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31 Ind. 121

Cheek v. Tilley

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided May 15, 1869

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1869-05-15

Suit by the appellee against Cheek and Arnold. The complaint alleges, that Cheek, as clerk of Dearborn county, on the 15th of February, 1864, contracted with the apjjellee to act as his deputy, their contract being set forth in a certain writing, as follows:— “State of Indiana, Dearborn County, Set. “I, John E. Cheek, clerk of the courts of Dearborn county, Indiana, do hereby constitute and appoint William Wirt Tilley my deputy during my term of office, his compensation to…

Relies on Becker v. Ten Eyck

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1869-05-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently February 1943

5 state decisions

20186918701880189019001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Frazer, J.

¶2The contract between the parties does not show an attempt to sell an office, but merely the appointment of a deputy and an agreement that for his compensation the latter shall share the emoluments of the office. In all this there is nothing in contravention of public policy, as is suggested in argument. We can conceive of no valid objection to it. The question has received the attention of other courts, and, so far as we know, such agreements have uniformly received their santion. Becker v. Ten Eyck, 6 Paige Ch. 68; Mott v. Robbins, 1 Hill, 21.

¶3It is certainly very plain that the case made by the complaint is a proper one for an injunction and a receiver, pending the cause, unless, as it is argued, such interlocutoi’y action by the court would transfer the duties of the office of clerkfrom the appellant, or interfere with his exercise ofthem.

¶4The collection of his fees is not a duty imposed by law. It is a right which belongs to him as an individual, and not an official duty required of him. The plaintiff’ according to the facts alleged, has also the same right; for a portion of the fees are also his. This collecting can be performed by a receiver, without in any manner interfering with the discharge by the appellant of all the official duties required of him by law.

¶5PTor do we think that the injunction should have been dissolved upon the affidavits. The appellant did not, under oath, deny his insolvency or his intention to apply the fees of the office, which he might collect, to his own use. *127So much of the complaint essential to the injunction as he dicl deny was supported by other affidavits. As the case thus appeared upon the affidavits, the injunction should not, under the chancery practice, have been dissolved, and there is nothing in the code which changes the former rule upon that subject.

X W. Gordon, X. 32. McDonald, A. L. Roache, E. M. McDonald, and X. W. JSHchol, for appellants.X. Schwartz, for appellee.

¶6The unimportant questions of mere practice which arc made cannot affect the case, and need not, therefore, be decided.

¶7Judgment affirmed, with costs.

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