¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent. The majority correctly states the law governing the determination of a criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial and to enter a plea of guilty. The majority misapplied this law, however, in reaching its conclusion that the motion court’s findings and conclusions were not clearly erroneous and that Mr. Hubbard did not suffer a manifest injustice. To the contrary, the motion court clearly erred in determining that the weight of the evidence supported the motion court’s finding that Mr. Hubbard was competent to proceed and that he was not prejudiced by his defense counsel’s failure to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exercise in similar circumstances.
¶3At the time of his guilty plea, Mr. Hubbard suffered from a chronic mental illness. There was extensive credible evidence that he was actively psychotic throughout the time the criminal charges were pending, and he was determined by a psychologist-attorney at the Missouri Department of Corrections to have a very severe mental defect “within the meaning of the law,” prior to the time he entered his guilty plea. Dr. Suthikant’s testimony that Mr. Hubbard did not have a mental illness and he was a malingerer was rejected by the motion court. Nevertheless, the motion court, and this court in affirming its judgment, finds that Mr. Hubbard’s *40demeanor at the time he entered his plea of guilty and his responses to questions asked provided sufficient evidence to outweigh the evidence of his active, severe mental illness. I disagree. The weight of the evidence proves that Mr. Hubbard’s mental illness was a mental disorder that falls within the definition of mental illness as defined in Chapter 552. Mr. Hubbard should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because he lacked the mental capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense. Section 552.020.1.
¶4The motion court clearly erred in determining that Mr. Hubbard’s demeanor on the day he entered his guilty plea outweighed the extensive evidence that he was suffering from a chronic mental illness with active hallucinations at the time he entered his guilty plea. Mr. Hubbard will suffer a manifest injustice if he is not allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion court’s judgment should be reversed and the motion court should be directed to order that Mr. Hubbard be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.