In re Sealed Case’s Empirical Analysis
310 F.3d 717 · 2002
Citation profile
27 federal appellate · 8 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 50 later decisions — most recently May 2025 · most notably United States v. Hammoud (2004), United States v. El-Mezain (2011)
27 federal appellate · 8 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (§ 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) · 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (§ 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) · 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (§ 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) · 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (§ 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) · 50 U.S.C. § 1806 (§ 106 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978) · 50 U.S.C. § 1808 (§ 108 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978)
Relies on Whren v. United States · Mistretta v. United States · Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco · See v. City of Seattle · United States v. Martinez-Fuerte
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[FISA] authorizes a judge on the FISA court to grant an application for an order approving electronic surveillance to “obtain foreign intelligence information” if “there is probable cause to believe that ... the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,” and that “each of the facilities or places at which the surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.””
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“(1) specific procedures adopted by the Attorney General that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance or search, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information; (2) procedures that require that non-publicly available information, which is not foreign intelligence information, shall not be disseminated in a manner that identifies any United States person, without such person’s consent, unless such person’s identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance; (3) notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), procedures that allow for the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which has been, is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[I]n today’s world things are not so simple. In many cases, surveillance will have two key goals-—-the gathering of foreign intelligence, and the gathering of evidence for a criminal prosecution. Determining which purpose is the “primary” purpose of the investigation can be difficult, and will only become more so as we coordinate our intelligence and law enforcement efforts in the war against terror. Rather than forcing law enforcement to decide which purpose is primary ... this bill strikes a new balance. It will now require that a "significant” purpose of the investigation must be foreign intelligence gathering to proceed with surveillance under FISA. The effect of this provision will be to make it easier for law enforcement to obtain a FISA search or surveillance warrant for those cases where the subject of the surveillance is both a potential source of valuable intelligence and the potential target of a criminal prosecution. Many of the individuals involved in supporting the September 11 attacks may well fall into both of those categories.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.