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← 31 Wash. App. 745 - State v. Montgomery

31 Wash. App. 745 - State v. Montgomery’s Empirical Analysis

1982

Citation profile

11
cited by 11 later decisions
1
states following
July 1999
most recently cited

11 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Terry v. Ohio · United States v. Brignoni-Ponce · Cantwell v. State of Connecticut · Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire · Brown v. Texas

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Fighting words" have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is addressed." . . . The test is what a man of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. . . . Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace. (Italics ours.) Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra at 573; Gooding v. Wilson, [ 405 U.S. 518, 523 , 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 , 92 S. Ct. 1103 (1972)]. Justice Powell, concurring in Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 , 39 L. Ed. 2d 214 , 94 S. Ct. 970, 973 (1974), noted: [W]ords may or may not be "fighting words," depending upon the circumstances of their utterance. . . . The words may well have conveyed anger and frustration without provoking a violent reaction from the officer. . . . [However] a properly trained officer may reasonably be expected to "exercise a higher degree of restraint" than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to "fighting words."”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “In sum, the words used by the defendant are protected even though they may not be acceptable in certain strata of society. It is the degree of loudness, and the circumstances in which they are uttered, which takes them out of the constitutionally protected area. Indeed, his conduct would have been equally disorderly had he merely recited "Mary Had a Little Lamb" in the same tone and under similar circumstances. We hold that mere words, used as a tool of communication, are constitutionally protected. The protection fails only when 1) by the manner of their use, the words invade the right of others to pursue their lawful activities, or 2) by their very utterance, they inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Limited by this construction, we hold the statute constitutional.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “i.e., words whose very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. State v. Montgomery, 31 Wn. App. 745, 754 , 644 P.2d 747 (1982); Kennewick v. Keller, 11 Wn. App. 777, 785 , 525 P.2d 267 (1974); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 , 86 L. Ed. 1031 , 62 S. Ct. 766 (1942). Such speech”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.