Volume 310 — Minnesota Reports

<bold>Criminal law — murder trial — admissibility — admission made</bold> <bold>during course of kidnapping</bold>. <block_quote> 1. Evidence of an admission of murder made by defendant during the course of a kidnapping was properly admitted in a murder trial even though this evidence also indicated defendant's participation in the crime of kidnapping.</block_quote> <bold>Same — trial — admission of evidence of prior crime —</bold> <bold>effect</bold>. <block_quote> 2. Although the trial court erred by admitting in the murder trial evidence of defendant's participation in an armed robbery,<page_number>Page 89</page_number> this error was not prejudicial in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — dental of motion for continuance or</bold> <bold>sequestration of jury</bold>. <block_quote> 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motions for a continuance or for a sequestration of the jury because of alleged prejudicial pretrial publicity contained in two magazine articles.</block_quote>

<bold>Subrogation — settlement by tortfeasor and his insurer with</bold> <bold>injured person — right of latter's insurer to recover</bold> <bold>medical payments</bold>. <block_quote> Where a tortfeasor and his liability insurer willfully disregard notice of the subrogation claim of the injured person's insurer for medical payments made to the injured person, and enter into a separate settlement with the injured person, such a settlement does not defeat his insurer's subrogation rights against the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's liability insurer.</block_quote>

<bold>Dissolution of marriage — custody of children — order</bold> <bold>awarding custody to mother — propriety</bold>.

<bold>Contracts — construction of agreement — duration</bold>. <block_quote> 1. The agreement of the parties made August 21, 1973, was an <italic>option</italic> to purchase and not a <italic>contract</italic> to purchase, and thus expired by its own terms.</block_quote> <bold>Same — claimed agreement to extend option — inability to</bold> <bold>exercise</bold>. <block_quote> 2. Though appellant claims an oral agreement to extend the August 21, 1973, agreement to January 15, 1974, was made, he could not fulfill the terms of the option in any event on January 15, 1974, because he did not have the purchase funds available on that date.</block_quote> <bold>Judgments — summary judgment — propriety</bold>. <block_quote> 3. The facts were not in dispute in this case and the decision of the trial court was made on questions of law only, so summary judgment was the proper remedy in this case.</block_quote><page_number>Page 257</page_number>

<bold>Ordinances — ordinance requiring paving of "parking area" —</bold> <bold>constitutionality</bold>. <block_quote> 1. The term "parking area" is sufficiently definite to comply with constitutional standards. The trial court properly found that the lots of defendant Larson Transfer and Storage, Inc., were in fact parking areas and within the purview of Bloomington City Code, § <cross_reference>10.01</cross_reference>.</block_quote> <bold>Same — same — same</bold>. <block_quote> 2. Bloomington City Code, § <cross_reference>10.01</cross_reference>, requiring the paving of off-street parking areas, is not an arbitrary or unreasonable restriction on the use of private property.</block_quote> <bold>Same — claimed discrimination in enforcement</bold>. <block_quote> 3. The city of Bloomington did not discriminatorily enforce the ordinance against defendant Larson. The mere fact that the city<page_number>Page 296</page_number> has not yet specifically enforced the ordinance against all potential violators is not sufficient to establish discriminatory enforcement.</block_quote> <bold>Zoning — failure to comply with conditions attached to</bold> <bold>conditional-use permit — criminal prosecution — propriety</bold>. <block_quote> 4. Under the facts of this case, the city of Bloomington may not initiate a criminal prosecution against defendant Allstate Leasing Corp. for its alleged failure to comply with particular conditions attached to its conditional use permit.</block_quote>

<bold>Highway traffic regulation — implied-consent law — revocation</bold> <bold>of license for refusal of chemical test — propriety</bold>.

<bold>Contract for deed — vendee's interest — finding of</bold> <bold>abandonment — sufficiency of evidence</bold>. <block_quote> The facts as found by the referee and approved by the district court adequately support the conclusion that defendants abandoned their interest under a contract for deed.</block_quote>

<bold>Trial — special verdict — propriety — claimed spectator</bold> <bold>misconduct — refusal to give requested instructions —</bold> <bold>effect</bold>. <block_quote> In plaintiff's action against a manufacturer for personal injury damages sustained while operating a corn grinder, the jury by special verdict found the manufacturer not liable upon alleged theories of negligence and strict liability and also found that plaintiff assumed the risk of injury. We hold the trial court was justified in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial as (1) the jury's assessment of inadequate damages was not perverse to its findings of no liability of the manufacturer; (2) no prejudice was established from alleged spectator misconduct; and (3) the court's refusal to instruct the jury as to plaintiff's alternate theories of breach of express and implied warranty was not prejudicial error.</block_quote><page_number>Page 472</page_number> <bold>Judgments — action against employer for negligence — finding</bold> <bold>in former salt of assumption of risk — effect</bold>. <block_quote> In a subsequent suit by plaintiff against his employer alleging negligence, which action was consolidated for consideration on this appeal, we hold the trial court acted properly in granting summary judgment for the employer upon the ground the jury's finding of assumption of risk in plaintiff's initial action against the manufacturer constituted an estoppel by verdict.</block_quote>