31 Kan. App. 2d 853 - State v. Bunyard’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The issue of whether consent may be withdrawn after penetration is one of first impression in this State; therefore, case law from other jurisdictions is instructive. In Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 683-84 , 414 A.2d 1266 (1980), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that consent must precede penetration. In other words, if a woman consented to a sexual encounter, even to intercourse, and consent is withdrawn prior to penetration, she did not consent to sexual intercourse. However, if she consents prior to penetration and withdraws the consent following penetration, there is no rape. In reviewing case law from jurisdictions other than Maryland, we conclude that the Battle holding has not been adopted by other courts. In fact, the Appellate Court of Connecticut specifically rejected an argument identical to Bunyard's.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 172 Md. App. 588 - Baby v. State · 171 Md. App. 329 - Baby v. State

2. ““[S]exual intercourse performed when one participant is under force or fear is rape. It does not matter if the force or fear exists at the initiation of the act or whether it comes after consent is withdrawn. The act is rape under either circumstance. A participant in sexual intercourse may withdraw consent after penetration has occurred. The continuation of sexual intercourse after consent has been with drawn, and in the presence of force or fear, is rape.” Bunyard, 31 Kan. App. 2d at 859 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Baby · State v. Flynn

3. ““The ¡John Z.] court noted that the defendant was given ‘ample time’ to withdraw, and that his failure to cease intercourse was not reasonable. 29 Cal. 4th at 763 . In John Z., the victim told the defendant three times that she ‘needed to go home.’ It was estimated that the intercourse continued for 4 to 5 minutes after the victim first told the defendant she needed to go home. 29 Cal. 4th at 763 . “In the instant case, E.N. estimated that it took Bunyard approximately 5 to 10 minutes to stop the intercourse. When consent is withdrawn, continuing sexual intercourse for 5 to 10 minutes is not reasonable and constitutes rape.” Bunyard, 31 Kan. App. 2d at 859 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Flynn