Volume 31 — United States Reports

THIS case came before the court on a certificate of division from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Maryland.

THIS was a writ of error from the circuit court of the United' States of the district of Columbia for the county of Washington. The action was assumpsit in the circuit court, and was instituted by the Bank of Washington against the Bank of the Unitéd States for money had and received, to recover the sum of eight hundred and eighty-one dollars and eighteen cents, with interest. The case was submitted to that court on the following case agreed.

Held: that the statute did not extend to the action, and that the plaintiff was not barred. By the acts of the legislature of North Carolina, in force in Tennessee, the indorser of a promissory note is entitled to sue in his own name, as on inland bills, of exchange in England; and he may therefore bring an action of debt on a promissory note held by him.

THIS case came before the court on a certificate of division of opinion between the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Ohio In the circuit court of Ohio, at July term 1829, on the motion of the defendants, a rule was given on the marshal, of the district of Ohio, and on the plaintiff, to show cause why the taxation of costs in this case, upon execution, should not be reversed, and corrected in respect to the marshal’s poundage taxed against…

THIS case came before the court on a certificate of division from the circuit court of the United States for the district of North Carolina.

The now defendants in error, Isaac Packard, Henry Disdier and William Morphy, brought an action of debt, on a recognizance of bail, against the now plaintiff in error, Charles A. Davis, in the supreme court of judicature of the state of New. York; the writ of capias ad respondendum in which action was returnable in January term 1830. The defendant, Mr Davis, appeared by attorney, and pleaded several pleas in bar, upon which issues were taken,, both in fact and in law.

In the circuit court, the Bank of the United States instituted an action of assumpsit against John O. Dunn, as indorser of a promissory note drawn by John Scott, in the following words: « $1Q00 — Sixty days after date I promise to pay John O. Dunn or order one thousand diollars for value received, negotiable and payable at the United States Branch Bank in Washington. John Scott.

THIS case came before the court on a certificate of division in opinion of the judges of the circuit court-of the United' States for the eastern district of Tennessee. In the circuit court, John Smith T. Instituted an action of trover against Robert Bell for the recovery of the value of certain negroes named and described in the declaration. The defendant pleaded not guilty, upon which plea issue was joined.

• This was an action on a promissory note drawn by James Moore, the plaintiff i i error, in favour of Gilbert Docker, and by him indorsed to the Bank of Columbia. The note was for five hundred dollars, dated April 25th, 1816, and payable sixty .days after date. The suit was commenced on the 14th of July 1825.

.APPEAL from ..the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky. The facts and pleadings are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

THIS case came before the court on a certificate of division in opinion of the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York. In that court the-dessee of the plaintiffs instituted an action of ejectment for the recovery of certain real estate in the city of New York. The jury found the following special verdict.

0,n the 8th day of March 1825, Stephen Sicard, a citizen of Pennsylvania, commenced his actions of ejectment in the circuit court for the district of Kentucky against Jesse Dayis and others, and against John Cecil, Robert Smithers and others, for the recovery of six thousand six hundred, and eighty acres of land; or parts of the same. Those who were In possession of the lands were admitted as defendants; eách for himself; and pleaded not guilty.

THIS case came before the court on a certificate of division of opinion of the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York. The defendant, James Paul, was indicted at October term 1830 of the circuit court.,- The indictment found by the grand jury was as follows: Southern District of New York, ss.

<p>On proceedings under libels in the district and circuit courts of the United States of the district of Maryland, claiming seamen’s wages from the ship Warren and her freight,upon which, in the circuit court a general decree, pro forma, against the libellants was entered, for,the purpose of an appeal to this court: a decree was here made, by which thirty-two thousand eight hundred and seventy-two dollars and’ thirty cents were adjudged to be due to the libellants from the respondents, as part of their wages, to be paid to them pro rata; and by the mandate of this court, the circuit court was ordered to ascertain the dums due, respectively, to each of the libellants. This was done: and on the report of a commission, fixing the several sums so due, a separate decree was entered in the circuit court for the sum so found due to each libellant respectively. <None of the sums decreed to be due amounted to one thousand dollars. The amount of the several sums1 adjudged to be due by the several separate decree's, was thirty-two thousand dollars and upwards. From these separate decrees'the respondents, in the circuit court prayed an appeal to this court; and gave a several appeal bond upon the appeal from each decree, as well as a joint appeal bond for the whole. The appeal was dismissed, upon the ground that the sum in controversy in each case was less than two thousand dollars.</p> <p>This is a case of wages, in which there is necessarily a'several and distinct contract with each seaman for the voyage, at his own rate of wages'; and though' he may sign the same shipping paper, no one is understood to contract jointly with, or to incur respousibility for any other.</p> <p>The shipping articles constitute a several contract with each seaman to all intents and purposes, and are so contemplated by the act of congress for the government and regulation of seamen'in the merchant service:, and have been so practically interpreted in courts of justice, as well as by merchants and manners in all commercial nations in modern times</p> <p>It is well known that every seaman has a right to sue severally for his own wages in the courts of common law, and that a joint action cannot be maintained in such courts by any number of seamen, for wages accruing under the same shipping articles for the same voyage. The reason is, that the common law will not tolerate a joint action, except by persons, who have a joint interest; if the cause of action is several, the suit must be several.</p> <p>But a different course of practice has prevailed for ages in the court of admiralty, in regard to suits for seamen’s wages. It is a special favour, and a peculiar privilege allowed to them, and to them only; and is confined strictly to demands for wages.</p> <p>Although the libel is in its form joint, the contract is always treated in the admiralty according to the truth of the case, as a several distinct contract wit*1 each seaman. Each is to stand or fall by the merits of his own claim, and is unaffected by that of his co-libellants.</p> <p>The defence which is good against one seaman, may be wholly inapplicable to another. One may have been paid; another may not have performed the service; and another may have forfeited in whole or in part hia claim to wages. But no decree whatever, which is made in regard to such claims, can possibly avail to the prejudice of the merits of others, which do not fall within the same predicament. And wherever from the nature of the defence it is inapplicable to the whole crew, the answer invariably contains separate averments, and is • applied to each claim, according to its own peculiar circumstances.</p> <p>The decree follows the same rule, and assigns to each seaman severally the amount to which he is entitled, and dismisses the libel as to those and those only who have maintained no right to the interposition of the court in their favour.</p> <p>The whole proceeding, though it assumes the form of a joint suit, is in reality a mere joinder of distinct causes of action by distinct parties, growing out of the same contract; and bears some analogy to the known practice at common law, of consolidating actions founded on the same policy of insurance. The act of congress adopts and sanctions the practice.</p> <p>.One seaman cannot appeal from a decree made in regard to the claim of another; for ire has no interest in it, and cannot be aggrieved by it.</p> <p>It-is very clear that no seaman can appeal from the district to the circuit court, unless his own claim exceeds fifty dollars; nor from the circuit to the supreme court unless his claim exceeds two thousand dollars. And the same rule applies to the owners'or other respondents, who are not at liberty to consolidate the distinct demands of each seaman into an aggregate, thus making the claims of the whole the matter in dispute; but they can appeal only in regard to the demand of a seaman which exceeds the sum required by law for that purpose, as a distinct matter in dispute.</p>

Held: that the bill of lading and the contract were not sufficient to maintain the issUejoined on the part of the plaintiffs in respect to the replication of merchants’ accounts.

<p>ERROR to the district court of the eastern district of Louisiana.</p>

Held: that the liability of the sureties must be governed by the rules of the common law; the accountability of the principal being at the city o£ Washington, to -the treasury of the United S.tates; and the bond being joint an< several, each is b.ound for the .whole: and that the contribution between the sureties is a matter with which the United States-have-no concern.

Held: that the jury were right in their original verdict; and the instruction of the court, that they should find a general verdict, the plaintiff having established a title only to part of the land,.was erroneous.

Held: that party might surrender his patent and take a new one, when the specification in the first was defective through mistake, and without fraud. 2. The court ruled, that though a specification be altogether defective, yet the jiatent is not void, unless such defect arise from design. How can these things stand together?

Held: that this was sufficient notice to the indorser to make him liable for the payment of the bill. ERROR to the circuit court of the United States for the. district of Ohio.

<p>The plaintiffs’ entry aflaml in Ohio was made in the name of a person who-was-dead at the time of the entry. This entry is a nullity in the state of Ohio. The case of Galt et al. v. Galloway, 4 Peters, 332, cited and confirmed.</p>

Held: and firmly bound unto the United States of America, in the sum of sixty thou *264 -■sand dollars, lawful money of the United States of America, to be paid to the said, the United States of America, their cer;tain attorney, successors, or assigns, to which payment well :and truly to be made, and done, we do bind ourselves, and our successors, firmly by these presents.

This was an action of ejectment instituted in the circuit court by the plaintiff in error, for the recovery of five thousand acres of land, situate in the district of East Tennessee. On the trial of the cause, the plaintiff excepted to the opinion of the court in rejecting certain evidence offered by him in support of his title from the original grantor, Stockley Do-nelson, holding under a patent from the state of North Caroling.

Held: that the acknowledgement of a deed before a justice of the supreme court, under a statute which required the acknowledgement to be made before a justice of the peace, havings beén long practised in Pennsylvania, and sanctioned by her tribunals, must be considered as within the statute. The chief justice, in giving the

Held: that this exception is valid; and that the burthen of proof to show that the lot for which the ejectment is brought is within the exception, is not upon the plaintiff in the action. That in many cases the bur-then of proof is on the party within whose peculiar-knowledge and means of information the fact lies, is admitted. But this rule is far from being universal, and has many qualifications upon its application.

THIS case came before the court on a certificate of division in opinion of the judges of the circuit cou.rt of the United States for the district of Rhodé Island. The. same cause was before the court on a writ of error at January term 1829. 2 Peters, 267. The case was again tried in the circuit court of Rhode Island at June term 1830; and the points on which the judges of that court were divided, were' ■certified to this court.

MR FRELINGHUYSEN, with whom was Mr Wirt, stated, that at the last court an order was made, giving the state of New Yo?k leave to appear on the second day of this term and answer the bill of the complainants; and if there should be no appearance, the. court would proceed to hear the cause on the part of the complainants, and to decree on the matter of the bill. 5 Peters, 291.

<p>ERROR to the district court of the United States, for the western district of Virginia.</p> <p>This was an ejectment brought in the district court of the United States for the western district of Virginia, by the defendants in error, against the, plaintiffs in error, for the recovery of eight thousand acres of land in the now county of Lewis, within the said district. The premises in question, are parcel of a large connexion of surveys made together, for Reed and Ford, for Thomas Laidley and John Young, and others — some in the name of one, and some in the names' of others of the owners. The whole connexion of surveys is represented by the connected diagram' made out and reported by the surveyor of Harrison county, pursuant to an order made in the cause, and appearing in the record. On that diagram, the premises in question are particularly represented.</p> <p>The plaintiffs below counted. on a number of separate demises from the defendants in error; all. of which were stated on the record as having been made by citizens of Pennsylvania, on the 1st of January 1820.</p> <p>On the trial, the defendants below tendered the following bill of exceptions;</p> <p>‘Upon the trial of this cause, a draft-and report returned by a surveyor in obedience to an order of survey made in this cause, was given in evidence to the jury, which draft and report are in the words following,'viz. (setting out t.he same). The plaintiff,'in order to' show the title of the lessors to the land in controversy, represented by, the red lines on said draft,- gave in evidence the patent under Much they claim, in these words, viz. (setting out the same). This patent is dated the'9th of May 1786. It was issued to Messrs “Reed and Ford,” and describes the lands thus: L e. “ a certain.tract or parcel of land containing eight thousand acres, by survey-bearing date the 23d day of December 1784, lying and being in the county of Monongalia,- near a large branch of French creek' adjoining lands of George Jackson on the south side, and bounded as follows, to wit: beginning at a maple, and running thence S. 10 E. one thousand poles to a poplar; S. 80 W. oiie-thousand two hundred' and eighty .poles to a W. oak; N. 10 E. one thousand poles to two white oaks; N. 80 $. one thousand two hundred and eighty poles to the beginning.” The’bill of exceptions then states that the plaintiffs, for-the purpose of showing the,identity of the-land in controversy with the land granted by said patent, gave in evidence a copy of the plat and certifícáte of survey on'which the said patent is founded, and the plats and certificates of survey of the various other tracts represented on said draft. After the plat and certificates had been given in evidence, the copies of the entries on which the said surveys were founded, were also given in evidence,</p> <p>It áppeared from the parol-.evidence introduced in order to identify the land in controversy, that the same,' at the da.te of the patent under which the lessors claim, and at the date of the said plat and certificate of survey on which the said patent -is founded) was situate in the county of Harrison, and not in the county of Monongalia, as stated in.the patent and certificate of survey, but that the said land, at the date of the entry on which the:survey was founded, was in the county of Monongalia, and became part of the county of Harrison by virtue of the act of assembly establishing, the county of Harrison. The act of assembly is dated 8th May 1784, and took effect the- 20th of July of the same year.</p> <p>The bill of exceptions further states, that evidence was.relied on,' on the part of the defendants, for the purpose of proving that the various marked lines represented by the said draft and report; of the survey or,.and,claimed by the plaintiff to be lines of the land in controversy, and of various other tracts designated on the said draft, were riot actually run or marked as lines of the land in controversy, and of the other tracts aforesaid; but liad been ru'd and marked by Henry Fink, a deputy surveyor of Monongalia, but who then resided in the county of Harrison, with a view of laying off the greater part of the country represented on said draft into surveys of about.one thousand acres each; that he was employed and paid for that purpose, by the persons for whom'the said plats and certificates of survey were afterwards made; that after said lines had been so marked and run, the said plats and certificates were made out by protraction; not by the said Henry Fink, but-by some other person or persons, not authorised by law; that said plats and certificates of survey were néver recorded-in the surveyor’s office of Monongalia county, nor there filed, but were surreptitiously returned to the register’s office and patents obtained thereon. It was contended on the part of the defendants, that the marked lines represented on said draft, as lines of the lands in controversy, were not the lines thereof, and that the evidence in the cause did not justify the jury in regarding them as such in preference to other marked lines represented on said draft. Evidence was given on the part of the plaintiffs, that the marked ■lines aforesaid were actually run, and marked by said Fink as lines of the said eight thousand acres, and of the various other tracts represented upon said draft; and that plats and certificates of survey were made out by him in conformity with the lines so run and marked, and-were by him delivered to the agent of the patentees, who gave them.to. the- principal surveyor to be recorded, who afterwards delivered-the same to the patentees^ who returned them to the land office,'on which plats, arid certificates, so returned,-patents issued, and copies.of which are before recited; ■ It was further contended on the part of the defendants, that the land in .controversy was not .embraced within the calls of'the patent under which the lessors claim;- that the natural objects, linesand:adjacent lands called for in said patent, were not. those, represented on said draft, in designating thereripon the land,in controversy,-and-that the marked lines represented.on said draft as'the lines'of the-land-in controversy,' were, in fact, the lines, not of the plat and certificate of survey on which the plaintiffs’-patent issued, but of other plats. and certificates of survey; and that there are no calls in said patentjustifyingjthe locating said patent on the lands'in controversy, as contended for by the plaintiffs. For the purpose of identifying-the said land in controversy with that granted by the said patent, parol and other evidence was introduced by the plaintiffs, in order tp establish several marked treesj-as.corners of other tracts represented on said draft — the boundaries of which tracts, it was contended, tended to establish the identity of the lands in-controversy, with that granted by said patent. For the purpose of showing that one of said marked trees-was not a corner of one of §aid tracts; that is to say, was not the corner on the said draft represented by the letter -A, as a corner of John Young!s four thousand acres: the counsel of the defendants' offered to introduce a witness to prove, that on the'trial of a former action of ejectmeilt, brought by the present lessors of the plaintiff against some of the present defendants, to recover the lands now in controversy, a witness, who is since deadj swore that an ancient marked corner tree was found by hjm at said point A, of á different kind of timber from that called for in Young’s patent: but the evidence aforesaid was rejected by thp court as inadmissible.</p> <p>•' After the evidence had been closed, and the cause had been argued before the jury, the plaintiffs’ counsel moved the court to'give the following instructions to the jury, to wit: that the grant aforesaid was a coniplete appropriation of the land therein described, and vested in the patentee the title'; and that any defects in the preliminary steps by which it was acquired, were cured by the emanation of the said patent. The said counsel further moved ..the court to instruct, the jury, that the said .grant is a title from its date, and. is conclusive against-all the world, except those deriving title under a previous grant; and further, that it does not affect the validity of the patent, if it should appear that the entry on which the plaintiffs’ survey was made, contained other or different lands from that actually surveyed.</p> <p>After the above instructions- had -been moved1 for by the plaintiffs! counsel, the counsel for the defendants moyed th.e court .to give to the jury the following instructions, to wit:.</p> <p>1. The .name of the county being mentioned in the plaintiffs’ patent, as that in which the lands thereby, granted were situated, the plaintiff is not at liberty tó prove by pare! that the land was, in fact, in a different county.</p> <p>2. As the patent states the lands to lie in the county of Monongalia, the patentees and those claiming title under them, can only recover lands in that county, and cannot, by force of the other terms of description contained in the patent, recover lands lying in the county of Harrison at the date of the patent.</p> <p>3. It appearing from the plat and certificate of survey on which the p&tent is founded, that the survey, thereby evidenced was made in the county of Monongalia, and it appearing, from the evidence introduced on the part of the plaintiffs to identify the said land, that it was situated, at the time of the survey, in the county of Harrison; the patent is void because the survey was made without lawful authority.</p> <p>4. If various marked lines are found, corresponding with the same calls in the patent, the mere coincidence of any one of those marked lines with the calls of the patent, does not establish that line as one of the lines called for in the patent.</p> <p>5. If there are no calls in the patent, justifying-the location of the land granted, as contended for by the plaintiffs, they cannot succeed in establishing their claim by relying upon extrinsic evidence.</p> <p>6. Proof that the land claimed in this action was surveyed for the patentees, by evidence contradicting the calls' of ihe patent, does not establish the right of the patentees and of those claiming under them to the lands claimed as aforesaid.</p> <p>7. An entry in a county which is afterwards divided, does not, after the division, authorise a survey in the original county, if the land falls into the new county.</p> <p>The parties respectively objected to the instructions moved for. The instructions moved for by the plaintiffs, were given by the court. All those required by the defendants were refused, except the first, which was modified by the court and delivered to the jury in the following terms: “ if a land warrant be entered in the office of the surveyor of a particular" county, and before the same be surveyed, the territory in which the land located lies, shall be erected into a new county, and the survey and grant afterwards affected, describe the lands to be situated in the former county, the grant is not void, and the plaintiffs may show by parol evidence extrinsic of the grant, and not inconsistent with its other descriptive calls, that the land lies within the new bounty.’’ . The exceptions were taken to the rejection of the testimony offered respecting the corner at. A, and to the instructions given as moved for by the plaintiffs, and the rejection of those moved for .the defendants.</p> <p>The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, for the lands in the declaration mentioned and 'described in the plat and report of Thomas Haymond, made.in pursuance of an order of court made-in the cause. Off this verdict, judgment was- rendered for the plaintiffs below, defendants in error; and this writ of error is brought to reverse that judgment.</p>

<p>The judges of this court, who were in the minority of the court upon the general question as to the constitutionality of state insolvent laws, concurred in the opinion of Mr Justice Johnson, in the case of Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheaton, 213. That opinion is therefore to be deemed: the opinion of the other judges, who-assented to that judgment. Whatever principles are established in that •' opinion, are to be considered no longer open for controversy, hut the settled law of the court. ■</p>

The plaintiff in error brought an action of covenant on a deed for certain premises in the city of Alexandria, by which the same were-granted to Ezra Lunt, the defendant’s intestate, reserving a yearly rent charge of seventy-three dollars.

THIS case came before the court, on a division of opinion by the judges of the circuit court for the district of Maryland.

THIS case was brought before the court by a writ of error to the district court of the United States for the district of Indiana. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

In the circuit court of Ohio, John Watts, a citizen of the state of Kentucky, filed a bill.in chancery against John Waddle and William Lamb, the appellees, to obtain a perpetual injunction to stay proceedings by John Waddle on a judgment obtained in the circuit court against him, for damages for the non-performance of a contract made by him with John Lamb in November 1815, wfiich contract had been assigned by him to John Waddle; and also to compel Waddieor Lamb to a-…

The material facts of the case appear in the following agreed statement made in the circuit .court, and brought up to the supreme court of the United States, to wit:. “ On motion of C. A. Rodney, on behalf of Colonel' A. M’Lane, collector of the Delaware district, for a distribution of the forfeiture decreed by the court, of which the said A.

Held: that the right of the-public to use the common in Cincinnati must rest on the same principles as the right to use the streets; and that the dedication made when the town was laid out, gave a valid and indefeasible title to the city of Cincinnati.

Held: “ that the removal of a parcel from the head to the tail of a wagon, with intent to steal it, was a sufficient asportation to constitute larceny.” In favour of the third point, it was contended, that the acts *455 given in evidence in this case, so far consummated the offence, that no locus penitentise remained for the traverser, after leaving the port of Baltimore.

<p>APPEAL from the circuit court of the United States for the county of Washington, in the district of Columbia.</p> <p>Mr Coxe, for the complainant, moved to dismiss this appeal for wánt of jurisdiction.</p> <p>The circumstances and proceedings in this case, as exhibited in the record, were the following:</p> <p>•Joseph Nourse was removed from the office of register of the treasury of the United States in 1829. The following comm,unication was afterwards addressed to him from the treasury department.</p> <p>Treasury Department, Comptroller’? Office, 26th June 1829;</p> <p>Sir — Upon a statement of a general account, comprehending the different agencies under which you acted as late register of the treasury, the following balances were found to be due on them, respectively, to the United .States, to wit:</p> <p>As agent for the joint library committee of congress, - @2,502 55</p> <p>Ditto for paying the expenses of stating and printing the public accounts, - - - 934 98</p> <p>Ditto for paying the. superintendent and watchmen of the buildings occupied by the state and treasury departments,- - 1,325 41</p> <p>Ditto for paying the expenses of printing certificates of the public debt, • - - - 1,011 29</p> <p>Ditto for paying the contingent expenses of the treasury department, - 5,994 90'</p> <p>Amounting, in the whole, to $11,769 13 ■ In the general account rendered by you, a balance of nine thousand three hundred and sixty-seven dollars and eighty-seven cents is claimed; between which and the balance above stated,- there is a difference of twenty-one thousand one hundred and thirty-seven dollars; and is occasioned, with the exception of fifty-four dollars and fifty cents paid to 'Gabriel Nourse and James Watson, suspended foi want of vouchers, by your having charged a commission of two and a half per cent on all the moneys which have passed through your hands, under the different agencies above specified, but which the accounting officers of the treasury could not allow; there being no law to authorise or sanction such a charge.</p> <p>A copy of the treasury settlement of your account is inclosed for your information. It becomes my duty to request that you will deposit the abovementioned balance of eleven thousand seven hundred and sixty-nine dollars and thirteen cents, in the office of discount and deposit of the branch bank of the United States at Washington city, to the credit of the treasury of the United States, taking duplicate receipts therefor from the cashier, one' of which you will forward to this department. Respectfully,</p> <p>Jos. Anderson, Comptroller.</p> <p>Jos. Nourse, Esq., late Register of the Treasury.</p> <p>The request contained in this letter not having been complied with, on the 14th of July 1829, the following process was issued by order of the agent of the treasury.</p> <p>To Tench Ringgold, Esquire, Marshal of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>Whereas Joseph Nourse, late register of the treasury, in relation to his several accounts as United States agent, stands ■ indebted to the United States in a cash balance of eleven thousand seven and sixty-nine dollars and thirteen cents; agreeably to the settlement of his account-, made by the proper accounting officers of the treasury, a copy of which is herewith inclosed; and vrhereas the said Joseph Nourse, having failed to pay over according to the act of congress, passed the 15th day of May 1820, entitled <c an act for the better organization of the treasury department,” the said sum of eleven thousand seven hundred and sixty-nine dollars and.thirteen cents, these are, therefore, in pursuance of the said act, to command you to proceed immediately to levy and collect the said sum of eleven .thousand seven hundred and sixty-nine dollars and thirteen cents, by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the said Joseph Nourse, giving ten days previous notice of such intended sale, by affixing an advertisement of the articles to be sold at two or more public places in the town or county where .the said'goods or chattels were taken, or in the town or county where the owner of such goods or chattels may. reside; and should there not be found sufficient goods and chattels to satisfy the said sum of eleven thousand seven hundred and sixty-nine dollars and thirteen cents, remaining due and unpaid as aforesaid, you are hereby commanded to commit the body of' the said Joseph Nourse to prison, there to remain until discharged by due course of law: and should the said Joseph Nourse be committed to prison, as aforesaid, or. if he abscond, and goods and chattels sufficient to satisfy the said sum of eleven ihousand seven hundred and sixty-nine dollars and thirteen cents, be not found, you are hereby commanded to levy upon, and expose to sale, at public auction, for ready money, to the highest bidder, the lands, tenements and hereditaments of the said Joseph Nourse, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the said sum of eleven thousand seven hundred' and sixty-nine dollars and thirteen cents, or whatever sum there may remain due and unpaid thereof, after you shall have given notice pf the said sale, at least three weeks prior to its taking place, in not less than three public places in the county of district where such real estate is situate; and all moneys which may remain of the proceeds of such sale, after satisfying the said sum of eleven thousand seven hundred and si,xty-nine dollarsand thirteen cents, and paying the reasonable costs and charges of the sale, you are required to return to thé proprietor or proprietors of the land or real estate sold as aforesaid: and whatever you may do in obedience to this warrant, make return thereof to this office; and for so doing this shall be your sufficient authority.. Given under my hand and seal, at my office, in the department of the treasury of the United States, at the city of Washington, in the district of Columbia, this fourteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-nine. S. Px,easonton [seal].</p> <p> Agent of the Treasury. </p> <p>This warrant was issued- under the second section of the act of congress passed May 15, 1820, 3 Story’s Laws U. S. 1791, entitled “ ail act providing for the better organization of the treasury department. ” The third section .provides “ that if any officer employed, or whp has been heretofore employed in the civil, military or naval departments of the government, to disburse the public, money appropriated for the service of those departments respectively, shall fail to render his accounts, or to pay over in the manner and in the times required by law, or the regulations of the department to which he is accountable, any sum Of money remaining in the hands of such officer, it shall be the duty of the first or second comptroller of the treasury,. as the case may be, who shall be charged with the revision of the accounts of such officer, to cause to be stated and certified, the account of such delinquent officer to the agent of the treasury, who is hereby authorised and required, immediately, to proceed against the delinquent officer in the manner directed in the preceding sections, all the provisions of which are hereby declared to be applicable to every officer of the government charged with the disbursement of public money, and to their sureties, in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been described and enumerated in the said section. ”</p> <p>The second section of the act directs the warrant to issue to the marshal of the district where the delinquent resides; and that the marshal shall proceed to levy the sum due, by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of such delinquent, and if. there be not sufficient goods and chattels to satisfy the warrant, the marshal is authorised to take the person of the delinquent, and to commit him to prison, there to remain until discharged by due course of law, &c.</p> <p>The fourth section provides, that if any person shall consider himself aggrieved by any warrant issued under the act, he may prefer a bill of complaint to any district judge of the United States, setting forth the nature and extent of the injury of which he complains; and thereupon the judge aforesaid may, if in his opinion the case requires it, grant an injunction to stay proceedings on such warrant altogether, .or for so much thereof as the nature of the case requires; but no injunction shall issue until the party applying shall give bond and sufficient security, conditioned for the performance of such judgment as shall’be awarded against the complainant, in such amount as the judge granting the injunction shall prescribe: nor shall the issuing of said injunction in any manner impair the lien produced by the issuing of such1 warrant. And the sáme proceeding shall be had on such injunction as in other cases, except that no answer shall be necessary on the part of the United States; and if upon dissolving the injunction, it shall appear to .the satisfaction of the judge who shall decide upon the same, that the application for thednjunction was merely for delay, “ the judge may add damages, not to exceed ten per centum on the principal sum.”</p> <p>The fifth section provides, that such injunctions may be granted in or out of court; and the sixth section enacts, “that if any person shall consider himself aggrieved by the decision of such judge, either in refusing to issue the injunction, or if granted, on its dissolution, it shall be competent for such person to lay a copy of the proceeding had, before the district judge of the supreme court, to whom authority is hereby given, .either to grant the injunction or permit an appeal, as the case may be, if in the opinion .of such judge of the supreme court the equity of the case requires it; and thereupon the same proceedings shall'be had upon such injunction in the circuit court as are prescribed in the district court, and subject to the same conditions in all respects.”</p> <p>The marshal of the district of Columbia having levied the warrant on the lands and tenements, goods and chattels of Mr Nourse; on the 25th of August 1829, he presented to the district judge of the United States for the said district, the following bill for relief.</p> <p>To William Cranch, Esq., chief justice of the District of Columbia, and judge of the district court of the United States for said district:</p> <p>This the bill of complaint of Joseph Nourse, late register of . the treasury of the United States, shows that his public accounts as such register, and agent of the treasury department in disbursing certain funds, and settling certain accounts of. contingencies and other miscellaneous matters, and as agent for the joint library committees of congress, matters altogether distinct from, and unconnected with, his duties as such register, have been settled at the treasury since his removal from office; upon which settlement, a pretended balance has been found against him for the sum of eleven thousand two hundred and fifty dollars and twenty-six cents; for which a warrant of distréss has been issued against his lands and tenements, goods ■and chattels, by Stephen Pleasonton, Esq., agent of the treasury, in the pretended execution of the act of congress, passed on the 15th day of May 1820, “providing for the better organization of the treasury department,” which warrant has been levied, during the absence of this complainant, on his lands, tenements, goods and chattels, by the marshal of this district; copy of which is annexed. That the said account is unjust and illegal; and so far from any balance being due thereon to the United States, a considerable balance should have been struck thereon in favour of this complainant, as appears by an account hereto annexed, which he declares is just and true.</p> <p>That, besides his regular duties, as register, established by law, and stated according to the custom and routine of his office as such register, he was, for a long course of years, that is to say, from the year 1790 till his recent dismission from office, dqly employed by the proper department of the government of the United States, in the separate, independent, and wholly extra business of special agent for the disbursement of the contingent funds of the treasury department, and for the Settlement, as such special agent, of all the numerous accounts connected with the disbursement of those funds.</p> <p>. That this distinct branch of duty, which he took upon himself, at jthe special instance and request of the proper department of the government, and "having competent authority to engage 'him or any other agent in that capacity, and for the performance of those duties, devolved upon him great labour, responsibility, and risk, altogether independent of, and apart from, his proper duties as register, and occupied a great" portion of his private hours, that is, of those hours, when, according to. the established order and routine of his department, he was altogether .discharged and free from the proper duties appertaining to his office of register, and had his time entirely at his own disposal; but for his employment as special agent as aforesaid. That the extent of the extra labour and responsibility so devolved upon him cannot be adequately described or conceived, without a" reference to, and inspection of, his books, bank accounts, and vouchers connected with this branch of his employment in the public service; and he there-, fore prays that these documents may be ordered to be produced from the treasury department, and audited in this court: that, besides the great labour and consumption of time induced by this extra employment, he was exposed to considerable pecuniary losses, from the ordinary errors that occasionally occur in the accounts of the best accountants, fro'm the multiplicity and minuteness of the various accounts and vouchers to be settled and preserved: that when he undertook this branch of public employment, the precise nature and amount of compensation therefor were not ascertained by any particular stipulation: that, if the government had employed, any indifferent person to perform these duties, without any other precise compensation stipulated beforehand, a reasonable mercantile commission or per centage on the sums disbursed would have resulted to such person, according as well to general usage as to the custom of the treasury department in the like cases. That the usage of the treasury department, and other departments of the government, has invariably been, since the organization of the general government, to allow such commissions or per centage, not only to unofficial persons so employed, but to official persons and clerks of the departments, when such duties were distinct from the stated duties appertaining to their offices and stations, notwithstanding such official persons were in the receipt of fixed salaries for their stated duties.</p> <p>That, as early as the year 1800, this complainant made out an abstract of his disbursements under these extra agencies, claiming to be allowed a compensation therefor; which original abstract is on file in the treasury department; from whence he prays that it may be produced and audited in this court. That he has duly made out and presented his account to the proper accounting officers of the treasury, charging his commission at the rate of two and one half per cent on the amount of his disbursements, which, if allowed, would, after a full and fair settlement of all his public accounts, leave the United States indebted to him in a balance of nine thousand eight hundred and eighty-six dollars and twenty-four cents; which he has good reason to believe, and does verily think and believe, to be justly and equitably due and owing to him from the United States; as stated in his said annexed account. That the accounting officers of the treasury have altogether rejected and thrown out his said charge, and denied him any manner of compensation for his extra services as such special agent as aforesaid, not upon the ground or pretencé that his charge of commission is too high or unreasonable, if he were entitled to any compensation; but that he is not entitled to any compensation whatever for his extra services as such special agent, and pretending that his stated salary as register shall be received as full compensation, not only for his proper duties as register, but for his extra employment and sgryices in the agencies above mentioned.</p> <p>. That the. commissions or per centage so charged by the complainant are not only reasonable and usual in the like cases, but are an inadequate compensation for th,e peculiar labour and responsibility of the complainant in the discharge of the particular employment and' duties for which they are charged:. And this complainant further shows, that he is well advised' by counsel, and believes, that the act of congress under which the said warrant of distress is pretended to have been .issued, being a law in derogation of common right, and of ihe ordinary and approved remedies under the general law of the land, ought to be construed, with the utmost strictness against any authority assumed under it, and in .favour of the citizen; but, that in no reasonable construction of the same, can- this complainant or his accounts, either as register of the treasury, or as the special agent of the treasury, or as the agent of the joint library committees of congress, above described-, be brought within th¡e description of persons over whom that act gives jurisdiction to the agent of the treasury:</p> <p>By the second and third sections of the said act, the officérs subjected to the summary jurisdiction' and process of such treasury agent áre distributed into two classes: 1st, those employed to collect and'receive-the public money before it is paid into the treasury; 2dly, those employed to disburse the public mo.ney after it is paid into the treasury, appropriated for the service of the civil, naval, or military departments.There can be no pretence whatever, and he presumes none ife set up, to bring this complainant within the first class;, and, therefore, the ■ only question is, whether he falls within the second.</p> <p>This class he is well advised and believes was intended to comprehend none but the regularly appointed officers of the government, charged, fex officio, with disbursements for any of the three great departments named in the act. That this description cannot embrace mere subordinate agents employed by any particular department of the government, as by the treasury,, to disburse the contingent funds of the department, such agent 'not being an officer who is, ex officio, to disburse the public money appropriated for the service of either of the three great departments named; but, in the strictest sense, a mere unofficial agent, employed informally, ’without any letter patent, or commission or letter of appointment, to perform extra services for the treasury as a commission merchant or banker, to make purchases or accept bills on public account, might be employed, without attaching l’o such commission merchant or banker the character of functions of a public officer. Whereas the third section of the act throughout describes the party subjected to the summary process authorised by it, as “any officer employed,” &c.; “such delinquent officer,” &c.: and as to his office of register of the treasury, which constituted the only official relation between him and the government of the United States, it was not an office, the duties or employment of which consisted in the disbursement of any public money appropriated for the services of any of the three great departments of service named in the third section of the act of congress.</p> <p>Nor did this complainant, as such register, receive or disburse, nor was he competent, as such register, to receive or disburse, any of the public money charged to him in the skid pretended account so settled by the accounting officers of the treasury, and upon which the said warrant of distress was issued as aforesaid.</p> <p>Nevertheless, the said accounting officers of the treasury have unjustly and unlawfully charged him, in the settlement of his official account as register, with all the’moneys received by him for disbursement as such special agent as aforesaid; and the whole of the alleged delinquency is charged, to him officially as register, and under that'official head; and against him, officially as register, such warrant was issued. Whereas, his said account for the receipts and disbursements of public money was wholly unofficial, and connected with his official duties and station as register.</p> <p>The complainant therefore submits, that, whatever its merit, in the opinion of the court, of the essential dispute on matters of account between him and the accounting officers, the parties may be remitted to the ordinary process &f law, so as to have a fair trial and regular adjudication of the merits, before execution be had of his body or estate. Therefore, this complainant prays that injunction may be granted to him to stay proceedings on the said warrant altogether; and that he may have such further and other relief in the premises, as to this court shall seem meet, and agreeable to equity and good, conscience. Joseph Nourse.</p> <p>The district judge granted the injunction as prayed for, which was served Upon the agent of the treasury, and a citation was issued, directed to him, to appear and answer the bill of injunction at the next court, to be holden in Alexandria.</p> <p>The following answer was filed on behalf of the United States.-</p> <p>The answer of the United States of-America, to a bill of injunction filed against them in the district court of the United States for the district, of Potomac, by Joseph Nourse, late register of the treasury of the United States.</p> <p>The United States, by Thomas Swann, their attorney, answer .and say, that, upon -a settlement by the proper ofiicers of the government of the general account of the complainant, comprehending the different agencies under which'he acted as register of the treasury, he was found indebted to the United States in the sum of eleven thousand seven hundred and sixty-nine dollars and thirteen cents, as will appear by the account settled as aforesaid, a copy of which is exhibited by the complainant, in his bill of complaint, with the letter of Joseph Anderson, comptroller, and to which the United States refer, and request that they may be .considered as a part of this answer. .</p> <p>The United States, by their attorney aforesaid, state, that the said-complainant had rendered to the United States; his general account against, them, charging a commission of two and a half per cent upon all moneys which had.passed through', his hands in the different agencies in which he had acted as aforesaid, and claiming, by that account, a balance, as due to him from the United-States, of nine thousand three hundred 'and sixty-seven dollars and eighty-seven cents, as will appear by a copy of the said account, exhibited by the complainant, and made" a part also of his said bill of complaint.</p> <p>The United States, by their said attorney, state, that the grounds upon which the United States had claimed from the complainant the aforesaid balance of eleven thousand seven hundred and sixty-nine dollars and eighty-seven cents, are fully stated and disclosed by the aforesaid letter of the comptroller; and the differencé between-the account of the United States and that rendered by the complainant, with the exception of fifty-four dollars and fifty cents, as stated in the comptroller’s letter, arises from the charges of a commission, as hereinbefore stated, of two and a half per cent upon the public money which had passed through the hands of' the complainant as aforesaid.</p> <p>The United States, by their said attorney, deny that the complainant is entitled to the commission which he claims as aforesaid, and say that there is no law of the United States authorizing any such commission, or any commission whatever upon the public moneys which had passed through his hands as aforesaid; and they insist that the balance of eleven thousand seven hundred and sixty-nine dollars and thirteen cents is justly and fairly due from the complainant to the United States, and that the United States were authorised bylaw, and fully justified in resorting to the remedy by distress, to enforce the payment of the said balance: the United States, do therefore request that the injunction granted to the said complainant in this case may be dissolved, and that they may be permitted to pursue their legal remedies for the recovery of the said balance. Thomas Swann,. Att’y U. S.</p> <p>On the 20th of December 1830, the district judge having heard the counsel on behalf of the complainant, and of the United States, made an order and decree,i ‘ that the said Joseph Nourse has produced satisfactory evidence that he did, for a long course of years, render various services, and disburse large sums of money for the use of the United States, and, at their request, from time to time, made, through the respective secretaries of the treasury of the United States for the time being; which services and disbursements were performed and made by the said Joseph Nourse, over and above the services required by the duties of his office as register of the treasury of the United States, for which said extra services and disbursements he has never been allowed -any compensation in the settlement of his accounts at the treasury department: and, it being by the court deemed expedient to ascertain, by the report of auditors to be. appointed by the court for that purpose, thevalueof those services, and the compensation to which the said' Joseph Nourse is equitably entitled therefor, and for his disbursements as aforesaid, it is further ordered, that Robert J. Taylor, Phineas Janney, and Colin Auld, be, and they are hereby, appointed, auditors to ascertain the said value and compensatioh, and to report thereon to this court without delay* and that such of the papers and evidence in this cause as relate to that subject, be submitted to the said auditors for their better information thereon.</p> <p>The auditors, on the 31st December 1830, reported as follows:</p> <p>The subscribers, appointed auditors by the decree of the court in the above cause, made on the 20th day of this month (of which a copy is annexed), to value the services of the complainant, and the compensation to which he is equitably entitled for the same, and for disbursements of public money made .by him, at the request of the United States, through the respective secretaries of the treasury for the time being, over and above the services required by the duties of his office of register of the treasury of the United.States, respectfully report; that it appears from the documents and evidence submitted to them, that, from the 10th of April 1790 to the 31st of May 1829, thirty-nine years, one month, and twenty-one days, the complainant, as agent for the payment of contingent expenses of the treasury department, for'stationary, and printing of public accounts, for payment of the superintendent and watchman of the state and treasury departments, for miscellaneous disbursements, comprising fifteen different agencies, for advances.made to sundry persons who brought, from the several states the votes for presidents and vice presidents of the United States, and on account of the congressional library, disbursed the sum of nine hundred and forty-three thousand three hundred and eight dollars and eighty-three cents; the services rendered in which said agencies, and in making said disbursements,, were over and above the services required of him by the duties of his office as register of the treasury of the. United States:1 we find, that, for similar services, where no special provision had been made by law, a commission of two and a half per cent has been heretofore, in many cases, allowed at the treasury of the United States; and we are of opinion, that a commission of two aqd a half per Cent on the said sum of nine hundred and forty thousand and three hundred arid eight dollars and eighty-three cents, amounting to the sum ,of twenty-three thousand, five hundred and eighty-two dollars and seventy-two cents, is an equitable compensation for the services so as aforesaid rendered to the United States by the-said Joseph Nourse; arid that the said services are equitably worth the said last mentioned sum, ..</p> <p>All which is respectfully submitted. R. J. Taylor, Phineas Janney, Colin Auld. Alexandria, Dec. 31,1830.</p> <p>■ Whereupon the following decree was made by the district judge, on the 4th day of January 1831.</p> <p>And at a court continued and held for the said district, the 4th day of January 1831, the auditors, Robert J. Taylor, Phlneas Janney, and Colin Auld, to whom, by an interlocutory order of this court, bearing-date December 20th, 1831, it was referred to ascertain the value of the services rendered by the complainant to the defendant, over and above the regular official duties attached to his office of register of the treasury of the United States, as set forth in said interlocutory -order as aforesaid, having made and returned .their report to the court, bearing date the 31st day of December 1830, iri and by which the said auditors state, among other things, that a commission of two and a half per cent upon the sum of nine hundred and forty-three thousand three hundred and eight dollars and eighty-three cents, amounting to the sum of twenty-three thousand five hundred and eighty-two dollars and seventy-two cents, is an equitable compensation for the services so as aforesaid rendered to the United States by the said Joseph Nourse; and that the said services are equitably worth the said last mentioned sum, and no sufficient reasons having been presented to the court against the confirmation of said report of said auditors, it is thereupon, this 4th day pf January 1831; ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the said report be, and the same is hereby, in all particulars, confirmed and made absolute.</p> <p>And the said cause now also criming on for final decision upon said report, and the bill, answer, replication, exhibits, depositions, and other evidence admitted by the parties, and upon the equity reserved under and by the said interlocutory order, it is further ordered, decreed and adjudged, that the injunction heretofore granted in this cause be, and the same is hereby perpetuated; and that the said defendants be, and they are hereby, perpetually enjoined from proceeding further against the said complainant upon the warrant of distress in the bill mentioned, for or on account of a claim or demand, for the recovery of which the said warrant of distress issued.</p> <p>The United States appealed to the circuit court, in which court a motion was made to discuss the appeal, which was overruled. The circuit court affirmed the decree of'the district judge, and the United States prosecuted this appeal.</p>

<p>Ejectment, 'me declaration described the property for which the suit was instituted as “ lying between Water street and the river Monongahela, with the appurtenances*situate and being in the city of Pittsburgh.” The jury found a general, verdict for the plaintiff; and the defendants assigned for error, that the veidict, being general, is void for the want of certainty. By the court: This must be.considered as an exception to the sufficiency of the declaration; as any other matter embraced in it might have been considered on a motion for a new trial, but cannot now be noticed,</p> <p>Formerly it was necessary to describe the premises for which an action of ejectment was brought with great accuracy; but far less certainty is required in modern practice. All the authorities say that the general description is good. The lessor of the plaintiff, on a lease for a specific number of acres, may recover any quantity of less amount.</p> <p>The plaintiffs in error, defendants in ejectment in the circuit court, claimed for the City of Pittsburgh, a slip of land lying on the bank of the riv'erMonongahela near the junction of that river with the river Alleghany, being a space between the southern line of the lots of the city, and the Monongahela river. It was contended by them, that this slip of land was dedicated by the surveyor, when he laid out the town, to the public, as a street, or for other public uses. The depositions of witnesses who were present when the ground on which the city' stands, was laid out in lots by the surveyor, authorised so to do by the proprietors of the land, were offered to prove declarations of the surveyor, made to personsassembied at the survey, arid who occupied part of the ground so laid out; by which declarations, and other acts of the surveyor, also proposed to be proved, it was contended the said dedication was made; i. e. that he had observed that “ the street,” the slip pf land, “ to low water mark, should be for the use of the citizens, and the public, for ever.” By the court: The surveyor had authority to fix upon the plan of the town and survey it. He had the power to determine the width of the respective streets and alleys, the size and form of the lots, to mark out the public grounds, and to determine on every thing so far as related to the town, and its beauty, convenience and value. These were clearly within the scope of his powers, as they were essentially connected with the plan of the town, on which he was authorized to determiné at his.discretion. The proof of such declarations should have been admitted by the circuit court; because, under the circumstances, they formed a part of the transaction.</p> <p>The declarations of a surveyor which contradict his official return, are clearly not evidence: nor ought they to be received, where he has no power to exercise discretion, as explanatory of his return, while he is still living, and may be examined as a witness.</p> <p>If the ground in controversy in the ejectment had been dedicated for a particular purpose, and the city authorities had appropriated it to an entirely different purpose, it might afford ground for the interference,of a court of chancery’to compel a specific execution of the trust, by restraining the corporation, or by causing the removal of obstructions. Butevon in sucha case, the'property dedicated would not revert to the original owner. The use would still remain in the public, limited only by the conditions imposed in the grant.</p> <p>The right of the court to decide on the legal effect of a written instrument, cannot be controverted; but the question of boundary is always a matter of fact for the determination of the jury.</p> <p>It is the province of the court, in an action of ejectment, that they should fix the boundaries of the tract in controversy by an examination of the whole evidence.</p> <p>Artificial or natural boundaries called for, control a call for course and distance.</p> <p>An unmolested possession for thirty years would authorise the presumption of a grant. Under peculiar circumstances, a grant has been presumed from a pos- . session less than the number of years required to bar the action of ejectment by the statute of limitations.</p> <p>By the common law, the fee in the soil remains in the original owner, where a public road is made upon it, but the use of the road is in the ptiblic. The owner parts with this use only; for if the road should be vacated by the public, he resumes the exclusive possession of the ground; and while .it is used as a high-way, he is entitled to the timber and grass which may grow upon the surface, and to all minerals which may be found below it. He may bring an action of trespass against any one who obstructs the road.</p> <p>Where the proprietor of a town disposes of all his interest in it, he would seem to stand in a different relation to the right of soil, in regard to the streets and alleys of the town, from the individual owner over whose soil a public road is established, and who continues to hold the land on both sides of it. Whether the purchasers of town lots are in this respect the owners of the soil over which the streets and alleys are laid as appurtenant to adjoining lots, Qucsre.</p> <p>In some cases a dedication of property to public use; as for instance a street or public road, where the public has enjoyed the unmolested use of it for six or seven years; .has been deemed sufficient for dedication.</p>

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), is a landmark case in which the United States Supreme Court vacated the conviction of Samuel Worcester and held that the Georgia criminal statute that prohibited non-Native Americans from being present on Native American lands without a license from the state was unconstitutional. While the state law was an effort to restrict white settlement on Cherokee territory, Worcester reasoned that obeying the law would, in effect, be surrendering the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation to manage their own territory. The opinion is most famous for its dicta, which laid out the relationship between tribes, state, and federal governments. It is considered to have built the foundations of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty in the United States.

Held: were suchchil *600 dren and heirs. Roger Morris and Mary his wife were at-tainted by an act of the legislature of New York, passed 22d October 1779.

■York. The pleadings -and the facts in this case, with the addition of those particularly noticed in the opinion of ithe court, were the same with those in the preceding case of Crane v.-Jackson.

<p>-The declaration was for .a balance of accounts of nine hundred and eighty-eight dollars and ninety-four cents, and the ad damnum was laid at two thousand dollars. The bill of exceptions showed that the United States claimed interest •on the balances due them. Under those circumstances it is no objection to the-jurisdiction, that the' bill of exceptions was taken by the. counsel for the United States to a refusal of the court to grant an instruction asked by the United Slates, which was applicable to certain items of credit only claimed by ' the- defendants, which would reduce the debt below the sum of one thousand dollars. The' court cannot judicially know what influence that refusal had upon the verdict..</p>

The bill filed by the appellant in the circuit court, stated, among other matters, that certain persons at New Orleans, trading under the firm of Vincent, Nolte & Co. having attached a brig belonging to the plaintiff, for a debt alleged by them to be due from said plaintiff, and which brig was consigned to the defendants, they the said defendants became security for the complainant on the said attachment, and the same having been ultimately decided against the complainant,…

The facts of this case are stated, in part, in the preceding equity case; and in the opinion of the court, delivered by Mr Justice Story. The defendants in error, citizens.of Louisiana, and merchants of New Orleans, instituted a suit in the circuit court against Hugh Boyle of Baltimore, for the amount which they had been obliged to pay as his securities in an attachment against his property at New Orleans. The action was brought on the 23d December 1819.

This was an ejectment in the circuit court of Ohio, instituted by the defendants in error for the recovery of a tract of land situated in the Virginia military district in the state of Ohio. The title of the plaintiff’s lessor was derived from a patent issued by the United Stales, dated the 1st day of December 1824, for the premises in controversy; of which the defendants were in possession.

Josiah C. Parker, the defendant in error, filed a bill in the court of common pleas of Brown county, in the state of Ohio, praying for an injunction; and that Cadwallader Wallace, the defendant in error, should be compelled to release his legal title to one thousand acres of land in the Virginia military district in the state of Ohio, which Josiah Parker, the grand father of the complainant, had entered, on or about the 12th of of January 1788, on part of a Virginia military…

THIS was an appeal from the superior court of the eastern district of Florida.

Held: that this was equivalent to an averment that the defendant is a citizen of the state of Louisiana. A citizen of the United States, residing in any state of the union, is a citizen of that state.

This was an action of ejectment in the district court of Missouri, brought by Daniel F. Strother of Kentucky, against John B. C. Lucas of Missouri, to recover a tract of .land, particularly described in the declaration, containing eighty arpens, adjoining the city of St Louis.

MR JONES, of counsel for the demandant in the above named cases, moved the court for a rule to be granted, to be served on the district judge of the district court of the United Slates for the northern district of Now York, commanding him to be and. appear before this court, either in person or by an attorney of this court on the first day of the next January term of this court, to wit, on the second Monday of January, anno domini 1833, to show cause, if any behave, why a…

<p>'After a- writ of error had been taken out to this court, in an indictment found and tried in the circuit court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, a nolle prosequi wa3 entered in that court, by order of the president of. the United States, and a copy of the same having been filed in the office of the clerk of the supreme court, the court, on motion of the attorney-general, dismissed the cause.</p>

<p>The transcript of the record showed that'no appeal-bond was taken or approved by the'judge who signed the citation in the cause.. The appeal was dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal dismissed; the appellees having failed to lodge a transcript of the recoru of the cause with the clerk of the court, agreeably to the rules of the court, and the appeal-bond and security not having been given.</p>