fact relating to the persons claiming under the will, the property claimed to be given, and the circumstances of the testator and his family, for the purpose of enabling the court to identify the persons or property intended, testator left a will containing the following devise : — “I give to my wife all my real estate so long as she shall remain my widow, but on her decease or marriage the remainder thereof I give to my children and their heirs respectively, to be divided in equal shares between them.” At the date of the will and at his death the testator had four children living, and four others had previously died, all leaving children. No reason appeared for supposing that the testator had any preference for his surviving children over these grandchildren. Held, that the testator must be understood to have intended these grandchildren by the word “ heirs,” and that the real estate was to be distributed in equal shares among the surviving children and the representatives of the deceased ones.</p>

<p>Assumpsit, on a policy of insurance upon a quantity of cider ; tried to the jury in the superior court,- on the general issue with notice, before Carpenter, J. The principal defense setup was that the policy was rendered void.by the storage of wine in casks in the same building with that in which the cider was stored.</p> <p>The policy was dated April 1,1860, and was countersigned by “ E. Fuller, agent.” The property insured was described in it as follows :—</p> <p>“ $200 on his cider in the two story frame dwelling house, occupied by the assured, and situated on Washington street in Norwich city.”</p> <p>The following indorsements were afterwards made on the policy, at the times when they bear date, by Fuller, the defendants’ agent.</p> <p>££ August 12th, 1861. — $200 on cider is removed to his new building on his farm, western part of town of Norwich, where it is now in force. E. F., Agent.”</p> <p>££ Sept. 20,1861. — One hundred dollars is hereby added to the $200 on cider, making in all by this policy on cider $300, terminating April 1st, 1862. ' E. F., Agent.”</p> <p>The policy contained the following condition : — ££ If after insurance is effected, either by the original policy or by the renewal thereof, the risk be increased by any means whatever within the control of the insured, or if such building or premises shall be occupied in any way so as to render the risk more hazardous than at the time of insuring, such insurance shall be void and of no effect.” Also the following provision :— “ It is agreed and declared to be the true intent and meaning of the parties hereto, that in case the above-mentioned premises shall at any time after the making of, and during the time this policy would otherwise continue in force, be appropriated, applied or used, to or for the purpose of carrying on or exercising therein any trade, business or vocation denominated hazardous or extra hazardous, or specified in the memorandum of special hazards annexed to this policy, or for the purpose of storing, selling or keeping for sale therein any of the articles, goods or merchandise denominated hazardous or extra hazardous, or included in memorandum of special hazards, except as are herein specially provided for, or hereafter agreed to by this corporation in writing, to be added to or indorsed upon this policy, then and from thenceforth, so long as the same shall be so appropriated, applied or used, these presents shall cease and be of no force or effect.”</p> <p>The policy also contained the following provision under the head of ££ Classes of Hazards : ”—</p> <p>“ Hazardous. — The following trades and occupations, goods, wares and merchandise, are deemed hazardous, and subject the building and all its contents to an additional charge of 10 cents per $100. They are: — China or earthen or glassware or plate glass in boxes, crates or casks, eating houses or refectories, fire crackers in packages, flax in bales, grocers’ stock, gutta percha unmanufactured, hat ironing or trimming or pressing, hay pressed in bundles, hemp in bales, India rubber unmanufactured, manilla grass in bales, oil, porter houses, rags in packages, sail making, segar making, Sisal grass in bales, spirituous liquors, sugar’s, sulphur, tallow, taverns, wine dealers’ stock, (not including wine in glass unpacked) and wool. The following are considered hazardous on account of their liability to damage, and are charged 10 cents per $100 in' addition, hut do not increase the rate of the building. They are: — Boots and shoes, brushes (stocks of,) card printing, coffee, cotton batting and wadding, dry goods (general stock of,) flour, furs and peltries in packages, hardware and cutlery, hides and leather, indigo, looking glasses in boxes, metals (in bars, rods, pigs or sheets,) paints ground in oil, paper hangings, paper in reams, potash, rice, spices, tailors’ stock and ready made clothing, teas, threshed grain, tin or sheet iron or copper ware, wine in casks, wine in glass in packages, window or plate glass in boxes, and generally all other stocks of merchandise (in buildings where fire heat is not used for manufacturing) not elsewhere enumerated.”</p> <p>It appeared from the testimony offered by the plaintiff that at the time of the fire fkere were stored in the same building with the cider about twenty-five barrels of native wine, also the property of the plaintiff. There was no indorsement on the policy of any permission to store wine on the premises. The defendants claimed that thereby the policy became void, and that the plaintiff could not recover. The plaintiff claimed that the cider, when originally insured, was stored in the city of Norwich, and the wine was stored in another building; that the wine was insured in the Hope Insurance Company of Providence, of which company the said Fuller was also the local agent, and issued the policy on the wine ; that early in the month of August, 1861, the plaintiff removed the wine to his new barn in the western part of Norwich, and soon after removed the cider to the same place, having previously obtained permission from Puller so to do; and that he soon after applied to Fuller, informed him of such removal, and requested to have both the policy issued by the defendants on the cider, and that issued by the Hope Insurance Company on the wine, continued in full force on the same property in the barn ; and that Fuller, with full knowledge of all the facts, continued the defendants’ policy in force, and made the indorsement thereon, previously stated, under date of August 12th, 1861: that on the 20th of September, 1861, the plaintiff applied to Fuller for f 100 additional insurance on the cider in the defendants’ company, which was granted, and that Fuller then had full knowledge of the storing of the wine in the building ; that the premium for the $5100 additional insurance was paid, but that nothing extra was paid for such removal. The plaintiff further claimed that at the time the policy was renewed and continued.in force on the cider in the new barn, it was the understanding and arrangement between Fuller and himself that everything necessary to be done in order to continue the policy in force would be done by Fuller, and that for that purpose the policy was left in Fuller’s hands and there remained until the fire.</p> <p>The defendants requested the court to charge the jury, “ that if, at the time when the fire occurred, the premises were appropriated, applied or used to or for the keeping or storing therein any wine in casks, spirituorrs liquors, wine dealers’ stock, or any of the articles, goods or merchandise denominated hazardous, extra hazardous, or specified or included in the memorandum of special hazards, and not named in the policy, or added to or indorsed upon the same as agreed to by the defendants, in writing, then the policy was void and the plaintiff could not recover.”</p> <p>The defendants also claimed that the parol evidence of Fuller in regard to the circumstances under which the removal of the cider was made, and as to his knowledge that the wine was stored in the building, and as to the oral representations made by the plaintiff, was not admissible in any way to affect the terms of the written policy.</p> <p>The court instructed the jury as follows: — u The claim of the defendants in respect to the effect of storing wine on the premises is substantially correct. The panties have a right to make their own contract, and when made it is the duty of courts and juries to give effect to it as made. The storing of wine in the same building with the cider is a violation of the contract, and if there is nothing else in the case, that of itself destroys the policy and entitles the defendants to a verdict. But if the jury shall find that Fuller was the agent of the defendants, with full power to write policies, and at the time of giving consent to continue the insurance on the cider in the new building, had full knowlege that the wine was also stored there, had the policy in his possession, and had an opportunity to indorse upon it the fact that the wine was so stored there, and that the arrangement between the parties was such that the plaintiff had a right to suppose, and did suppose, that the agent of the company would do everything necessary to be done in order to continue the policy in full force ; or in other words if you are satisfied that it was the fair understanding of the parties that permission to store the wine on the premises should be indorsed on the policy, and the agent of the defendants failed to do so through his own neglect, and not through any neglect of the plaintiff, the defendants can not now set up the omission of such indorsement in defense.”</p> <p>The defendants claimed upon the trial that the preliminary proofs of loss submitted by the plaintiff were- defective, which the plaintiff denied. The plaintiff however claimed that if any such defect existed it had been waived by the defendants. To prove such waiver the plaintiff offered, in connection with other evidence, the testimony of Fuller, the agent of the defendants in Norwich, who in behalf of the plaintiff had made out and forwarded to the home office the preliminary proofs of his loss, to prove that the general agent of the defendants, while investigating the circumstances of the loss, in a conversation with Fuller, stated to him that the quantity, quality and value of the property were what the company objected to; and that, although the general agent had full knowledge that the proofs were prepared and forwarded by Fuller, he never at any time made any claim to him that they were defective. To the admission of this testimony the defendants objected, but the court overruled the objection and permitted the evidence to go to the jury.</p> <p>The jury having returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendants moved for a new trial for error in the rulings and charge of the court.</p>

<p>The statute (Rev. Stat., tit 6, § 18,) provides that “ every person who shall with actual violence make an assault upon the body of any female with intent to commit a rape, shall suffer imprisonment, &c.” An information charged that the defendant “with force and arms did an assault make on A W, a single woman, and did her then and there beat, wound and illtreat, with an intent violently and against her will, her feloniously to ravish and carnally know.” Held, that the information was not defective in not charging in terms that the assault was made with actual violence.</p> <p>Under this statute any language which charges the accused with the exercise of physical farce upon the person assaulted, is sufficient.</p>

Writ of error from a decree of the 'superior court against the borough of Stonington, upon the petition of the defendants in error, laying out a highway within the borough and ordering its construction.

Lyon, deceased. The estate was insolvent and was so represented.

Debt on judgment, with the common counts in debt; tried in the superior court on the general issue closed to the court. The following facts were found by the court. On the 16th day of January, 1858, the defendant Hale, was justly indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $102 for goods bought.

Bill in equity. The facts were specially found by the superior court.

Bill in equity to enforce a trust. The facts were specially found by tlie superior court.

Assumpsit, against the defendant as indorser of a promissory note; tried in the superior court, on the general issue closed to the court, before Seymour, J. The note was made by one Chesney, to the order of the defendant, on the 29th day of June, 1860, payable in sis months from date at the Bridgeport City Bank. It was on the same day indorsed by the defendant and delivered to the plaintiffs. The third day of grace on the note fell on the first day of January, 1861.

Bell for a foreclosure. The following facts were found by the superior court. The respondent, on the 31st of March, 1857, executed and delivered to Holcomb & Birdsey, copartners, to whom he was indebted, a note for $450, payable to their order, on demand, with interest, and on the 15th of April following mortgaged to them certain real estate for its security.

Writ of error, brought by the plaintiffs as executors of George W. Ives, against wliom as executor of Henry Wolf the defendant in error had obtained a judgment in the superior court, in a case heretofore reported in 30 Conn. R., 329. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action on the case, against the defendants as common carriers, for the loss through their negligence of money and clothing contained in a trunk of the plaintiff; tried to the jury in the superior court, before McCurdy, I. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendants moved for a new trial for error in the charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action of slander ; tried to the jury in the superior court, on the general issue with notice, before Me Curdy, J. The slanderous words charged in the declaration were as follows, the plaintiff being a physician : — “ Dr. Swift loses almost all his patients.” “ I wonder any respectable person should employ Dr. Swift.” “ Do you employ Dr. Swift ?

Assumpsit against the defendant as indorser of a promissory note. The ease was tried in the snperiorc ourt before Park, J., on the general issue closed to the court, and the following facts were specially found. The note in question was made by Isbell Brothers, a co-partnership then located in Meriden in this state, and was payable to the order of the defendant, who indorsed it and delivered it to the plaintiff.

Assumpsit, for services rendered and moneys paid out by tlie plaintiff, as a counsellor at law, for Minerva E. Washband, one of the defendants, before her intermarriage with John S. Washband, the other defendant.

Action on the case by husband and wife, for an injury to the wife from a defect in a public highway which it was claimed that the defendants were bound to keep in repair.

Assumpsit, to recover for money expended for the support of a pauper. Harmon Wooding and his wife removed to the town of Burlington from the town of Cheshire, where they were legally settled, in the year 1846. Soon after he abandoned his wife, who was subsequently returned to and supported as a pauper by the town of Cheshire.

Action on the case, alleging that the defendants on the 8th day of January, 1851, wrongfully and fraudulently transported a pauper, named Samuel Ingraham, from the town of East Haddam, where he was then residing and was supported as a pauper, and where the defendants resided, to the town of Marlborough, where he had ever since remained, and been a charge upon the town as a panper — that he was brought there by the defendants for the purpose of throwing the burden of his…

Bill in equity. The respondents were trustees in insolvency of the Hartford County Savings Association, and had brought an action at law against the petitioner upon sundry-notes given by him to the association before its insolvency.

Bill in equity. The bill alleged that the respondent, as executor of John M. Niles, on the 18th of March, 1858, brought to the superior court for Hartford County an action at law against the Tunxis Company, a joint stock company located at Windsor in this state, and factorized the petitioner as the debtor of the company, claiming damages in the writ to the amount of $4,000 : that the petitioner appeared in the suit as garnishee by counsel retained by him for the purpose ;…

Assumpsit, to recover the amount of a tax collected of the plaintiffs by the city of Hartford, to which the plaintiffs claimed that they were not legally liable. The case was referred to auditors by the superior court, by whom the following facts were found.

Assumpsit for money paid; tried in the superior court, on the general issue closed to the court, before Carpenter, J. Upon the trial it was proved that in October, 1860, the defendant had procured from Frazier, Mills & Co., who were indebted to him, their note for the sum of ¡¡>500, payable to the order of the plaintiff, three months after date, at the Aetna Bank, Hartford.

Assumpsit, to recover for a quantity of tobacco alleged to have been sold to the defendant. The case was referred to an auditor by the superior court, who reported that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $5334.36.

Bill in equity, brought by the petitioner as trustee in insolvency to set aside a conveyance made by the insolvent of certain real estate. The case was referred by the superior court to a committee to find the facts. The report of the committee was returned to and accepted by the court, and the case was reserved for the advice of this court at its February Term, 1862.

The decree appealed from was as follows: “At a probate court holden at Hartford in and for the district of Hartford, on the 10th day of March, A. D. 1862. Present Hernán H. Barbour, judge. Estate of Thomas Hender, deceased.

Bill in Equity, for tlie foreclosure of a mortgage of personal property and a sale of tlie mortgaged property, brought by the petitioner as trustee for the Bank of North America, a corporation located at Providence in the state of Rhode Island, and for other parties interested.

Assumpsit, tried before Seymour, J., in the superior court. Plea in abatement for defective service, replication and rejoinder, and judgment for the defendant. Motion in error by the plaintiffs. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Bill for a foreclosure. The note secured by the mortgage was given in part for the rent of a farm leased by the petitioner to the respondent, and in part for personal property on the farm sold.

Assumpsit, to recover back the amount of a tax laid by the town of Colchester, and which the plaintiff had been compelled to pay, on certain land within that town, claimed by him to be exempt from taxation. The case was reserved by the superior court, on facts found, for the advice of this court. The facts areBsufficieutly stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit, to recover for supplies furnished to a pauper claimed to be an inhabitant of the defendant town. The case was tried to the jury in the superior court, on the general issue, before Hirnnan, G. J. On the trial the principal question was, whether the pauper had gained a settlement in North Stonington by commorancy.

Ejectment; tried to the jury, in the superior court, on the general issue, before Park, J. On the trial the plaintiff claimed title to the demanded premises as the heir at law of Frances E. Hubbard, deceased.

Ejectment ; tried to the jury in the superior court on the general issue, before Park, J. The demanded premises, previous to the 4th day of May, 1857, belonged to Joel Jacobs, one of the defendants, who on that day conveyed them by quit-claim deed to the other defendants, who were his children. The plaintiffs had since levied an execution on the premises and had them set off to them in satisfaction of it.

Bill in equity for the establishment of a lost and uncertain boundary, under the act of 1859, authorizing certain proceedings in equity in such cases.* The bill alleged that the petitioner was the owner of a certain tract of land, situated in the town of Westbrook, containing about sis acres, bounded easterly on land of the respondent, southerly on Long Island Sound, northerly on the petitioner’s land, and westerly on land of Amasa Spencer; and that the respondent was the…

Book debt, with the common counts in assumpsit; referred to an auditor, who reported a sum due the plaintiff “ to balance book accounts.” Motion in arrest of judgment by the’ defendant for misjoinder of counts. The court found on the motion that the defendant made no objection to the plaintiff’s declaration until after the acceptance of the auditor’s report, and reserved the case for the advice of this court.

Trespass gu. cl.fr., brought originally before a justice of the peace and appealed by the defendant to the superior court.

Information by the state’s attorney to the superior court, for a breach of the peace. The defendant moved that the case be erased from the docket for want of jurisdiction, and the question arising on the motion was reserved for the advice of this court.

Bill in equity. The principal allegations of the bill were as follows: That on the 7th day of March, 1834, Eliphalet Tomlinson, then in full life but since deceased, being anxious to aid in the erection of a house for a high school, to be used by an association known by the name of the Upper Tillage High School Association of New Preston, said house to be used by said association for educational, religious and other public purposes, and for no private use, did make and…

Information for a nuisance by the defendant in placing spring guns in his shop for its protection against burglars, by reason of which the public were endangered in passing by upon the adjacent highway. The jury returned the following special verdict. In this ease the jury find the following facts:— The defendant owned and occupied a blacksmith’s shop adjoining a public highway in Colebrook, about one and a half rods from the traveled path.

Bill for an injunction against the prosecution of an action of ejectment. The bill was dismissed by the superior court, (' Waldo, J.,) and the case was brought before this court by the petitioner, by motion in error. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Trover, for a horse, wagon and harness; tried to the jury in the superior court on the general issue, with notice, before Seymour, T. On the trial it was proved that the horse in dispute, until the sale of it to the plaintiff, had for several years been owned by Guy Webster, the plaintiff’s brother. The plaintiff purchased it of him on the 29th of September, 1861.

Debt, in tlie name of the judge of probate, on a bond given by the defendants for the faithful discharge, by the defendant Lewis, of the office of trustee of the insolvent estate of William Rogers.

Petition for an injunction, to restrain the respondents from proceeding with the levy of an execution upon the body of the petitioner. The facts were found and the bill dismissed by the superior court, ( Carpenter, J.,) upon which the petitioner filed a motion in error and brought the record before this court for revision. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit for money expended in the support of a pauper, reserved by the superior court, upon a special finding of the facts, for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Bill in equity for the correction of a policy of insurance, and for an injunction against a defense set up by the respondents in an action at law on the policy. The superior court made a special finding of the facts.

Trespass quare clausum fregit; tried in the superior court before Carpenter, J. The defendant pleaded the general issue •with notice of proof of title. The jury rendered a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiffs moved for a new trial for errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The facts are very complicated, and a statement of them would require so much space that it is omitted.

Assumpsit on the following note: “ $1,075. Hartford, August 14th, 1854.

Appeal by the appellant, as administrator of tlie estate of Lyman H. Dickinson, from an allowance of a claim against his estate by commissioners ; tried in the superior court, before Me Curdy, J. The claim was presented against the estate in behalf of Susan Green, the minor daughter of Joel T. Green.

Trover, for a stock of goods, tried in the superior court on the general issue. The goods had originally belonged to one Jesse W. Henry. The plaintiff claimed them as trustee under an assignment in insolvency made by Henry on the 9th of July, 1861. The defendant claimed them under a mortgage bill of sale executed on the 8th of July. This mortgage the plaintiff claimed to be void under the insolvent act.

Action of covenant on a sealed receipt, executed to the plaintiff as sheriff by the defendant, jointly and severally with Elisha Tilden and William McNeil, in which they acknowledged the receipt of certain property then attached by the plaintiff as an officer, and covenanted to deliver the same to him on deniand or pay $500, or if demand was not made before judgment recovered, to pay the amount recovered with costs if less than $500, with a provision that the defendants…

Gbandjuror’s complaint, brought to a justice of the peace, and appealed by the accused to the superior court; tried in the superior court before Carpenter, J. The jury found the accused guilty, and she moved for a new trial for errors in the rulings and charge of the court.

Case, for the negligence of a deputy sheriff in the keeping of attached property and the service of an execution, by which the debt was lost; tried in the superior court, on the general issue closed to the court, before Waldo, J. Judgment for the defendant. Motion for a new trial by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action on the statute, for an injury from a defect in a high-* way. Tried in the superior court before Phelps, J. Verdict for the plaintiff. Motion in arrest of judgment, and a motion for a new trial, by the defendants. The former motion, with the facts found upon it, was reserved with the latter for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Trespass quare clausum fregit. The defendant pleaded a right of way. Tried on an issue closed to the court, before Park. J. Judgment for the defendant and motion for a new trial by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Trespass, with a count in trover, against the defendant, a deputy sheriff, for the wrongful taking and carrying away of a horse, wagon, and harness, claimed by the plaintiff to be held by him as trustee for his wife, Caroline Smith, and which had been attached by the defendant as the property of the husband.

Assumpsit by husband and wife, to recover money due for the personal services of the wife during coverture. The defendant pleaded a set-off of an account against the husband. The issue was closed to the court, and the case tried in the superior court before Carpenter, J., who refused to allow the set-off, and the defendant moved for a new trial. The statutes affecting the question are stated in the opinion.

Bill for a foreclosure and for an injunction against the removal of nursery trees and shrubs on the mortgaged premises. The respondents who made defense were the assignee in, insolvency of the mortgagor and a principal creditor. The case was heard in the superior court before Carpenter, J., who passed a decree for a foreclosure and for the injunction prayed for.

Petition for the discontinuance of a highway ; reserved for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. . ^