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← 31 F.3d 942 - Beard v. Teska

Beard v. Teska’s Empirical Analysis

31 F.3d 942 · 1994

Citation profile

90
cited by 90 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
May 2018
most recently cited

27 federal appellate · 23 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 90 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2018 · most notably Friends of the Earth Incorporateds v. Laidlaw Environmental Services Inc (2000), Buckhannon Board and Care Home Incs v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (2001)

27 federal appellate · 23 district · 1 state decisions

570199420002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975) · 20 U.S.C. § 1401 · 29 U.S.C. § 794 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Relies on Hensley v. Eckerhart · Kentucky v. Graham · Blum v. Stenson · Farrar v. Hobby · Honig v. Doe

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 90 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[Jjust as lawyers are not fungible, so too legal services are not fungible. It will be recalled that the legal standard for fee awards is a prevailing market value test. And for that purpose the relevant market value is not the price that the particular lawyer chosen may be paid by willing purchasers of his or her services, but rather the price that is customarily paid in the community for services like those involved in the case at hand. Only a moment’s thought is need[ed] to see why that is so in the context of fee awards against an adversary. There are of course different markets for different areas of lawyer’s work. Lawyers who handle home closings do not bill or receive payment at the same hourly rate as lawyers who handle major corporate mergers and acquisitions-even though each may be handling a “purchase.” If the home buyer chooses to retain a merger specialist because the buyer wants to take advantage of the latter’s demonstrated negotiating skills, the buyer of course is free to do so and to pay the higher tariff. But if and when it comes down to fee shifting-to imposing on the other side an obligation to pay the lawyer’s fee for a legally sufficient reason-the higher cost of the merger specialist cannot properly be thrust on someone who did not, after all, make the uneconomic choice of counsel.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The plaintiff must demonstrate that his lawsuit is linked causally to the relief obtained, i.e., the suit must be a “substantial factor or a significant catalyst” in prompting the defendants to act or cease their behavior. He must also demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct in response to the lawsuit was required by the Constitution or federal law, i.e., the defendant’s actions must be legally required.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “required by law” prong of the catalyst test is, in essence, a showing that the defendants' response was necessarily to an action that in itself was frivolous or groundless. We disagree with the plaintiffs' reading.... The essential part of that language is”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.