31 Md. App. 247 - Quinn v. Glackin’s Empirical Analysis
1976
Citation profile
6
cited by 6 later decisions
1
states following
March 2009
most recently cited
6 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Greenfeld v. Hook · State, Use of Taylor v. Barlly · Creaser v. Owens · Peregoy v. Western Maryland Railroad · Legum v. State Ex Rel. Moran
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“If the evidence in this case was sufficient to show any negligence at all on [the driver’s] part ... then it was original negligence which continued, and concurred with the admitted negligence of [the child] to cause her injury. There could be no fresh opportunity available to [the driver] to avoid the consequences of [the child’s] negligence until she did something negligent. Her approach down the driveway was not negligent, and did not then place her in a position of peril. Her lawful approach could not constitute notice to [the driver] that she would fail to yield the right of way to him. A motorist on the favored highway has the right to assume that the unfavored driver will yield the right of way. [The child’s] negligence — her failure to yield the right of way to a motorist on the favored highway — was followed almost instantaneously by the accident. The trial judge correctly ruled that there was no evidence to show that [the driver] had a last clear chance to avoid the accident.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]here was no evidence sufficient to go to the jury in the present case to support a finding that, assuming the appellant's negligence, there was a time after such negligence when the appellee could have averted the accident and the appellant could not. Both the train and the truck were moving at the time of the impact, and it is clear that if the appellee was negligent, its negligence was concurrent and not sequential. We have said that in order for the rule to be applicable "[s]omething new, or independent, must be shown, which gave the defendant a fresh opportunity to avert the consequences of his original negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence." Even though the operator of the appellee's locomotive saw the appellant's truck standing or moving slowly at a point close to the tracks, he had the right to assume that the appellant would stop before he reached the track upon which the train was proceeding. The appellant did not present any evidence to support an inference that the appellee had a "fresh opportunity" to avert the consequences of his own contributory negligence in driving onto the tracks.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“there was then still time for [Mr. Glackin] to avoid the accident.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.