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← 31 KAN 767 - Ryus v. Gruble

Ryus v. Gruble’s Empirical Analysis

1884

Citation profile

42
cited by 42 later decisions
15
states following
November 1984
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 1 district · 38 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 42 later decisions — most recently November 1984 · most notably 103 Wash. 2d 111 - Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. BRAZIER CONSTR. (1984), Kitchener v. Williams (1951)

3 federal appellate · 1 district · 38 state decisions — followed in 15 states

11018841890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Dawes v. Shed

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““As before stated, the wrongs committed by the defendant are the real and substantial foundation for the plaintiff’s cause of action, and the sheriff’s bond is virtually only a collateral security for the enforcement of such cause of action. The bond does not give the cause of action; the wrongs or delicts do; and the bond simply furnishes security to indemnify the persons who suffer by reason of such wrongs or delicts. . . . Whenever a cause of action is barred by any statute'of limitations, the right to maintain an action therefor upon a bond which simply operates as a security for the same thing must necessarily cease to exist. When the principal debt or cause of action fails, the security must also fail.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Civil actions, other than for the recovery of real property, can only be brought within the following periods, after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards: 6 "First. Within five years: An action upon any contract, agreement or promise in writing. 7 "Second. Within three years: An action upon a contract express or implied not in writing; an action upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty. 8 "Third. Within two years: An action for trespass upon real property; an action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including actions for the specific recovery of personal property; an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated; * * *. 9 * * * * * * 10 "Fifth. An action upon the official bond or undertaking of an executor, administrator, guardian, sheriff, or any other officer, * * * can only be brought within five years after the cause of action shall have accrued.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““The wrongs charged in the plaintiff’s petition as the foundation for his present action, are a trespass upon real property, and the taking, detaining and selling of personal property. Now an action for these wrongs is barred within two years; . . . “Under the facts of this case, the plaintiff had an action against the defendant for a trespass upon real property, which action was barred within two years. He also had an action for the taking and conversion of the personal property, which action was also barred within two years; . . .” (p. 769.)”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.