31 Fla.
Volume 31 — Florida Reports
51 opinions
- 31 Fla. 1In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (1893)
<p>1. A suspension from office and appointment to fill the office under Section 15 of Article 4, of the Constitution, do not affect the suspended officer’s right to qualify for, or exercise the duties of a succeeding term of the same office; nor do they prevent a Governor succeeding the one who made the suspension from commissioning the suspended officer for the new term.</p> <p>S. An appointment to fill an. office, the incumbent of which has been suspended under Section 15, of Article 4, of the Constitution, cannot be for a longer period than the remainder of the pending term of the suspended officer, and until the qualification of his successor.</p>
- 31 Fla. 10Sammis v. James (1893)
Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Duval County. STATEMENT. This action vs as commenced in Duval Circuit Court in October, 1885, by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error, who sues for the use of James and Lucetta Marcher.
- 31 Fla. 45Sammis v. Wightman ex rel. Marcher (1893)
STATEMENT. The introductory part of the bill, omitting the address, is as follows : “ James S. Wiglitman, * * suing for the use of James Marcher and Lucetta Marcher, * * who exhibits this, his bill for himself as aforesaid, and for all others in like situation who maj come in as parties complainant, and bear his or their proportion of the cost and expense hereof, brings this his bill of complaint against Egbert C. Sammis, as administrator of the estate of John S. Sammis, and…
- 31 Fla. 56National Broadway Bank v. Lesley (1893)
<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 31 Fla. 60DeVaughn v. County Commissioners (1893)
<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Jackson County.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 31 Fla. 62Columbia County v. Branch (1893)
<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Columbia county.</p> <p>The-facts of the case are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 31 Fla. 73Lovell v. Wall (1893)
<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumter county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 31 Fla. 83McGehee v. Wilkins (1893)
<p>Appeal from tlie Circuit Court for Lake county.</p> <p>STATEMENT.</p> <p>This was an action of ejectment brought by appellant against appellee. The plea was not guilty. The plaintiff proved title, through mesne conveyances, under a patent from the United States, and that he went into possession the latter part of June, 1887, and erected improvements, and had not sold or leased the premises sued for. The defendant then offered in evidence a certified copy of a writ of fieri facias which was issued by the clerk of the Circuit Court of Lake county on a judgment by a justice of the peace, with the return thereon. Plaintiff objected to its introduction and the objection was overruled, and plaintiff excepted. Defendant then offered in evidence a certified copy of a transcript of a judgment rendered by the justice of the peace against J. J. McG-ehee. Plaintiff objected to its introduction and the objection was overruled, and he excepted. Defendant then offered in evidence a sheriff’s deed to himself, conveying the lands in question, and which was based upon a levy and sale under the execution in evidence. The introduction of this deed was objected to on the ground that the deed was made upon a sale under fieri facias issued on a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace, which judgment had not been proven, and it had not been proven that the justice of the peace who rendered the judgment had jurisdiction either of the person of the defendant or the subject-matter of the suit. This objection was overruled and the deed admitted; the judge ruling that the plaintiff should introduce the record of the proceedings of the justice, if he claimed that they were invalid. To which ruling of the judge the plaintiff excepted. Defendant then offered in evidence a transcript of the docket entries in the justice’s docket, certified to by the clerk of the Circuit Court, the docket having been filed in his office upon the expiration of the term of office of the justice. Plaintiff objected to its admission and the objection was overruled, and plaintiff excepted. Defenclant closed, and plaintiff then introduced in evidence the original docket entries and papers in the suit before the justice, in which the judgment was rendered on which the execution issued that was levied on the land in controversy. It appears from the evidence, so introduced in rebuttal, that the suit before the justice was commenced by attachment; that the attachment was levied upon the lot in controversy, and that the defendants were not found, were never personally served, and never appeared. It appears from the transcript that after all this evidence was in, the judge again overruled the objection of the plaintiff to the admission of the sheriff’s deed, and that in consequence of this, plaintiff took a non-suit with a bill of exceptions.</p>
- 31 Fla. 89Shad v. Livingston (1893)
<p>Appeal from a Decree of the Circuit Court for Duval County.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 31 Fla. 100McCrillis v. Copp (1893)
<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 31 Fla. 111City of Orlando v. Pragg (1893)
<p>Upon, appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange-county.</p> <p>The facts of the case are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 31 Fla. 125Griffin v. Lacourse (1893)
<p>In proceedings to quash an execution on account of illegality in its issuance, under the act of February 15, 1834 (McClellan’s Digest, page 524, §§ 19 and 20), the giving of the bond therein required is an essential prerequisite to the right to suspend the execution at all; and where it appears that an affidavit of illegality was made, but no bond was' given, the overruling of a motion to quash the execution by the Circuit Judge will not be reversed for error, although it appear from the record that the execution was illegally issued, the defendant in execution not being in a situation to insist on the illegality in any other recognized way than that provided by the statute of 1834, supra.</p>
- 31 Fla. 134B. G. Lockett & Co. v. Robinson (1893)
Upon appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion county. STATEMENT. In this case a bill was tiled on the 16th of May, 1885, by appellants against the appellee, and its material allegations are, in substance, as follows : That H. P. Robinson and Charles F. Robinson were copartners under the firm name of H. P. Robinson & Bro. That they were the owners of a certain lot in Ocala, and in May, 1884, commenced the erection, on said lot, of a brick building for business purposes.
- 31 Fla. 139Belton v. Summer (1893)
<p>Upon appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for* Marion county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 31 Fla. 147Gibbens v. Pickett (1893)
<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval county.</p> <p>The facts, in the case are stated in the opinion.</p>
- 31 Fla. 152Dell v. Marvin (1893)
Writ of error to tlie Circuit Court for Duval county. Motion to vacate supersedeas. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion.
- 31 Fla. 160Odlin v. Woodruff (1893)
<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Orange county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 164Lovett v. State (1893)
<p>Verdict in homicide most state degree.</p> <p>Under the provisions of Section 2383, Revised Statutes, a verdict, on a trial for murder, that simply says: ‘HVe, the jury, find the, defendant guilty as charged in theindietinent,” is a nullity: and no judgment or sentence can legally he pronounced thereon,. because it fails to ascertain and declare the degree of the crime of which he is convicted. Buck Hall vs. State, decided at the present term, approvingly cited.</p>
- 31 Fla. 166Murphy v. State (1893)
<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Gadsden county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 170Garner v. State (1893)
<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Suwannee county.</p> <p>The facts in the ease are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 176Hall v. State (1893)
<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Jackson county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 190Jenkins v. State (1893)
<p>.'Summoning witnesses at cost of state subject to legislative REGULATION.</p> <p>1. Section 2868, Revised Statutes, prescribing the requisites to be complied with by parties charged with crime in applications for the procurement of witnesses for their defense at the cost of the State; held, to be a proper legislative regulation of the constitutional right,'that “in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses in his favor.” And, Held further, that when the cost of the procurement of such witnesses is initiatorily proposed to be thrown upon the State, a sound judicial discretion is reposed in the trial judge to decide as to whether the statutory requisites have been properly complied with, and as to the Iona fides of the application.</p> <p>2. Applications under Section 2868, Revised Statutes, for the procurement of witnesses, at the cost of the State, for the defense of parties charged with crime, should be seasonably made at the earliest reasonable opportunity, and not withheld until the cause is actually called for trial.</p>
- 31 Fla. 196Jenkins v. State (1893)
<p>JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS—EXAMINATION OP JURORS ' ON VOIR DIRE—ACCOMPLICES AS WITNESSES.</p> <p>1. In all such matters as the granting of applications to pass the trial of causes when called for trial, or to temporarily postpone the trial thereof in order to give counsel time to prepare papers to be filed therein; or, during the trial, to have the testimony adduced with sufficient slowness so that it can be written down in extenso, a large discretion must of necessity be reposed in the trial judge, and an appellate court can not declare any given exercise of such discretion to be error, unless the record discloses a palpable abuse thereof.</p> <p>2. In testing the qualifications of jurors on the voir dire, it is not a proper field of inquiry to interrogate the proposed juror as to the comparative credence that he would or could give to the evidence of persons belonging to different races, who may or may not be witnesses in the cause.</p> <p>3. An accomplicelis [a competent witness against his confederates in the crime, and'a conviction, may be had upon his uncorroborated evidence, where it satisfies the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.</p>
- 31 Fla. 207Brown v. State (1893)
<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Walton county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 218McCall v. State (1893)
<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Hamilton county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 221Wood v. State (1893)
Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Washington county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court. ...
- 31 Fla. 240Whetston v. State (1893)
Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Wakulla county. STATEMENT. The plaintiff in error was indicted in the Circnit Court for Wakulla county for burning, in the night time, a certain outbuilding described as a cotton house, belonging to Ed. Whaley,, and upon an arraignment and trial at the Fall term, 1892, of that court was convicted of the offense charged against him.
- 31 Fla. 255Donald v. State (1893)
<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for G-adsdeu county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 262Golding v. State (1893)
<p>1. The conviction of an accused of murder in the second degree upon an indictment charging him with murder in the first degree, has the effect in law to acquit him of the’ higher offense charged in the indictment, and he can not legally be put upon trial a second time for the higher offense. Following Johnson vs. State, 27 Fla., 245, 9 South. Rep., 208.</p> <p>2. A motion in arrest of judgment reaches only such defects as are apparent upon the record, but in a case where a judgment rendered has been reversed and a new trial granted, and a second trial is had upon the same indictment in the same court, the entire proceedings constitute one record, and a motion in arrest of judgment on the ground of a former acquittal of a higher offense charged in the indictment, will be good where such fact appears upon the record.</p>
- 31 Fla. 266Ballard v. State (1893)
Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Maiion county. STATEMENT.
- 31 Fla. 291Mathis v. State (1893)
<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 320Woodruff v. State (1893)
<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Polk county.</p> <p>STATEMENT.</p> <p>According to the testimony of Will Janes, one of the witnesses for the prosecution, who was sitting in front of the pool room, the decease l came out of the pool room where he had been playing or romping with a girl, and sat down on a bench in front of and about ten feet, or, as he states on cross-examination, eight or nine feet from the building, and was ‘‘motioning” a beer bottle which he held by the neck, backwards and forwards towards the girl, who had followed him to the door. Deceased had told her to make, up his bed, and was saying to her that if she came out he would hit her on her head with the bottle. The girl and deceased were both laughing, and not angry. The prisoner, who had been between the pool room and another building to the west of it, came from the corner of the building and sat down on the bench by the deceased, and deceased said he was going to mash some s—n of a b—’s mouth, and thereupon defendant pulled out his knife from his left hand pocket, and deceased thereupon said to him that if he pulled out that knife for him, he would mash his “dam mouth;” to which defendant replied: “Go on, man, I am in trouble enough;” or, as witness puts i-c on the cross-examination, deceased asked defendant if he pulled the knife out for him, and defendant said: “Go on, man, I am in trouble enough;” and then deceased said: “If you pull that knife out for me, I will mash your mouth.” Deceased kept on “motioning backwards and forwards,” the woman having poked her head out of the door. Then the deceased went off two or three minutes to the southwestern corner of the pool room and relieved himself of water, and returning sat down at the same pláce he had left, and as he did so the defendant, who had gotten up and was standing with his knife in his hand, stepped in front of him and stabbed him between the right shoulder and the neck, using liis left hand. The deceased dropped the bottle then and ran, and defendant followed close behind him, saying he would cut his “dam throat,” and stabbed at him. The deceased was then brought back, and he fell and died in .about twenty-minutes. That all this was in Polk county, in this State. That defendant went to whittling when he pulled out his knife. That deceased and prisoner seemed to be joking; did not seem to be mad with each other; were friendly. The wound was about an inch wide, and the blood was gushing out. Deceased said, after he was brought back, that if he had a pistol he could kill him (the defendant); and that he (the deceased) was a dead man. Nothing had been said to cause deceased to make the remark uttered before the knife ivas drawn by defendant, and witness does not know what caused him to make it.</p> <p>The account given by Nathan Rich, also a State witness, and who had come to the locality of the pool room only about five minutes before the difficulty, is, that he and defendant were on the bench, he at one end, and the.defendant at the other, he haying been there about three minutes before the difficulty. That the deceased, who, when witness came up, was playing with the girl and had the bottle in his hand, came up and told defendant, who had taken his seat after witness reached the locality, but before he (witness) sat down on the bench, that if he had opened that knife on him, he would mash his “dam mouth,” and defendant said: “Gro on, man, I am in trouble;” or as stated on cross-examination: “Go on, man, I am in trouble; I don’t want him to bother.” and got up and walked to the corner of the house, and was standing there with his knife in his hand, when the deceased repeated the same words, and then defendant returned, the distance/ being about fifteen feet, and stabbed him with his knife. Deceased had taken a seat when he made the last remark, and was still sitting there, and -was making no attempt at resistance when he was cut. When asked if he saw the deceased get up from the bench and go anywhere before he was cut, the witness answered: “Ho more than he was playing with the woman,” and when asked if he saw deceased get up and go to the corner of the house, he replied: “He came from around the corner.” He also said he could not say positively what he was doing at the corner, and did not know wdiether deceased had been sitting on the bench before witness came up. Witness says he did not know anybody was angry, defendant, or anyone else, but thought it was all play.</p> <p>Henry Holmes went to the pool room with defendant the afternoon of the difficulty, and after coming out of it, witness and defendant had a conversation at the northeast corner of -the next house west of the pool room, everything being pleasant, and deceased came up. Just before the deceased came up, defendant put his hand in his pocket and took out his knife, and had it in his left- hand. Witness thought he took it out to cut tobacco. Deceased asked him if he had pulled out that knife on him, and defendant told him to go on, man. It- was something like this ; and .then deceased said that if he thought he had drawn that knife on him, he would break his mouth with that bottle. Wit n.ess turned off and went to playing with Sol. Moore, and deceased and defendant went towards the pool room, the latter ahead and the former behind. Deceased did not appear to be angry ; they were talking' that way all the time, but witness did not know his ideas ; thought they were merely joking. Deceased also said to defendant that, if he just knew that he pulled that knife out for him, he would break his “dam head” -with the bottle. “Last account” witness “got of deceased he was going towards the bench,” and when he noticed him next he was going around the house and the defendant was after him. The next thing that attracted witness’ attention while he was playing with Moore was the girl’s exclaiming: “Oil," he is stabbed,” and he looked and deceased was going around the house and defendant after him. Did not know -what occurred or what was said after tin y left to go to the bench, or around the bench. On cross-examination he says he can not remember what time in the afternoon he got there. Deceased was there when he arrived, and a lot of them were standing up talking and laughing. Witness does not remember whom he played pool with. Sol. Moore was standing “side” and about ten feet from the stated northeast corner when witness and defendant went to it. Thinks defendant took out his knife to cut tobacco. Defendant told deceased “to go on,” when he made tlie stated remark, and then turned off towards the mentioned corner of the porch of the mentioned adjacent building. Witness went to the porch and he and Moore went to tussleing with each other. Prom the time deceased and defendant went off till witness heard the lick was long enough for them to go to the poolroom. He can’t say where they were when the lick was struck. Was in position to have heard any conversation that afternoon between deceased' and the woman after leaving the pool room. Did not see deceased and defendant sitting on the bench in front of the pool room. Did not see Will Jones there; was not acquainted with him then ; he might have been there. Moore and witness wmre playing when he heard the lick. Re-direct: Defendant pulled out his knife two or three minutes before deceased came up. Did not see defendant cut any tobacco. Deceased and defendant were in front of the pool room towards the bench. Not positive as to the exact length of time he was standing at the corner in conversation.</p> <p>J. E. Shannahan, witness for defense, was deputy marshal of Bartow, and arrested defendant and found the knife on him, which he identifies. John Bishop testified to the peaceable and law-abiding character of the defendant,, and that he came to his house soon after the difficulty is said to have occurred.</p> <p>The deceased made a statement of his defense under oath. He speaks of going to the pool room with Henry Holmes and of taking a drink there, and of other matters not necessary to mention. He also says, he and Henry Holmes went to the third house (there wer we may remark, three houses, all- facing north, the pool room by the eastern one), where a game of cards (skin) was going on. Moore was there and suggested to him to bet, but he declined. He then says : I turned and walked off, and I said to Henry, come on, and then says, I don’t believe I will go up town. And 1 ran my hand in my coat pocket and got out my pipe and put it in my mouth, and ran my hand in this] pocket and pulled out this very knife and opened it, and after I had opened it, this fellow they call Will Powell walked up and said: “If I knew you pulled that knife out to m3, I woullbreak this bottle, I would burst your dam brains out;” and I said to him: “Go away man, don’t bother me; I don’t want to worry with you;” and I started off to the pool room, and he walked up to me and patted me on the shoulder and says: “Say, old parti,” and I turned around to him and says: “ What is it ?” and he said: “I want to talk business to you.” Me and him went up towards the closet,, and he ran his hand in his bosom and pulled out a pistol and says: “I got this pistol for $2, and would let you have it for that,” and I told him, “no, 1 can’t do it,” and he said: “Hell, dam it, you got money.” I told him, “yes, I have got $2 or $3, and am going to keep it. I did not want any pistol, as I got no use for it,” and I walked off and went to the pool room and the fellow on behind me. And I went in the pool room and paid Hall the ten cents that I owed him on the bottle of barley that I got of liim, and I come out. Will was in front of the pool room on the ground, and I turned to the corner of the. house and come up towards Hamp’s barber .shop. He come walking behind me and says: “Stop .there a minute,” and I stopped and he says: “Are .you going to let me have the two dollars,” and I told .him, “no, I can’t do it,” and he. said: “I would take that dollar and go in a skin game and win two or three "dollars, and I will pay you back in five minutes,” n,nd I said, “no, I had just been to Mr. Bishop and got $5 from him and spent it all but $2.50, and I can’t do it.” The deceased then, addressing him with an epithet of the vilest and most opprobious character, stating it, which defendant denied, saying also that it was something he did not give or take, whereupon ‘ ‘deceased ran his hand in his bosom, and I had this very knife which was open, and when he put his hand in his bosom, I struck at him, just like that, and I struck at him and cut him on his arm, and as I cut him, he broke to run right by me, and I broke and run towards Hamp G-ammon’s barber shop. ’ ’ Then he says he went to town and told Mr. Bishop about it, and that he had cut him on the arm, but not bad, and would go up town and give up to Mr. Kilpatrick, whom he was on his way to see when he met Shannahan, who arrested him. He had no intention of killing deceased.</p> <p>In rebuttal: The State called Solomon Moore, who testified: That he saw deceased before the difficulty, and that he had no pistol, and that deceased was sitting on the end of the bench when the blow was struck. That he did not see deceased go up to defendant at the corner of the pool room and say he wanted to see him, but could have seen him. . Deceased was sitting down on the bench with a bottle in his hand, and defendant standing right in front of him holding a knife. Deceased did not put or have his hand in his bosom at the time he was stabbed. Did not hear deceased use the epithet referred to in defendant’s statement; was eight or ten feet from them. Examined deceased immediately after the killing, and he had no pistol on him. On cross-examination: Was standing alone in front'of the middle house when the cutting took place; had just left Holmes and walked out in front of the house; stopped and sat down, and heard them speaking at the time I saw them in the positions indicated. Deceased asked defendant what he wms standing over him for; what he meant by it. Will Jones was on the pool room porch at this time. Didn’t see Rich; don’t know whether he was on the bench or not; was looking right at east end of bench ; the bench was eight feet long, and four or five feet from pool room porch. Had been standing there about five minutes when the fight occurred. Defendant did not see anything until deceased asked him if he pulled that knife out for him, to which he replied, not to bother him, and then deceased said, that if he thought he was standing over him with that knife he would knock him in the mouth with that bottle, and defendant told him to go on, he did not want to be bothered. The woman was at this time standing- in the room of the middle house. She spoke to deceased, but he can not tell what she said, and deceased said something to her about making up his bed. This was all going on at the same time. He is sure defendant made the last remark at the same time he struck the blow.</p> <p>Will Jones, recalled, said he was about and not further than ten feet from the parties when the stab.bing occurred. Deceased did not get up and follow defendant to the corner of the pool room, and ask him to lend him money, or have any of the conversation stated by defendant, or make any effort to draw a pistol from his bosom, or put or have his hand in his bosom. He had on a woolen shirt and his bosom was open, and he did not place or attempt to place his hand on his bosom when he was stabbed, or while he was talking to defendant. He did not have a revolver; witness helped to carry him in the house, and had his hands all over him, and would have seen it if he had had one; did not examine him. On cross examination : He had on a shirt, but no coat. His face was toward witness when the stabbing occurred. Witness was sitting on the porch, his legs hanging over it towards but not touching the gro und. Stating that the deceased had been playing with the woman that afternoon, he was then asked: “You know that as a fact?” and replied: “Hot in my presence.” Hathan Rich was sitting on the bench. Sol Moore was between the two buildings. Defendant did not shut up his knife any more after opening it when he was sitting on the .bench by the side of the deceased. When deceased made his first remark about mashing mouth he did not call any name. When the woman went to the door after lie made the remark lie '‘motioned” the bottle at her. Her direction from him was right in front. The length of the porch was the width of the house, and witness was sitting about the middle of it. Could see deceased, on his way to the southwest corner, through a middle door; heard him making water; saw no one else pass that way ; positive he was the one; did not see him, but saw him pass the corner of the house and come from around that way. Defendant got up and was standing up at the bench with his knife in his hand when deceased went around the corner; he was gone about two or three minutes. Neither of the parties said anything when deceased returned. Defendant stabbed him immediately on his sitting down; slipped up and stabbed him without saying a word. • Defendant ran after deceased and cut at him once.</p> <p>Nathan Rich, recalled, testified that he was not further than ten feet from the parties when the stabbing occurred. Deceased was sitting down on the east end of the bench, and defendant was standing up by the bench. The corner of the pool room is about fifteen feet from bench. Deceased did not follow defendant to the corner of the pool room and ask him to lend him money; would have seen him if he had done it; no conversation or acts, spoken of by defendant in his statement took place at the corner; when cut, deceased was sitting on the bench and had the bottle in his hand, and made no attempt to draw a revolver. Witness was sitting on the east end of the bench, facing south; was looking at them at the time; did not know whether they 'meant it, or was joking; liad seen things of that sort around there before, joking, playing and going on. When defendant walked off to the corner of the pool foom, deceased repeated the remark. Deceased did not come to the corner of the house just before being stabbed, or while witness was sitting there; it was defendant; is positive of this. Witness was sitting to •the left of deceased and defendant.</p> <p>The other facts in the case are stated in the opinion 'of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 340English v. State (1893)
<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Brevard; county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 356English v. State (1893)
<p>UPOli. PETITION POE REHEARING—REHEARING DENIED.</p> <p>1. A rehearing will not be granted where the questions that the petition alleges to have been omitted from the consideration of the court were necessarily involved in and determined by the decision, though not in express terms.</p> <p>3. The legal presumption is, that the official acts of grand juries in finding and presenting indictments are lawfully and regularly done ; and that unless twelve of their number concur iu finding au indictment, properly endorsed and regularly presented, it would never have been returned or presented as such.</p> <p>3. The general charge of the court to a grand jury forms no part of the record proper in the trial of any one indicted by such grand jury, but is matter in pais, and cannot be made a part of the record entitling it to consideration on writ of error, unless it can be made so by bill of exceptions; and this can only be done by the judge below so long as he is at liberty to settle and sign such bill. After the expiration of the time limited by him for settling such bill he cannot add new matter thereto by amendment or otherwise.</p>
- 31 Fla. 364Persinger v. Bevill (1893)
<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumter county.</p> <p>The facts m the case are stated in the opinion of the ■court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 369Summerlin v. Thompson & Co. (1893)
<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 392Hardee v. Hutchinson (1893)
<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard county.</p> <p>Motion to vacate supersedeas.</p> <p>The facts in the.case are stated in the opinion of the ■court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 401Gamble v. Hamilton (1893)
<p>1. Where B. has paid the taxes of H. for several years, and then-purchased at a tax sale, and after such purchase has written to H. that he has paid the taxes on the land and taken the receipt as sold for taxes, but that it will be all right, and then gets a tax deed upon the certificate of sale and does not inform H. of that fact, and subsequently agrees to pay the taxes for H., and then makes a contract with H. for the purchase of the land, the tax deed is fraudulent and void as against H. and those in privity with him.</p> <p>3. One who purchases land with actual notice that another claims it and is exercising dominion over it, takes it subject to all the rights and equities of the person so claiming and exercising dominion over the land.</p> <p>3. One who claims title to land, legal in its character, cannot maintain a bill in equity against the person in possession of the land, or any part thereof, to remove a cloud from his title.</p> <p>4. Where B. purchased land from H. .by parol contract, and H. put him into possession, and part of the purchase money remained unpaid, the possession of B. is not adverse to the title of H., but in subordination thereto.</p> <p>5. A party may convey land held in the actual possession of another, provided that such actual possession is not adverse.</p> <p>6. Where a party endeayors to adjust and settle a disputed claim between ver. dor and vendee of a parcel of land, and fails, and some years afterwards purchases the land from the said vendor, with his own funds, and obtains a deed thereto, he acquires the title subject to any existing obligations of the vendor.</p>
- 31 Fla. 413Johnson v. Armour & Co. (1893)
STATEMENT. In December, 1891, the appellees filed a petition in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Fourth Circuit, in and for Duval county, and addressed to the judge of that court, sitting in and for that county, in which they represent: 1.
- 31 Fla. 428Kennedy v. State (1893)
<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Walton county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 458Westcott v. State (1893)
Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Leon county. STATEMENT. The plaintiff in error was indicted at the Fall term, A. D. 1892, of the Circuit Court for Leon county, for the murder of Amanda Howell, and during the same term of this court was arraigned, tried and convicted, upon the indictment returned against him, of murder in the first degree. From the judgment of the court imposing the sentence of death on him, the accused has sued out a writ of error to this court.
- 31 Fla. 471Hull v. Greeley (1893)
<p>The authority of tax collectors to sell lands for unpaid taxes was abrogated by the general revenue law of 1891, Chapter 4010, and the act providing for certifying to the Comptroller lands upon., which taxes have not been paid, Chapter 4011; and consequently a sale of land for unpaid taxes of 1890 by a tax collecter in the year 1891, after such statutes took effect, is illegal. They took effect August 4, 1891, the Legislature having adjourned finally on the fifth day of the proceeding June.</p>
- 31 Fla. 482Florida Central & Peninsular Railroad v. State ex rel. Mayor (1893)
<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court' for Lake county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 514Roten v. State (1893)
<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Monroe •county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 525Godwin v. King (1893)
<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Jackson county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court. • '</p>
- 31 Fla. 541Hoey v. Jackson (1893)
STATEMENT. Cordelia Hoey, in her own right, and as administratrix of Cason Cooper, deceased, and Charles Hoey, who joined in right of his wife, Cordelia, filed a, bill in 1884 in the Circuit Court for Hillsborough county, .against John Jackson.
- 31 Fla. 558State ex rel. Peruvian Phosphate Co. v. Board of Phosphate Commissioners (1893)
Original proceeding—Mandamus. STATEMENT. Tile alternative writ sliows, in substance, that the relator is a body corporate under the laws of this State, organized in June, 1891, for the purpose of digging, mining and preparing for market phosphate rock and phosphatic deposits.
- 31 Fla. 574Collins v. State (1893)
<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Suwannee county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>
- 31 Fla. 589Florida Central & Peninsular Railroad v. Foxworth (1893)
<p>A case will not be dismissed under Supreme Court Rule 12, before it has been called for argument at the third term.</p>
- 31 Fla. 590Gray v. First National Bank (1893)
<p>Appellee confessed the errors assigned by appellant, and moved thereon for reversal, giving notice of motion to appellant, by whom there was neither appearance nor resistance to the motion. Reversal, without defining the extent of the error.</p>
- 31 Fla. 594State ex rel. Colcord v. Young (1893)
Mandamus by the State on the relation of Russell E. Colcord, by his next friend, John L. Colcord, against William B. Young, circuit judge, to compel defendant to determine a cause appealed from the ■county court to the Circuit Court. Judgment for de.fendant.